The 3 unknown factors after Berlusconi's manoeuvre

Will Silvio Berlusconi be able to manage with his government and with his majority the maneuver that makes his heart bleed and which he had to launch almost on the dictation of the European bodies? To achieve this, our prime minister should be able to hold the majority in his grip, to be able to dialogue with the opposition and above all to be a credible interlocutor for Europe and for the ECB in particular. In short, there are three political boulders blocking the path of Berlusconi and the government, which would like to last until the end of the legislature.
 On the first point, the holding of the majority, the final days of preparation of the decree speak for themselves: relations with the Minister of the Economy are increasingly precarious, the League has shown that it often and vaguely goes on its own, tensions in the PDL are strong and within minutes of the Council of Ministers meeting, Minister Galan even put forward the hypothesis of not voting on the maneuver in Parliament. It's hard to think that Scilipoti's granite and faithful support is enough to act as the glue for a breakfast in obvious trouble. As for the second point, the dialogue with the opposition, the impression is that the prime minister aims to divide it rather than dialogue with it, to seek an improbable recovery in the centre. Finally there are relations with Europe and with the ECB, the so-called commissioners.
 Here it should be remembered that Berlusconi had always denied that the conditions of the Italian economy required external intervention. In short, while the house was burning, rather than call the firemen, he preferred to deny that the house was burning. And so the firefighters (ECB and so on) intervened on their own initiative. Except that at that point fire extinguishers and hydrants weren't enough anymore, you needed the hatchet. And here is the tears and blood maneuver that disturbs our prime minister to the point of making his heart bleed. With these precedents, it is difficult to think of Berlusconi as a "reference statesman" (the definition is by Stefano Folli in "Il sole 24 ore").
 And then: either the lessons of things will be able to impose an authentic metamorphosis on our premier too, first of all in terms of style, or we will just have to conclude, as Giovanni Spadolini did in his articles, before dedicating himself to politics, that perhaps “the worst is yet to begin”.