This week the Britain celebrates ten years since the referendum su Brexit, but also the resignation of the sixth Prime Minister since the same date. Many observers speak of a Britain that has become "Italian," or at least of a Brexit that would paradoxically make the country more "European." There's some truth to this. Those who, like this writer, lived through the years of Britain's presence within European institutions remember a difficult country, often obstructionist, but always predictable and understandable, regardless of the governing party.
This, in contradiction to the less predictable and often more confusing way of policy making in many other member countries, including the Germany and of course theItalyToday, however, I challenge anyone to predict with any certainty the broad lines of British policy, both domestic and foreign, in the coming years. Brexit has certainly played a role in this less than brilliant evolution, but the underlying reason is that difficult transition that all liberal democracies go throughEveryone will have to try to cure the disease in their own homes. The collective problem that concerns all of us Europeans is how to heal the consequences of a nasty divorce that has hurt everyone.
The first phase was the negotiation of the Brexit terms, which lasted almost five years. It's hard to imagine a more asymmetrical confrontation. In Great Britain, the referendum was won on the basis of lies and an appeal to emotions, which in reality translated into a collective demonstration against the ruling elites. Something not dissimilar to the phenomenon that later led to Maga e Trump in power in America. The result was that the referendum winners arrived at the negotiating table without any concrete strategy for achieving their objectives. The only possible course of action was to proclaim the limits of their regained full sovereignty as insurmountable: Brexit means Brexit.
The strategy of the 27, however, was different. Aware of the objective disproportion of forces in their favor, the "Europeans" were guided by the primary concern of avoiding contagion at all costs. To this end, no concessions were possible to the demands of the reprobate traitor. No compromise could touch the sacredness of the European rules that Great Britain had decided to evade..
The final result was a complete victory for the 27-member position, but above all for the strategic objective that the European institutions had set themselves. In fact, any desire to imitate disappeared: the end of attempts to Frexit or ItalexitEven the most ardent sovereignists have adopted the policy of "changing Europe from within". Not only that. None of the countries traditionally close to British positions, such as theNetherlands, the Nordic countries, or some Eastern countries made the slightest attempt to soften the tough negotiating position decided in Brussels.
In the meantime, the world has changed for everyone. It has changed visibly for Great Britain, which quickly discovered that none of the Brexit promises had any serious basis and that the effects of the divorce were resulting in a visible loss of growth and well-being. Given the disproportionate forces at play, it was only natural that the negative effects of Brexit would manifest themselves first and more forcefully for Great Britain. It should therefore be no surprise that the country has undertaken a soul-searching over its mistake, to the point of questioning, as many polls show, the validity of the referendum result. The behavior of other Europeans, however, has been different. The negotiations had proven us right, the traitor had been punished, and no one had any desire to imitate him; we could therefore leave him to stew in his own juice and move on to other matters.
In reality, there was no shortage of issues to address: the challenging climate transition, the growing loss of competitiveness and innovative capacity compared to the United States and China, and, above all, the profound transformation of global balances, marked by Russian aggression in Ukraine and the progressive disengagement of the United States from Europe, made even more evident by Trump's hostile stance. All these challenges require a rethinking of the nature and functioning of the European Union. However, we have discovered that they affect Great Britain in very similar ways and that, in some respects, it would be difficult to address them without a solid relationship with London.
Just think of a few examples. Helping Ukraine defend its sovereignty and building greater strategic autonomy in defense, the so-called "European pillar of NATO," would become much more difficult without the United Kingdom's participation. Even responding to the challenge of competitiveness, at the heart of the Draghi and Letta relationship, requires strong collaboration with the country that hosts some of the most dynamic innovation centers on the continentFinally, everyone agrees that a modern and efficient capital market must be an essential part of the European response. And while Brexit has led to some relocation of activity from London to some European hubs, the City remains by far the most liquid, dynamic, and efficient financial market available to Europeans. A broad range of common interests thus emerges. These convergences have since been consolidated by certain aspects of the evolution of American policy in the Middle East.
It has therefore gradually grown, on both sides of the Channel, awareness of the mutual interest in opening a new phase in relationsThis prospect has become more concrete with the end of the last Conservative government in Great Britain. The question is how to proceed, and the difficulty is confirmed by the limited progress made since the new Labour government came to power. The reason is that the two negotiators, despite being motivated by good will, remain trapped within the "red lines" drawn after the referendum. On the British side, the crux is clear: the categorical refusal to accept any return, even partial, to the jurisdiction of Brussels rules.
The European position is more complex. Since the negotiation was won in the name of the sacredness of those rules, today it is not considered possible to make concessions on this point.At most, one can imagine a situation for Great Britain similar to that of Norway or Switzerland, which entails automatic alignment with the rules decided in Brussels. This intransigence is also fueled by a certain desire for revenge. According to some, numerous in Gaullist France and beyond, Great Britain should pay not only for Brexit, but also for the obstructionism it exercised during the long years of its participation in the common project. In essence, it should come to Canossa.
This attitude has some justification, but it is largely exaggeratedA clearer look back shows that in many areas—from international trade to the construction of the integrated market—the United Kingdom's contribution has been very positive. Moreover, this obstructionism is sometimes invoked as a pretext to hide difficulties that have other origins, especially the fragility of the common will of Europeans. When we truly wanted it, we have overcome it: in the introduction of majority voting for matters relating to the single market, the euro, and Schengen, all choices made despite British opposition.
The problem is that Great Britain is neither Norway nor Switzerland and that it's difficult to unblock the situation without also calling into question Europe's "red lines." It's no coincidence, after all, that the area where the best results are being achieved is defense and security; areas not affected by European rules. Some blame the slow progress on a lack of ambition. Essentially, relying on polls indicating a strong shift in British opinion, we should explicitly raise the issue of a return to the EU.
It would be a serious mistake that could lead to very negative outcomes for everyone. If the main motivation for Brexit was a question of identity, nothing that is happening tells us that the issue has been resolvedThe mistake that must not be repeated is the one that led to the defeat in the referendum of those who defended the need to remain in the EU with the argument that "leaving is worse." Moreover, the European Union, faced with new existential challenges, is also going through an identity crisis. Under these conditions, it would be impossible to accept Britain's return to the EU under the same conditions that existed before Brexit, for example, regarding the euro.
The path forward is to pragmatically address the most pressing concrete issues of common interest: defense, security, relations with the United States, innovation—including artificial intelligence—and finance; all areas crucial to a qualitative leap for Europe. To achieve this, both sides will have to soften their red lines.On the European side, without imposing constraints on their respective sovereignties, this should translate into a willingness to discuss the new rules with Great Britain before their final adoption. Basing this convergence on concrete interests would also allow the new relationship between Europe and the United Kingdom to be oriented toward building the future, rather than addressing the problems of the past.
Of course, no one can predict what the future political balance in Britain will be, nor what the priorities of the likely new Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, will be in the coming months. However, common sense suggests that there is still enough time to make progress which, once achieved, would be difficult to dismantle. It's still worth a try.
