La war in Ukraine will it be as long as the one in Syria? Kiev will do the end of Sarajevo? Why doesn't NATO intervene? Must concessions be made to Putin to get out of the war? And if so, wouldn't that be a serious precedent? These are the questions that FIRSTonline asked Alessandro Politi, director of the NATO Defense College Foundation, the only one think tanks non-governmental organization that bears the name of the military Alliance in its very title.
The Foundation is an NGO born in Rome in 2011, ten years after the attack on the Twin Towers, inspired by the top management of the NATO Defense College (an agency founded in 1951) and by the president Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, an expert Italian diplomat , former Deputy Secretary General and interim Secretary General of the Alliance. As the main purpose (and what purpose), the NDCF has that of elevate the political and strategic debate in the 70 allied countries and partners starting with Italy. It also studies strategic trends to help those who prepare and take decisions in an agile and compact format.
Director Alessandro Politi has been a geopolitical analysis professional for thirty years, which in the imagination sometimes resembles the work of a chess player and sometimes resembles Dr. Ryan in the hunt for the Red October submarine. The reality is less adventurous and more fascinating as the work done with four defense ministers and other decision makers shows live. He teaches the subjects of geopolitics and intelligence at Sioi, a well-known school of diplomacy, and in times of hot crisis he is also professionally requested for evaluations by managing directors and high-level consultancy firms.
Let's start with the ground. Some argue that the schedule is being followed to the letter by the Russian military; and who instead says that it got bogged down because Putin thought he could close the matter in a few days. What does she think?
“It is possible that the Russians misjudged the resistance of the Ukrainian people. But in my view the Russians are conducting an unspectacular but very methodical advance. It's like the strangulation of a python, it happens slowly. The most serious thing is happening in the south of the country: if the Russians take Odessa they will have completely cut off Ukraine from the sea and can draw a continuous line that goes from the Donbass to Transnistria, that piece of Moldova which proclaimed itself independent in 1990 and was occupied by Russian troops. It's clear that it doesn't matter how many cities are conquered, it's not the Risk; what matters is the political outcome vis-à-vis the Ukrainian government to force it to negotiate. It's actually a race against time: the Russians know they don't have a lot of it, otherwise they wouldn't have even started this war, and the Ukrainians, as long as they resist, earn it, even if at the cost of heavy losses from the point of view of human lives and destruction of the country. But I wonder if the Russians are changing their plans at this point. That is, I wonder if they are not adjusting the victory criteria compared to what they can realistically achieve ”.
And what can they realistically achieve?
“From this government they can realistically get Ukraine to remain neutral. Provided, however, that this government does not fall due to street protests. Because now Zelensky is a hero, but if he goes on to say: 'forget guys about joining NATO', it is not improbable that at least some political sectors will treat him as a traitor."
Couldn't Europe's promise to let Ukraine join the EU help him?
“Those who promised Kiev's entry into the European Union sold the bear's skin before getting it. It takes no less than ten years to be accepted as a member of the EU. And Ukraine unfortunately at the moment does not have the slightest condition to enter it. It was a promise, to be very diplomatic, an incautious one. How can one promise Ukrainian accession to the EU if all the Balkans have not yet joined? I remember about it sketch of the former comic actor Zelensky who played the figure of the president on the screen before becoming one. Phone call: it's Merkel. 'Congratulations', she says, 'you are about to enter Europe'. 'Thank you thank you,' replies the then fake president. And Merkel immediately after: 'ah, excuse me, I'm very sorry, I got confused with Montenegro'. Brutal, but very effective, because it also makes us understand the thinking of various European chancelleries. And we forget that Turkey has been waiting for 40 years? And here it is not a question of Muslims or Christians, it is a question of the state".
Back to wartime: should we expect a Syrian perspective? Or a Sarajevo-type siege?
“I recently gave the answer to a company manager who asked me: 'but how long will this matter last?' Serious question, serious answer. If it doesn't close by the end of the month, it will become a long affair. From experience I make a rough estimate: if the conflict is not stifled soon, the dynamics of war will prevail over those of diplomacy. From the point of view of reducing political tension, if the humanitarian corridors fail, it is a humanitarian tragedy and a negative signal, but of little political value. In Syria many humanitarian corridors have been created simply to empty the cities and storm them without too many civilians in the middle.”
There is talk of mediators: of Merkel, of the Chinese president Xi. What do you think?
“First of all, it is not at all true that a mediator is needed to reach an agreement, it is the two parties in the field that should find a solution, the Russians and the Ukrainians. If we then want to rely on a third party, then we need to be clear. First: the mediator is not one better than others, mediation is not a 'willing good'. The mediator must be the strongest of all, the most esteemed of all. And speaking of Merkel, he is an extraordinary person for the qualities he has, but for Putin these qualities are no longer enough for the simple reason that he is no longer the German chancellor. This is why she herself was very careful not to intervene in the debate: she is well aware that she no longer has any power. This is the reality. Putin can only negotiate with Biden. At most with Zelensky, but if he gives him what he wants."
And so we also eliminate Xi?
“The Chinese president is already doing what he has to do, not for the sake of peace, but for the national interest. All this disorder in Ukraine creates problems for Chinese projection in Europe. They signed an important document with Moscow highlighting their friendship. And above all it outlines an alternative globalization to the current one: 'The Est versus the Rest'; i.e. the East versus the Rest of the World. So no more 'The West and the Rest', the West and the Rest of the world. In short, the Russians and the Chinese argue: economic globalization is fine, but the world must be multipolar and the rules must be written by several hands. The Ukrainian war also blocks the development of their Silk Road. It doesn't go through Ukraine, it's true, but it still breaks the picture."
And therefore only Biden can talk to Putin effectively.
"Absolutely yes. If Zelensky gets to it himself, all the better. Hoping that he will not be overthrown by discontent ”.
We come to NATO: why doesn't it intervene as it did in the former Yugoslavia?
“Let's start with the fundamentals. NATO is a defensive alliance. It was born to defend itself from the Soviet Union, even before the Warsaw Pact. We persist in calling this war cold, which was such only for us lucky few, those protected by the umbrella of nuclear terror. It was not at all for many peoples on at least three continents. Then when the Soviets repressed East Germans, Hungarians, Czechoslovakians and Poles, no help from NATO was expected. Demonstrations of solidarity as many as you wanted, when Russian tanks entered Prague or Budapest, but no intervention because those countries were under the aegis of the Warsaw Pact. In the meantime, we intervened in Kosovo because the cold war was over and therefore certain things were more feasible; and we intervened, anticipating a vote by the UN Security Council, which then arrived. In any case, NATO cannot intervene without the consent of all its Allies. And last but not least: one thing was Serbia, now isolated even from the Russians; one thing is Russia. Serbia is small, Russia is big, plus it has nuclear weapons. It is no coincidence that Putin refers to nuclear power: it is a clear warning to those with ears to hear: 'Be careful, you are dealing with a power of rank, not with just any country'.”
Who is Putin?
“Many things can be said about Putin. And perhaps he cares little what is said about him. And also to the Russians. But one thing is certain: that he has given himself a mission, that of rebuilding Russia as a world power. It is an understandable goal for any great power and explainable not only for Putin's obsession with Peter the Great, but for the 8th of September that the Russians experienced when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. And I can ensure that this kind of humiliation was visible in Moscow at that time: I have seen soldiers ask for cigarettes in front of the Defense Ministry, a sentry never does that. The internal confusion was identical to what we experienced when we had the Germans at home. Putin is a man of force structures, one of the syloviki, as the Russians say. He has reverted from fourth-rate secret agent to president of a world power. And he did all this not only because of his ambition, which is undoubtedly great, but also because Russia must be respected, powerful and with a group of countries to protect it. Countries to be made neutral include Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia. Putin's tragedy is that his conception of power goes back almost two centuries. I say this because he could have achieved the same results with a little more time and patience. This haste is a sign of weakness. We don't know why, if it's health, age… we don't know a number of things. But this rush of action indicates that he feels that time is not on his side. He has achieved one result: he has rebuilt power outside the country, but Russia has the GDP of the Benelux. It doesn't seem like a great result to me. This is the tragedy of Putin as a statesman, perhaps the tragedy of Russia. Not even Peter the Great, of whom Putin has a huge portrait in his studio, despite being the great reformer we know, managed to improve the conditions of his people quickly. Because – we Westerners know it well – the political action of a single man or woman in command is not enough to have much impact on reality in the short term and sometimes not even in the long term”.
Could we Westerners have done something different when the USSR fell?
"I am sure. We have done nothing to support that short period which followed the fall of communism and which I like to call the Little Weimar Republic in Russia. If we had done that, maybe we wouldn't be facing Putin today."
Let's come to the ways out: is every yielding to Putin a sign of weakness?
“ It is correct reasoning, but partial. Why do we all think of Munich when, in 1938, to defend peace, France and Great Britain, with Daladier and Chamberlain on one side and Mussolini and Hitler on the other, signed an agreement which led to the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany , a piece of Czechoslovakia inhabited by Germans. Historical comparisons, however, must be put into context. The Munich Treaty, contrary to the best-known vulgates, was not a letdown by democratic countries, which in doing so thought they had satisfied Hitler and avoided war. It was based on three convictions: the first was that the peace of Versailles had been a real crap, written by ultra-nationalists; the second was that, if England entered the war, she would disappear from the Pacific, a prediction that surgically came true in '41; the third was that time had to be taken to rearm. There is also a fourth, which is omitted by British historians: hatred of the Soviet revolutionary experience. It was hoped that Hitler would kill Stalin. We know how it went. And so back to us: even if we were warmongers, and many of us are just armchair warmongers, we are not ready for a war with Russia. NATO has a much higher military potential than Russia, thanks to the Americans of course. But the way this potential is deployed right now, it exposes us to defeat, at least initially. Apart from that we should train our forces much more; apart from that we have to equip them seriously; we must then get these forces to the front and from Spain to the border with Poland the journey is long.”
And so?
“And therefore we must hope that Zelensky will find the right formula together with Putin. because these things are done in twos; for the conflict to stop; and that with patience, over time, the distortions that will be further imposed by the negotiation will be corrected. Because the occupation of Crimea remains illegal. And it is so true that Putin is asking for its legalization.”
That's what the Minsk Protocol was for…
“With Minsk we wanted to resolve the issue of Donbass. And here the Ukrainians have not thought at all of the Italian lesson of Alto Adige or of Kosovo. In Kosovo it is not that the Kosovars have not accepted important Serbian presences, but they have patiently negotiated and gradually resolved them. Ukrainians do not yet have this sensitivity. That does not concern only the Ukrainians. In this regard, I point out that we Italians speak very little, we do not advertise what we do well. Hardly anyone knows the lesson of South Tyrol, for example”.
Let's come to Europe, to the European defense that should be born sooner or later.
“It has been talked about for 30 years. I note that since 2005 we have combat groups already available that have never been deployed in all this time. Not even in the Sahel. If the Europeans want to be serious let them send one to the borders of Romania. The American opposition is gone today. They say: do, just do something. But it doesn't. As a convinced pro-European I say that we are not there”.
What about NATO? How should it be in the future?
“NATO is a structure that exists and is solid, but the whole discussion about how to make it more political is not hot air. Because if there is no political attention within the Alliance, things get bureaucratised. In Madrid next June we will have the text of NATO's new strategic concept, after ten years of one that was the result of good work. We will understand the new guidelines. In the meantime, however, we have an ally like the USA which has its head elsewhere; first at his home and then in the Pacific. It will be seen in that document whether the American ally has contributed and how to indicate the new route. And we will also understand where the Western world is headed and how it wants to get there”.
