The sacrosanct debate on the costs of Italian politics has found broad consensus on at least one point: the maximum number (two is the most popular) of legislatures allowed to each elected MP, or nominated by a few. Instead, nothing is said about how many times the prime minister himself (if anything, the one who appoints the parliamentarians) can lead a government not only in the event of its success, but also in the event of disasters committed against the country. It is no coincidence that the head of the most powerful government in the world (the US one) cannot exceed two terms for a maximum of eight years. In Italy we know government men who have governed for a number of years multiple of those granted to the president of the United States. And many aspire to imitate them.
The proposal so widely shared by the leaders of the parties and by potential men of government should therefore be overturned especially when there is the hope of strengthening the power of the prime minister over parliament. If this were to happen, then it would be appropriate to place a limit on the number of premierships and no limit on the number of legislatures allowed to a single lamenter. Doing so would allow, as in the US Senate and Congress, the presence of authoritative parliamentarians to scrutinize government acts.
Instead, I see in the proposal to limit the number of mandates the devaluation of the function of the parliamentarian, as if this were only that of supporting the prime minister and therefore their rotation as quickly as possible is welcome. If then the overwhelming power (if anything with an artfully modified Porcellum) of the party secretariats in the appointment of parliamentarians were maintained, these would become simple pawns to be moved at the most opportune moments. A Parliament of yes men. Learning the job of parliamentarian (obviously for those who want to do it) is not easy, especially for those who intend to exercise the function of not only political but also technical control over government acts.
In any case, the parliamentarian responds directly to the voters, the man of government responds mainly through consent to the use of the power exercised. Power therefore tends to personalize itself and to lapse into populism. It is also known that around the men who manage the powers of government there are crowds of other loyal or rogue men who weave personal relationships to maintain over time. If Italian capitalism is defined negatively as a relational capitalism, even long-term government men give life to relational politics not controlled by occasional and rotating parliamentarians.
