In the first quarter of 2026 the Stellantis plant in Cassino ha worked just seventeen days e produced approximately 2.500 carsIt's a number that captures the depth of the crisis better than any statement. For decades, that plant was one of the industrial heartlands of the Italian auto industry, capable of churning out 135 Alfa Romeo Giulias and Stelvios in 2017. Today, on the same lines, we proceed in fits and starts, between redundancy payments, the Maserati Grecale, models waiting for a future, and an uncertainty weighing on workers, the supply chain, and the region.
It is from this painting that moves the analysis di Marco Bentivogli, published on Italy Post Monday 11 May 2026, which reads the Cassino case not only as a local crisis of Stellantis, but as the possible entry point of the Chinese manufacturers in the Italian automotive sector.
As reported by Bloomberg, Cassino would be among the four European plants that Stellantis is reportedly considering selling or sharing. The names circulating they lead to China. On the one hand D, the group's historic partner in China and on the other Leap motor, a company of which Stellantis already owns 20% and with which it controls 51% of the joint venture for international expansion. two different hypotheses, but they point in the same direction. Where Stellantis retreats, someone else could enter. And on May 21, at Investor Day of Auburn Hills, Michigan, CEO Antonio Filosa will have to start clarifying what Cassino will really be in the group's new industrial plan.
Strategic errors at Alfa and Maserati
La crisis at the Lazio plant It doesn't arise suddenly. It's the result of a long sequence of industrial choices, postponements, and rethinking. The first issue concerns the Giorgio platform, created for the Alfa Romeo Giulia and Stelvio and later also used for the Maserati Grecale. It was an expensive base, certainly, but also a refined one, designed for premium rear- and all-wheel drive models. For a brand like Alfa Romeo, it wasn't just a technical architecture. It was product identity.
The choice of move Alfa to common platforms of the group, in particular Stla Large, was to accompany the electric trajectory of the Dare Forward 2030 plan. But the transition proved to be slower, more unstable and less linear than expected. The electric car market has slowed, new generations have slipped, the Giorgio platform has been sidelined without the alternative being ready to guarantee volumes. The paradox is that now that same platform is extendedThe Giulia and Stelvio are expected to remain in production until 2027, while the Giorgio could continue to exist, also thanks to Euro 7 adaptations and Maserati uses, until 2032. First deemed old, then rediscovered as still necessary.
The weight was also on the failure to hybridize Giulia and Stelvio in a timely mannerIf those models had been updated in time with mild hybrid or plug-in hybrid versions, Cassino would probably have had greater production continuity. Instead, the plant remained stuck between still valid but older models, reduced volumes, and an electric leap that had not yet been achieved. The problem, ultimately, was confusing standardization with strategyShared platforms help cut costs and improve margins, but for premium brands they can become a trap. Alfa Romeo and Maserati don't thrive on industrial efficiency alone. They need a technical, aesthetic, and dynamic reason to be chosen. Giorgio offered that reason. Putting it aside without having a new, equally credible architecture ready has weakened both the product and the plant.
China enters where Europe leaves space
The Cassino case is not isolatedIt is the visible point of a much broader transformation. In Europe the Chinese production capacity begins to move from simple export todirect industrial settlementBYD is preparing mass production in Szeged, Hungary. Chery has converted a former Nissan plant in Barcelona. Leapmotor will assemble the B10 in Zaragoza within the Stellantis perimeter. SAIC is considering a second European location. For years, Chinese cars arrived primarily by sea. Now, however, a new phase is dawning. Joint ventures are being signed, factories are being announced, and production is beginning to enter the continent. This isn't just Chinese aggression. It's also the result of the gaps left by European manufacturers.
Bentivogli reads this dynamic through three industrial precedents. On thesteel Europe has chosen defence, between safeguard measures, duties and Cbam (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, a European regulation that imposes a tax on carbon emissions from high-intensity products imported from non-EU countries), but without solving the structural problem of energy costs and production competitiveness. PV He protested too late, and then effectively withdrew from the field, leaving over 90% of the installed panels to come from Chinese factories. On the carInstead, Brussels and some national governments have attempted a different approach. Not to close down entirely, but to make it more profitable to produce here than simply export.
READ MORE: Stellantis and Ford partner with China to survive in Europe di G. Bruschi
I European duties China's 2024 electric car ban, accompanied by a 2026 floor price agreement, sent a clear message. Anyone who wants to sell in Europe must build at least part of the value in EuropeBut for this approach to work, factories, incentives, competitive energy and governments capable of negotiating are needed. differenceSo, it's not just the tariff. It's the method. On steel, Europe tried to protect. On photovoltaic, it protested when the supply chain was already compromised. On autos, it tried to turn the tariff into a bargaining tool. But leverage only works if someone uses it. And here, the confrontation between European countries becomes decisive.
Spain ahead, Italy behind
This is where the most uncomfortable comparison for Italy emerges. The Spain It moved earlier and better. According to rumors Beijing would have favored the move European Leapmotor production from Poland to Spain also for political reasons, following Italy's vote in favor of EU tariffs on Chinese electric cars and Spain's abstention in October 2024. There is no official confirmation, but the industrial picture remains clear.
Producing in Italy costs moreThe energy impact per vehicle is estimated at around 1.400 euros, compared to around 500 euros in Spain. Madrid can count on a more favorable energy mix, still-operational nuclear power plants, and an incentive policy that has already brought Stellantis over 130 million euros for battery projects.
The result is that Chinese investments in the European automotive sector they went to ZaragozaBarcelona, Szeged. Not Mirafiori, not Pomigliano, not Cassino. Yet Cassino itself could have been a natural setting for a new productive negotiation, if accompanied by clear conditions regarding labor, supply chain, technology, and local content. Bringing Chinese producers to Europe is not in itself a surrenderIt could mean employment, subcontracting, logistics, skills, and industrial transfer. But it could also turn into a simple assembly operation if batteries, software, semiconductors, platforms, and data remain firmly outside of European control.
The question, then, is not whether to open or close the door. It is under what conditions to do itA Chinese investment can become an industrial lever if it brings with it suppliers, research, training, social standards, employment clauses, and local content. Without these conditions, the factory risks becoming a fragile production terminal, useful as long as it's profitable and expendable when economic or geopolitical calculations change.
The real crux is the value chain
The game is not decided only at the factory gate. It is decided on the critical chain That powers the electric car. Batteries, power semiconductors, on-board software, critical materials. That's where the most significant share of value is captured. Who assembles only remains in the most fragile part of the supply chain. From this point of view, the European map does not favor ItalyHungary is strengthening its battery business with CATL in Debrecen, Eve Energy, EcoPro, Samsung SDI, and BYD. Germany has CATL in Thuringia and Volkswagen PowerCo in Salzgitter. Spain has the CATL-Stellantis joint venture in Zaragoza and Volkswagen PowerCo in Sagunto. Italy, however, it has The ACC gigafactory project in Termoli has been lost., definitively cancelled together with the German one in Kaiserslautern.
The risk is that Europe will be satisfied with assembly while the technological heart remains elsewhereIt would be better than a closed factory, but it wouldn't be enough to rebuild industrial sovereignty. A true industrial policy isn't measured solely by the number of cars produced. It's measured by the ability to retain skills, technologies, suppliers, and added value.
The Cassino case reaches the Stellantis Investor Day crossroads on May 21 in Auburn Hills, in Michigan. It will be there that CEO Antonio Filosa will present the new industrial plan and will have to clarify, at least in part, the role of the Italian plants in the group's new phase.
