A few days ago a Swiss banker offered me this metaphor: "It is as if someone were betting on the crash of an airplane, making huge sums of money if the disaster occurs". Metaphor aside, a group of "financial operators" made a bet on the collapse of the euro, obviously indifferent to the possible consequences.
The problem is that this bet is based on objective facts. "It is a drift between continents, like the San Andreas fault, which can trigger earthquakes, the result of changes in economic relations and the related terms of trade". In short, the tumultuous growth of South America and a large part of theAsia it is causing a series of jolts of which so far we have only seen the beginning. That's where the resources, investments and technologies go.
In this framework theEurope it is disunited; L'England has called itself out, the German leadership is uncertain and, for now, unwilling to expose itself, and this for real (why take charge of the deficits of inefficient countries?) and political (elections imminent) reasons. And it's not clear where we're really going to end up with. In any case, it seems to me illusory that the ECB will be able to have the necessary resources to guarantee the debts of European countries in crisis without limit. Draghi has said it several times: the ECB does not have infinite resources and, at a certain point, it must block acquisitions.
In this context, Italy is faced with a dramatic question: can it be sure of finding the support it needs in Europe? Today the answer is negative: in a situation of uncertainty, a good father of a family must think of going on his own feet, if he still has them. And we have them, in the form of patrimonial wealth several times higher than the public debt even if concentrated in a small percentage of the population.
And here we get to the heart of the problem: Italy is subjected to the "blackmail" that the market might not refinance the debt, or refinance it at increasing and unsustainable rates (the expression blackmail is inaccurate - although not entirely unfounded - since the markets do not blackmail but choose where it is best to invest). In addition, in the coming months we have to face maturities for 350 billion euros and the growth in interest rates could burden the public finances by around twenty billion euros per year, or more. The already onerous Christmas maneuver would be nullified. And it is obvious that this could lead to an irreversible screwing.
This scenario is totally regrettable but not entirely impossible; it is widely believed that (Vox populi, Vox Dei):
1) Increasing direct or indirect taxation only covers the gaps in the current management of the state;
2) The political-administrative system will take advantage of the higher revenues to continue to cover waste and inefficiency. Let us not forget that it is, in fact, very powerful;
3) The maneuver favors a strong flow of capital exports above all due to the lack of confidence that it can really go through;
4) The hoped-for relaunch of the country, however correct the government interventions may be, is far from certain and, in any case, will unfold its effects in a long time (2/3 years);
5) In addition, 2012 will be a year of recession, accompanied by inflation.
To overcome the "blackmail" we must therefore act today on public debt. Many have supported the need for an extraordinary balance sheet of 300/400 billion to reduce debt but there is a veto from Berlusconi (actually circumvented by Monti with a light balance sheet, substantially useless in the short term if not to introduce the mechanism, and with L'Imu, the new Icimuch larger and much heavier). I believe that whoever has more should contribute more to overcoming the crisis, but I don't think that capital is the most effective answer.
Instead, I think we need to make a “patrimonial loan”, also of the size of 300/400 billion, which provides that those with assets exceeding, for example, 1 million euros, are required to subscribe to government bonds that are completely similar to the existing ones. The calculation basis is the real estate and financial assets held in Italy and abroad; the loan should be no less than 5% of the asset value. The securities should have a maturity of 10/15 years and could provide for a significant remuneration of 2 or 3%. Thus, instead of paying a property, citizens and businesses "buy" government bonds with the aforementioned characteristics.
Although costly, the maneuver has a number of substantial advantages:
1) The whole action acts on the fundamental node of the debt;
2) The average maturity of the public debt lengthens and the cost stabilizes/contains;
3) Dependence on the potentially lethal and ungovernable international financial markets is reduced;
4) Time is given to implement the maneuvers to relaunch the economy and reduce public spending;
5) In the hypothesis of recovery of the overall framework, the remuneration of 2 or 3% becomes attractive;
6) The internal "allies" for an effective recovery policy are increasing;
7) The widespread perception of throwing resources into a bottomless pit is limited; the perception of impoverishment is contained;
8) Debt interest flows remain in Italy, with positive impacts on the economy;
9) The securities are marketable shortly after issue; those who need liquidity can sell them on the market, obviously resulting in a probable capital loss in the short term;
10) Banks could easily manage the transaction on behalf of citizens and businesses;
11) Even for those who have assets, an operation that affects 5% of the value is preferable but greatly increases the probability of maintaining the value of the assets compared to smaller shares that have a non-existent impact.
Obviously, the solution of the Asset loan should be carefully evaluated in all its implications, for example by remodeling some of the choices already made in particular on theIMU and property tax. Similarly, it would not replace actions on the development and rationalization of spending, the latter remaining absolutely necessary; similarly, an intervention at European level in the terms under discussion today would remain entirely desirable. But it would be that action that "cuts the bull's head" of speculation and gives breath to carry out the process of recovery and relaunch which in any case constitutes the main road.
