Share

Schiavon: "Bank of Italy, out the whole truth about the Veneto banks"

Interview with GIOVANNI SCHIAVON, former president of the Court of Treviso and founder of the Veneto Banca Shareholders' Association - "There are many doubts about the statements of the head of Supervision of the Bank of Italy but the most important point concerns the function of the Central Bank in bank consolidations and the indication of Popolare di Vicenza as aggregating bank" with "Zonin in the role of father and boss"

Schiavon: "Bank of Italy, out the whole truth about the Veneto banks"

What was the real role of the Supervisory and Control Authorities in the face of the bankruptcy of the Veneto banks which ruined thousands and thousands of savers, families and businesses in the North East? The first hearings of the Bank of Italy and Consob before the bicameral commission of inquiry into the Italian banking system did not convince and the American-style confrontation on Thursday 9 November between the head of Supervision of the Bank of Italy, Carmelo Barbagallo, and the Director General of Consob, Angelo Apponi promises sparks. There are many still obscure points but there is above all one at the center of attention: is it true or not that the Bank of Italy's supervisory authorities considered Banca Popolare di Vicenza, despite all the troubles it had, as an unifying bank and allowed to a controversial banker like Gianni Zonin, then boss in Vicenza and now accused by the judiciary, of doing good and bad times? Giovanni Schiavon, a magistrate for over 40 years and former President of the Court of Treviso and founder of the Veneto Banca Shareholders' Association, has raised the bar on this. Here is his point of view in this interview with FIRSTonline.

Doctor Schiavon, you are not new to twists like when you unexpectedly resigned from the presidency of the Court of Treviso and as a magistrate in controversy with the CSM against the bureaucratic and Bourbon management of justice, but now, on the eve of the American confrontation on Thursday 9 November between the head of Supervision of the Bank of Italy, Barbagallo, and the Director General of Consob, Appon, your request to the Rome Public Prosecutor's Office caused a sensation, asking them to evaluate whether there are the conditions for a judicial investigation into false testimony against Barbagallo: why did he do it and what exactly is he contesting against Barbagallo? 

“First of all, I would like to remind you that, in a banking disaster which, in the Veneto region alone, has suddenly pulverized the savings of about 220.000 families and small businesses (but the long wave has not yet arrived), one cannot worry only about institutional moral suasion and the formal independence of the Authorities; it is also necessary to give people a strong signal of protection of savings, according to the provisions of art. 47 of the Constitution. And, therefore, already the confirmation of Visco in the role of governor of Bank of Italy has aroused many perplexities precisely because, during his mandate, serious banking crises emerged almost suddenly, which demonstrated that the system was not all that secure and solid, as we had always been assured (even by Bank of Italy). Savers would have appreciated a sign of change at the top, even if Visco's person was not, per se, in question because no one has ever doubted that he is not a gentleman. It is certainly true that the so-called anti-Visco parliamentary motion was clumsy and improper, but, in balancing the reconfirmation of the governor (who, being head of the Authority, cannot be exempt from responsibility for the operational criticalities of his structure) and the respect of thousands of desperate people, it would have been preferable to think of a replacement and not a reappointment, which has a vague and inappropriate reward flavor.

Why?

The concept must always pass that the head of a structure that has proven not to work cannot tout court opt ​​out. That said, everyone had the impression that the Head of Supervision of Bank of Italy (Dr. Carmelo Barbagallo), in his first hearing, was particularly engaged in fierce self-defense and played an improper role as a speaker in a sort of inauguration of the financial year, in the presence of applauding civil, military and religious authorities, reading his pre-packaged theme in the Research Department. But since his statements seemed, in several points, strongly different from the real occurrence of the events, I thought - and I think - right to remind the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry that the same institutive law (art. 4 paragraph 2 Law 12 July 2017 n 107) expressly provides that the persons summoned by it to report risk, if they lack memory, the indictment for perjury (art. 372 criminal code). It should be remembered that the Commission is not a judicial body and that the persons summoned are not witnesses, in the technical sense. Nonetheless, their eventual criminal liability for perjury is expressly provided for by law no. 107/2017. There are many doubts about the veracity of Barbagallo's statements, on key points of the investigation, but the most important concerns the function of the Central Bank in bank consolidations, with particular reference to the indication of BPVI as aggregating bank”.

On Tuesday 7 November, the newspaper "la Repubblica" reported on a meeting on 27 December 2013 between the top management of the two Veneto banks at the estate of Gianni Zonin in Aquileia after a visit to the Bank of Italy where Barbagallo and his deputy allegedly indicated in the Popolare di Vicenza a "partner of standing" for Veneto Banca: do you think so? 

“The newspapers spoke about this fact at the time and the topic was also the subject of extensive discussion in the shareholders' meeting of Veneto Banca in April 2014. The newspaper articles portrayed Zonin radiant and reported that he had ordered to Consoli to give him the keys to the bank, with the specification that all the members of the Board of Directors of Veneto Banca would have to leave. Knowing now that Barbagallo knew nothing about it and realizing that what everyone, in these three years, has always taken for granted, also because it has never been denied, would not be true, raises many perplexities. Once again, I invite the Commission to carry out precise investigations to verify whether it is not true that Dr. Barbagallo himself had indicated Banca Popolare di Vicenza (to Banca Etruria and Veneto Banca) as an institution of high standing, deserving, as such to play unifying roles. But I don't think these are the only incorrect answers from Barbagallo".

What are the others? Certainly moral suasion is part of the normal activity of the Bank of Italy's Supervisory Department and Barbagallo says that at most one could imagine a merger and not an acquisition of Veneto Banca by Popolare di Vicenza, but it is not a little strange that Via Could Nazionale leverage a much-discussed banker like Zonin? 

“Everyone knew, in Veneto, that Zonin had excellent connections in Bank of Italy, unlike Consoli (Ed. who was the number one of Veneto Banca). And everyone has always been amazed that an Authority so attentive to his image of impartiality allowed Zonin to play the role of master father in the Berici bank. The widespread suspicion was even more consolidated when, in 2014, the European stress tests highlighted the first crunches of the BPVI, which however was enabled, in the Cesarini area, to return to the parameters with the urgent conversion of the bond into capital from 253 million. Someone must have given Zonin an alarm."

In your first hearing before the bicameral commission of inquiry into the banking system, Barbagallo advanced a rain of criticisms of the insane management of the Veneto banks: when you were President of the Court of Treviso, had you never received complaints and complaints to that effect? What did you do with it? 

“Until I held the role of president of the Court of Treviso, Veneto Banca has always enjoyed a good reputation and the trust of savers (myself included) was full. However, I specify that the Public Prosecutor's Office should have been the recipient jurisdictional body of any reports of criminal value. In any case, until 2012, I never had the opportunity to have doubts about the solidity of the bank".

One of the most incredible aspects of malpractice that emerged during the parliamentary hearings on the Veneto banks is that of the so-called "revolving doors" between inspectors from Banking Supervision or Consob and magistrates on one side and Veneto banks on the other: in the Court you were aware of the do you keep changing shirts? 

“The system of the so-called revolving doors can only be referred to the Popolare di Vicenza, not to that of Montebelluna”.

You too were offered assignments by Veneto Banca especially in Romania and Albania: how did you behave?  

“After my retirement I was part of the board of directors of Banca Italo Rumena (of the Veneto Banca Group), for a few months. Some time later, I was indicated by the Appointments Committee of Veneto Banca as a possible recipient of the role of president of the Bank of Albania (also of the Group), but the proposal was not followed up, due to my declared non-availability".

After your resignation as a magistrate, you assumed the presidency of the Veneto Banca Shareholders' Association, which mainly brings together small savers, but, given the bank's disaster, some say that you too have been a little too tender towards the summit of the Montebelluna institute: could more be done? 

“The question would require a very complex answer. I will limit myself to saying that the Association that I helped to set up did the impossible to allow savers-shareholders to get to the bottom of their problems. And I recall that, in the Veneto Banca meeting of 5 May 2016 (on the occasion of which two opposing lists of candidates for the new board of directors were presented, one from the outgoing board and the other suggested by the savers' associations) they surprisingly won the shareholders. As a result, I myself was appointed vice president of the bank. Well, right from the start, the new BoD operated in a climate of clear hostility and all of us (those of the new board, I mean) were convinced that we weren't even free to speak, so much so that, to communicate privately, we often went out to Terrace. Before that meeting, the outgoing CDA (which had been appointed precisely on the proposal of the one to which Consoli and Trinca belonged, in the name of continuity) openly declared that their list (and not ours) had been approved by Bank of Italy and of BCE. No one has ever denied these statements of theirs, even if published in pages that appeared in the major newspapers (obviously, at the bank's expense). Just go and read the newspapers of that time. We were unable to do more for the shareholders, not only because we found ourselves isolated, but also because the Atlante fund intervened immediately afterwards. We had the feeling that the games were long overdue."

What do you expect on Thursday from the American-style confrontation between the Bank of Italy and Consob and more generally from the Parliament's Commission of Inquiry? 

“I have already recently had the opportunity to express my doubts about the real usefulness of the Commission's work, at least because it is clear that it will expire shortly and will not be renewed. But people expect that, for once, at least some segment of the truth will emerge. The blame game we are used to in Italy suggests that everyone will end up blaming only the former top management of the banks. But starting next Thursday, the Commission will have an important opportunity: that of establishing which of the two Authorities (Consob and Bank of Italy) has lied about the mechanism of their direct collaborations. At least this. Citizens are tired of seeing so many blatant lies being propounded in the face of such a huge economic disaster."

Will the real culprits of the collapse of the Veneto banks ultimately pay? And will savers who have lost 15 billion between shares and bonds get some of their money back? 

“The problem is precisely this: who are really responsible for the banking disaster? I have always been convinced that the former leaders, however many mistakes they may have made and however great their management megalomania, cannot be – they alone – responsible for everything. The issue is complex, but there were far greater and more significant causal factors which, at this point, I fear will never emerge. But, at least, some probable co-authors of the disaster should not seek self-beatification. Savers, now abandoned by everyone, will perhaps be able to obtain some economic reparation only at the cost of heavy and difficult civil litigation: and certainly not against the former top management of the two former People's Banks. The savers' associations have done what little they could”.

comments