Having overcome the concern for the electoral outcome in France, the financial markets are now evaluating (it is their job, whether strong or weak powers) the risk of Italy, above all from the point of view of its political stability in anticipation of the outcome of the next elections policies. One wonders whether the electoral return of the German type gives rise to a stable government albeit a coalition, whatever it may be.
Political observers occasionally argue that, due to the effect of the proportional system of the law, the formation of so-called "planks" including senators and deputies of different political visions but united to overcome the 5% threshold and sit in Parliament is to be expected. It is reasonable, he adds, that even within the main alignments that will present themselves in the elections there will be a place, as in the past, for potential parliamentarians who express different political sensitivities on the most diverse issues.
If these are the predictions of political commentators, it is surprising that the debate on electoral reform neglects the potential effects on the stability of future governments allowed by the current parliamentary regulations: therefore not at the time of the vote, but at the next one when the elected will present themselves to their respective chambers .
As we know at that time, each individual elected will have to choose which parliamentary group he intends to join. It is an act imposed by the parliamentary regulations of the Senate and the Chamber. But there is no guarantee that the structure of the parliamentary groups resulting from the most diverse personal options coincides with the parties or with the "planks" that presented themselves in the elections.
Even today, at the end of this legislature, the invoked stability of the government depends crucially not so much on the configuration of the parliamentary groups assumed at the beginning of the legislature, but on the structure that they gradually assumed during the legislature and on the correlated voting behavior of the numerous groups: 10 in the Senate and 12 in the Chamber. Standing out among these is the Mixed Group (33 senators and 51 deputies) which, as documented by the consultations at the Quirinale for the constitution of the Gentiloni government, was in turn fragmented into subgroups contributing to the formation of those 23 groups (some also born by emulation of the split of the atom) who also legitimately express different political positions on the occasion of the various topics on the agenda.
A look at today's parliamentary groups as a whole shows that they are distributed between a minimum of 12 senators and a maximum of 99; from a minimum of 11 to a maximum of 282 deputies, showing also in this case a persistent fragmentation which, even in the foreseeable future, could not guarantee the stability of the executive over time. It should be added that transmigration from one parliamentary group to another is a widespread habit in both chambers. For example, the Democratic Party won 9 senators and 24 deputies during the legislature but lost 16 and 33 respectively. For its part, the 5-star movement lost 19 senators and 21 deputies and won only one senator. Forza Italia lost 52 senators and 52 deputies and won 4 both in the senate and in the chamber (OpenParlamento. http://oopenpolis.it).
It should be recalled that in the face of such migrations from one parliamentary group to another, it has been proposed by some pentastellati to modify article 67 of our Constitution (exercise of the parliamentary function without mandate) to introduce the so-called electoral mandate constraint an imperative which, however, does not adapt to democratic and representative political systems. It is no coincidence that the prohibition of the imperative mandate, which many pentastellati forget, is one of the most important legacies of the French Revolution of 1789, whose subsequent Constitution of 1791 sanctioned the prohibition of the imperative mandate. As far as I know it was only on the occasion of the Paris Commune - which followed the military defeat of France by Prussia - whose provisional government governed Paris from 18 March to 28 May 1871 and introduced precisely the imperative mandate elected as well as having adopted the red flag as their symbol.
It seems to me that it is not an example to imitate, even for those who refer to the thought of the Calvinist Jean Jacques Rousseau who, as is well known, died in 1778 before seeing the French Revolution and perhaps appreciating its democratic legacies.
It would be appropriate for the current Parliament to question itself also about the after elections, the parliamentary regulations and the not impossible migration allowed by the latter, unless you want to follow the admirers of the Paris Commune.
