"Behind the new balance of Italian insurance there are old hands". This is how the Financial Times comments on the "historic" day for Italian policies. Behind the relay at the top of Generali there is the long hand of Mediobanca which undoubtedly played the most important role in the removal of Giovanni Perissinotto and the choice of Mario Greco.
But most of all, there is a lot of Mediobanca behind the extremely troubled Fonsai-Unipol operation. As can also be seen from the final deed of the operation: the guarantee consortium, set up with so much effort and the mirage of fabulous commissions thanks to the commitment of Piazzetta Cuccia, will have to take charge of a third of the Fonsai shares, as well as a quarter approximately of the unopted Unipol. This is not a surprise, given the characteristics of the transaction so strongly dilutive that it seems made on purpose to keep small shareholders away. The real surprise, if anything, is that the market has subscribed 19% of the shares, behind about 37% of Unipol and 7% of Unicredit.
The real surprise lies in the incredible news that emerge, day after day, from the investigation into rigging and obstruction of Consob's activities underway at the Milan Public Prosecutor's Office. Since yesterday, the accusation against Salvatore Ligresti has been shared by none other than Alberto Nagel, CEO of Mediobanca. The plot, now well known, is far more compelling than the romance-finance feuilletons that populate TVs in the afternoon slot. In summary: a few days after the Consob decision on the exemption from the takeover bid for Unipol, the CEO of Mediobanca signs a sheet in which the Ligresti summarize their requests to withdraw in good order. Is it a contract, as claimed by the Sicilian lender? Or a simple acknowledgment by the banker, who has always had relations with Ligresti, his major shareholder? While waiting for the prosecutor Luigi Orsi to advance his investigation, the most picturesque, singular, embarrassing if not disturbing aspect concerns Mediobanca's attitude: first a sharp denial on the very existence of the card, then Nagel's denial of having signed anything . Finally, unmasked by a recording that Lionella Ligresti made against the lawyer Rossello, secretary of the Mediobanca board of directors, an embarrassed admission.
It is on this basis that an illustrious investigation was arrived at, which will produce consequences, beyond the criminal aspects, both on the fate of Fonsai and of the insurance sector. In addition, probably, to the repercussions on Mediobanca itself and the so-called northern galaxy. Let's see how.
1) First of all, Consob could review the decision to exempt Unipol from the takeover bid on Premafin. The choice of the commission, it is known, provided as an essential condition that the Ligresti family did not derive any benefit from the transaction. Now it turns out that, pending the same by Giuseppe Vegas and his associates, Mediobanca was negotiating the conditions of the onerous "surrender" of the Sicilian family.
2) If Vegas retraces its steps, the loser would be Unipol, which claims to be completely unaware of the Nagel/Ligresti negotiations, a circumstance corroborated by the complaints of Ligresti himself who, in his contacts with Mediobanca, complains of not receiving any response from the company meat sauce. It is probable that Unipol will thus be able to escape the trap of the mandatory takeover bid. Administrative acquittal for Mediobanca involved in the consortium is less probable. But, apart from the sanctions, a new situation is being created between Unipol, today a 5,4% shareholder of Mediobanca after joining Fonsai, and the manager Nagel, already under fire for the bank's lackluster results. It is possible that the new shareholder will ask the manager for this "mess". Of course, in the past both Enrico Cuccia and Vincenzo Maranghi did not hesitate, when the interest of the institution required it, to maintain attitudes towards partners and clients that were just as hard and nonchalant as those of Nagel towards the former Ligresti protégés (settled in Fondiaria to avoid conquest by Fiat). But signatures, not just votes, are weighed. That is, what was granted to Cuccia is not the automatic prerogative of the descendants.
3) The messy Fonsai happens on the day of Greco's inauguration at the helm of the Generali Lion. It could have been Mediobanca's pax day on the entire insurance sector, it risks being the launch day of the war of independence of the big companies against a powerful shareholder but, at this point, unable to bear the weight of a challenge alone international which requires capital, above all for Trieste. The risk is that the industrial recovery of Fonsai/Unipol or the strengthening at no cost for the Trieste shareholders will take place to the detriment of consumers, potential victims of the tangle of shareholdings, agreements, syndicate and placement pacts that binds the two groups. For this reason, according to the FT, the government needs to intervene soon in two ways: a) to transfer supervision of the sector from Isvap to the Bank of Italy; b) entrusting via Nazionale the task of providing for Fonsai a governance that sterilizes any direct or indirect influence of Mediobanca, dominus in Trieste.
In short, the Fonsai match risks costing Nagel dearly. For the consolation of the enemy Mateo Arpe who withdrew from the match once and for all.
