FONSAI CASE, SO THE GOOD LIVING ROOM GOES IN FLAMES. NAGEL, UNDER FIRE, ATTACKS WITH A CANNON
“Great is the disorder under the sky, therefore the situation is excellent”. Who knows, if Chairman Mao's saying turns out to be true, the unfortunate Fonsai affair could represent a turning point for the crisis of Italian capitalism. For now, however, only the mess is visible.
The guarantee consortium of the Fonsai operation, headed by Mediobanca and Unicredit, has updated to this morning the decision on the start of the auction of the unexercised rights. Only today will it be known whether the operation will start next Thursday, to be interrupted over the weekend and on August XNUMXth. Or if it will be postponed in the second half of the month, perhaps coinciding with the Premafin meeting convened at the request of the judicial custodian of 20% of the company, seized from Salvatore Ligresti's offshore holding companies. An additional complication for a company that already has the flavor of the almost impossible, also because the quotations on the Stock Exchange float below the offer price (yesterday 0,94 against 1 euro): the unopted amount is around 290 million for Fonsai without taking into account the 140 million relating to savings which will be subscribed as per agreements by Unipol; 370 million are missing from the increase by the Bologna-based company. The consortium's objective is to arrange 10% of the capital to reduce the total commitment to no more than 500 million, half paid by Mediobanca (and a banking pool of junior creditors), half by foreign institutions (Credit Suisse, Ubs, Nomura, Barclays, Deutsche Bank) which, however, will collect super commissions against the commitment.
But financial problems are, at the moment, the least of worries for Mediobanca and, in particular, for CEO Alberto Nagel. The storm stirred up by the "papello" signed with Salvatore Ligresti which cost the manager registration in the register of suspects for obstructing Consob, does not subside. On the contrary. The "Corriere della Sera", of which Mediobanca is an influential shareholder, talks about the risk of a "healing" takeover bid, or the possibility that Consob will review the exemption in favor of Unipol in the light of the backroom agreements (which Nagel continues to deny) with the Ligresti family. Hypothesis remote for now but which risks blowing up the entire operation. In this context, also in the light of the results (the Mediobanca stock is down by 60% since the beginning of the year) the solidarity shown by the "tribe" of the members of the Piazzetta Cuccia pact could crack. Even because in the crosshairs of the Consob investigations there is also the role played by Vincent Bolloré in 2010/11 when the Breton financier attempted to pilot Fonsai towards Groupama, then led by his friend (later defenestrated) Jean Azéma.
In the background, then, the wounds suffered in the tough Fonsai/Unipol pro-wedding campaign continue to burn, starting with the defenestration from Generali of Giovanni Perissinotto, suspected of too much friendship with Palladio's Roberto Meneguzzo and torpedoed for his "non-performing management" , as Nagel explains (whose management, in truth, no longer seems efficient) during a historic interview granted this morning to Repubblica. A sensational gesture, given that, as the interviewer Massimo Giannini appropriately recalls, Enrico Cuccia had to say that "The venial sin of a banker is running away with the cash, while the mortal sin is speaking". But Nagel, who beyond the official certificates of trust, feels the ground slipping under his feet, has broken the rule, revealing, among other things, incurable conflicts within the bank's shareholding structure which will soon have to be addressed and resolved. But not only. In summary:
to) "Since the death of Vincenzo Maranghi onwards, a war of power has been fought and is being fought in Italy – declares Nagel – And it is also true that this war has gone hand in hand with the evolution of politics…”. And again: “Between 2009 and 2010 there was a clear attempt by a group of shareholders and managers to acquire a strong position within the circuit headed by Mediobanca…”. With the explicit support of the Cavaliere, at that time head of a government that had swept the elections, Geronzi and Bollorè "tried to enter the Galaxy as masters" through the bridgehead of the Ligresti family. At that time also with the agreement of Profumo, who at the time headed Unicredit, and - adds Nagel - "in the silence of the supervisory authorities, very compliant at the time".
B) "The turning point is the moment we managed to knock Geronzi out of the game. That was the beginning of an epochal change, for Mediobanca and for Italian finance. For the first time we managers, Renato Pagliaro and I, have re-established the primacy of autonomy and independence. We are the ones who have upset the balance of what you, in the newspapers, called and still call the Good Lounge of the Powers Forti, or of the Powers Rotten…”. And again: “We are the ones who have taken three steps backwards in RCS. It is we, unique in the Italian panorama, who have radically reformed the governance of the Institute, introducing the 65-year limit for managers. We are the ones who, since then, have tried to bring Mediobanca into the modern era, making it an investment bank that thinks from a pure market perspective”.
c) And about Ligresti? “But we Ligresti kicked him out, complete with official letters! And we started doing it already in that autumn of 2010, when we understood that he was dealing with Bollorè and with the French. She came to us, asked for "Room 7" and told us: I have to meet some financial operators. Without even telling us what she was dealing with”.
d) And about Unipol? “You know what? In any other European country, faced with the situation of the Ligresti and Unipol's industrial project, the government would have summoned Carlo Cimbri and said to him: what do you need? We are ready to help you, because yours is a plan that protects the interests of the country. You see, me I'm not in love with the "national champions", but no one can say that the Unipol project on Fonsai doesn't have great strategic and industrial value”. But when he talks about the treatment of minority shareholders, Nagel rediscovers Mediobanca's ancient grit and sentiments: “Damage to small shareholders? But what are we talking about? We will carry out the capital increases, and we and Unicredit will take care of the unopted shares, as it should be. Then it is clear that I have to worry about defending my credit, but do you know why? Because even Mediobanca has its small shareholders to protect! And what is the point of speaking of a "dilutive" capital increase? All recapitalisations are by definition”.
e) There is also some for Palladio/Sator and, dulcis in fundo, for Giovanni Perissinotto. “That of Arpe and Meneguzzo is a pure disturbing action. And as for Perissinotto, the truth is simple: he was retired after so many years because it was agreed in the board of directors that the results of his management were not performing as it is right to expect from a group with the potential of Generali. And this assessment was shared by everyone: even by Pellicioli, Caltagirone and even Bolloré".
Thus spoke Nagel, protagonist of a self-defense from which emerges a conflict, real or presumed, between old and new in Mediobanca which can no longer be removed or postponed to a later date. Without wanting to go into the merits of strong affirmations (ask Diego Della Valle if he considers the version of the "three steps backwards in RCS" authentic or Alessandro Profumo of the accusation of having supported the pro Berlusconi "clique") or wanting to comment on the request of government support for the national champion or the contemptuous judgment of Arpe-Meneguzzo, a disturbing picture of the fragmentation of Italian capitalism emerges, which raises its voice when capital is scarce and it would be necessary, on the contrary, to support the spirit of enterprise. Difficult, after words that have at least the value of clarity, to ignore it.
