Once again the fragile internal political balance undermines the effectiveness of economic policy. It is a sort of damnation that has haunted us since the end of the First Republic and that has compromised the country's capacity for growth for more than twenty years. Indeed, there is no doubt that, in the negotiation of economic measures to deal with the pandemic, requesting that an unidentified European body issue an unidentified Coronabonds instead of discussing the merits of the clauses of "light conditionality" of the Mes (and therefore that it is this body that issues the bonds) reflects the Prime Minister's fear of a destabilizing convergence between the Lega and 5 stars, notoriously hostile to the European Stability Mechanism.
But the effects of this weakness of the premier - which then in turn reflects the lack of cohesion of the majority that supports him - go further the failure to solve the Coronabond problem. There are at least two others that are equally harmful. The first is to focus communication on the need for "Europe to measure up". It is unlikely that the sovereignists will not take the opportunity to fire on Europe (Salvini has already begun with his well-known "lightness" - the "but go shit" on which the Italian press has glossed over all too elegantly), also given the vagueness of the criterion. Put too many expectations on the mutualisation of new debt in a phase of weakness of the German leadership is the best way to create disappointment and then serve arguments to sovereigns on a silver platter.
The second effect is that the political debate – and also the work of the technical structures of the ministries – it is mainly absorbed from Europe: even if it is a partly inevitable outcome given the strong symbolic value of European solidarity underlying the issuance of new debt, space is taken away – and political capital is consumed – for the discussion and deepening of the measures to relaunch the national economy. And there is much to do here. In addition to income support and liquidity support interventions for companies in the Cura Italia decree (moreover, the expected increase of the Central Guarantee Fund for SMEs is insufficient) in fact, it would be useful to envisage specific interventions in public investment and research, just as it would be appropriate to start the discussion on the concrete ways and times of a gradual reopening of production and commercial activities.
Finally, it should be noted that the announced purchase of public bonds by the BCe it is such from compensate for deficits even higher than 5% of GDP. Then there should be no problems in placing the securities necessary to cover the greater requirement. And 5 points of GDP correspond to about 100 billion: we spent just under 30 (25 for Cura Italia and 4,7 for the measures announced on Saturday evening but these do not seem to be all additional). In this picture, of Eurobonds, at least for the next few months, maybe there wouldn't even be all this need. What instead is urgent to plan a plan for spending the other 70 billion and procedures to make it effective quickly. In the meantime, the best negotiating strategy in Europe would be to tone it down and build a proposal that is technically sound and politically viable.
