In recent days, the Italian banking system has returned to the center of attention. Two pieces of news have brought about this new interest. The first was the judgment of the European judges with which, after four years, the appeal presented by our country was accepted and the European commissioner for competition was dismissed who, by preventing the intervention of the Fitd, contributed to causing profound losses not only economic but also of reputation for the system Italian bank. An error of which, due to malice or foolishness, neither the competition commissioner Margrethe Vestager (Denmark) nor the vice-president of the European commission Valdis Dombrovskis (Latvia), both from satellite countries of Germany, seem to be aware of yet. The second is, however, the position expressed by the OECD in the report on Italy, where the need to complete the Renzi reform on cooperative banks is underlined, a judgment that does not take into account the fact that this reform is currently still being examined by the European Court of Justice due to the diversity profiles that this reform contains between national and supranational. Not to mention that continuing to dismantle the territorial presence of local banks, as would happen with the completion of the reform, it is not clear how it can help the country's economic recovery and its fabric of small and medium-sized enterprises which represent 70 per cent of the private added value.
Precisely for this reason what is happening in Germany appears even more strident with the merger between Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank (the State is present with a 5 per cent stake in Commerzbank and is playing an active role in the operation) and what is reported by the press agencies on another operation which, again in Germany, sees public institutions very active, this local times, with the Lander of Saxony-Anhalt which has allocated almost 200 million euros for the rescue of the Norddeutsche Landesbank, of which it holds 5,6 percent of the capital.
Overall we are faced with two situations, the Italian one and the German one, which seem to fall within the classic case of “two weights and two measures” and which should lead us to be even more incisive within the institutions of the European Union to defend our interests, as the Germans seem to be doing effectively. It should be recalled that just before the introduction of the bail-in, Germany magically acted to save its heavily compromised banking system, making public resources available over the years for a total value of almost 230 billion euros (a value equal to 7,2 percent of German GDP) making Germany the first country in the eurozone in terms of spending. The Italian figure, just to better understand the orders of magnitude in question, was 13 billion euros, 0,8 percent of the national GDP.
Added to this is a further one peculiarities of the German banking system, that of local public banks (contrary to Italy where the banks are all private), le Landesbank and Savings bank, which on the initiative of Germany were kept foutside the scope of ECB supervision and who continue to operate following political logic and not purely economic, as also underlined by a report by the ECB itself signed by the economist Alexander Popov which highlights the increase, recorded after the elections, of 42 per cent of the exposure on regional government bonds of these banks. All while still continuing to debate the inappropriateness of Italian banks to have government bonds of their own country on their balance sheets. If we consider that in Germany the set of regional and commercial banks, of the Landesbanks, of the Sparkasses and of the local cooperative credit institutes - as shown by the supplement to the latest Bundesbank statistical bulletin - reaches more than 1.300 units out of a total of about 1.500 credit institutions (in Italy there are 650 banks overall, less than half), so we can better understand the extent of the phenomenon under discussion and how the protection that German policy offers to these institutions is almost unique within the banking union.
Then it looks strange the German parliament's obsession with shifting attention towards Italian banks, given the repeated requests for information that are sent to the ECB, the last one in recent days and relating to Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Carige and Banca Popolare di Bari, in which clarifications are requested on the "worrying news" relating to the state of health of the Italian banks also entering into the merits of the decisions of the European Central Bank on the measures adopted. It would be interesting to know what they would respond to in Frankfurt if a similar request were made by Italian institutions and concerned the German banking system. the exposure of the major banks in derivative products e the difficulties that seem to go through the local institutes and which is only overcome through the direct action of the central state or local authorities, in the name of a financial stability that seems to apply only in certain circumstances or geographical areas.
Needless to say, organized confusion seems to reign supreme in Europe. But, unfortunately, it is not a question of confusion, but of the demonstration, once again, of how the existing rules are interpreted and applied according to the balance of forces in the field and how the European institutions appear to be intransigent only with some. institutions Super partes, what those of the union should be, continue to operate with different assessments to the benefit of some and to the detriment of others, thus marking the real decline of the European ideal. The problem, which fortunately is no longer a taboo, is now evident to everyone. Certainly, it cannot continue for much longer, also given the reiterated succession of problematic contexts in the banking systems of the other EU countries. At the basis of this difference in treatment there is, after all, a different way of understanding Europeanism which on the part of some is absolutely opportunistic. Certainly not the case for the Italians who still today and despite everything, show themselves to be the most pro-European, given that they have sacrificed 20% of their industry on the altar of integration.
[The author is general secretary of the National Association of Popular Banks]
