In recent weeks, by conducting an informal poll among politicians, bankers and senior officials of the Bank of Italy on the deeper reasons for the clash between Tremonti and Draghi which began shortly after the new government took office in 2008 and which has become increasingly acute as the international crisis worsened, I received the most diverse answers, but they all agreed in excluding that there was on any occasion an explicit snub or an act of hostility on the part of the Governor towards the Minister.
Certainly Draghi has always safeguarded, especially at international level, his own role and that of the Bank of Italy, which is different and independent from that of the Government. And perhaps this is exactly what aroused the dislike of the minister who, as we know, always wants to be the first in his class. In short, Tremonti was annoyed by the excellent reputation Draghi enjoyed internationally, including as president of the Stability Board , an appreciation which is completely independent of that enjoyed by the Italian Government and which, indeed, with the passing of the months appeared to be clearly growing, while that of the Minister was clearly declining. So Tremonti was, and is, jealous of Mario Draghi's successes and he certainly didn't welcome his rise to the top of the ECB.
Someone argues that, perhaps, for a certain period, Tremonti identified Draghi as a dangerous competitor to the seat of Palazzo Chigi, to which the minister felt predestined once Berlusconi was pushed aside. Now, however, Tremonti's race for the Presidency of the Council has at least come to a halt. Draghi, on the other hand, from the ECB can influence Italian economic policy even more (as we saw this summer with the informal letter from the European Central Bank to Berlusconi on the recovery measures to be adopted), putting the Minister of Economy in the shade. This explains, at least in large part, the tug-of-war hired by the minister over the succession to Draghi in the Bank of Italy and his insistence on the name of Grilli in place of the natural candidate, namely the current general manager of the Bank, Saccomanni.
In fact, Tremonti would like the Bank of Italy to have a man who is less autonomous and more inclined to act as a simple shoulder to the minister both in the choices of internal economic policy and in the battles on an international level where decisions of great importance must be taken both on the euro and on the structures of the banking system. It is no coincidence that Tremonti has never missed an opportunity to stigmatize the decision to delegate to a technical body (the conference of central bank governors) the task of rewriting the rules of operation of financial systems after the 2008 crash. In his opinion, this undermines the "primacy of politics" that must be restored compared to the excessive power of the "marketers" who with their greed have led the world towards disaster. But it is precisely here, in this blend of personal ambition and shaky economic theories, that Tremonti seems to have lost his bearings.
Both he and Grilli, in fact, found themselves completely unprepared for the crisis of confidence that hit our public debt at the end of July. For years they have stubbornly denied the need to launch a series of structural reforms as soon as possible to try to raise Italy's growth potential. They argued that it was not worthwhile to face the risks of reforms which, having to affect monopolies or privileges of many categories of citizens, would certainly have aroused much discontent without however changing Italy's performance which is so much exclusively linked to the trend of the international economy .
So when the crisis arrived, once again action was taken on taxes and linear cuts, all the same provoking widespread protests but without giving credible development prospects to the whole country. These are not minor errors on the part of the Ministry of the Economy, which the European Central Bank and the Bank of Italy have jointly tried to stem, both by suggesting an economic policy totally different from the one followed, and with purchases on the market. of securities of our public debt. So what sense can such a stubborn battle by the minister have today to hit the autonomy and authority of our central bank, when there is more than ever a need for an independent body that can dialogue with credibility with the European authorities and with the markets? Absolutely none.
Perhaps the minister is seeking revenge against the "technocracies" to revive his image, which has emerged somewhat dented by the latest economic and judicial events involving a close collaborator of his. But this would happen once again on the skin of Italy and the Italians. Unfortunately, President Berlusconi's weakness seems to favor the minister's obstructionist tactics. It is only to be hoped that Berlusconi, who has become the laughingstock of all the cartoonists and comedians of the world, will for once demonstrate that he knows how to choose for the safeguarding of one of the few Italian institutions that still boast world prestige, thus doing the interest of the country.
