In 1966, Senator George Aiken of Vermont, a Republican of the old moderate school, formulated a lapidary judgment on the strategy to be adopted in Vietnam, handed down as follows: "Let's declare victory, and let's go".
That's what the United States should have done long ago in Afghanistan, where sent troops in the fall of 2001, shortly after Osama bin Laden's horrific bombings in New York and Washington. They called together against the sanctuaries of terrorism, and Afghanistan was then in full force, all NATO partners, with Italy among the major ones to contribute after the United Kingdom, and other allies and willing ones. Even Switzerland then sent a tiny contingent, the first military mission abroad since 1815. In the end Washington spent at least a trillion, much more according to some estimates, by far the largest part to train and maintain an Afghan army of over 300 thousand men; had more than 2.400 servicemen killed (58.220 in Vietnam), more than 3000 contractors (often ex-military) killed, 20 wounded, while the allies had over 1100 dead (53 in Italy), 10 wounded and spent a total of over 100 billion dollars.
It didn't help much. Kabul is today one of the major disasters of foreign and military policy, American and Western. The definitive end of the Pax Americana is written by many today, and certainly with valid arguments, and the definitive start of a post-American world that Fareed Zakaria already outlined in 2008, months before the serious financial crisis, largely of American origin, of that year.
The temptation to apply Aiken's law it presented itself several times, and then Vice President Joe Biden repeatedly interpreted it, especially in the first two years of the Obama presidency. But the Pentagon always had a plan that, they said, would bear fruit.
Washington had three time windows which today appear clearly favorable to the "Aiken law", but which were also not taken due to fundamental errors in American diplomacy and strategy which, having supported post-war Europe in a decisive way in 1947-48 (in their own interests, mind you, but also in ours) with the Marshall Plan, NATO and much more, have since then believed that with the right project something not too different can be repeated everywhere. But the world is not Europe.
They could have gotten out in 2003-2004, after defeating the al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan; they could leave in 2011 after eliminating bin Laden, hiding in Pakistan; And they could leave in 2015, when they decided to effectively suspend large-scale military operations and greatly reduce a presence that had reached 110 men during the early years of Barack Obama. The announcement by Washington in April and NATO in May of a troop exit timetable was a mistake. He gave the Taliban a war calendar. Once everything fell apart, Prime Minister Ghani fled with the cash on August 15, the retreat became a defeat à la Saigon 1975. Even in terms of the methods of exit, which had to be managed with much more shrewdness, the war in Afghanistan ended badly.
American comments, even among the most authoritative and moderate observers, are often fiery. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations of New York and former diplomat, condemns the choice of Biden, who followed too much the final script already written by Trump, to set a precise date, 11 September; and he recalls that the Taliban could now create serious problems for Pakistan, which has always covered them up in its complicated anti-Indian strategy but which remains an unstable country. Charles A. Kupchan, of the same New York Council, argues instead that if the choice to strike at the beginning (2001) the Taliban-al Qaeda link was justified, the later was based on the illusion of the possibility of a centralized Afghanistan and on its way to modernity , a naive dream in a deeply tribal reality; Biden all he did was say the word “to a losing effort in search of an unattainable goal”.
It now remains to be seen whether the American-Western débȃcle will relaunch the strategy of global terrorism, with attacks both in Islamic countries and in the West. Many believe that relations between the Taliban, a part of them, and what remains of al-Qaida will be able to strengthen, but it is not clear to what extent, while an Afghan presence for ISIS, which the Taliban has in opposed genre. Djoormat Otorbaev, former premier of Kyrgyzstan, insists on need for a collective economic commitment also Western so that the country does not sink completely, associating China and Russia, and recalls how "Russia with its profound influence in Central Asia holds the keys to all of this".
As for the United States, and Europe, the lesson is clear. If anyone still had doubts about the end of Pax Americana, the lesson is served. However, this does not mean that America disappears. Biden has paid a very high price, also of credibility at the moment, of the country and his personal, to a project of a renewed foreign policy that shares with that of Trump a part of the premises, for example the centrality of the Chinese puzzle, but to arrive at very different objectives. Trump's was and is pure and hard nationalism, let's mind our own business, meanwhile allies don't exist and often, see the EU, they are worse than their adversaries. Biden on the other hand definitively abandons some American Century logics, first of all the one according to which the whole world is vital for Washington, but wants to strengthen the field, with Europe first of all, because he needs allies for an effective policy towards China, and more. He doesn't believe one America first, which is equivalent to one america alone. The disastrous exit humiliates the United States, but it is possible that in the eyes of the electorate it will soon become more positive than negative, "because our money is spent in Kansas City and not in Kabul". This, between Republicans and Democrats, is today's America by a clear majority. And without taking this into account, there is no lasting American foreign policy.
Robin Niblett, director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, foresees stronger and more fruitful relations with Europe first of all, but also with Japan and some others. And in the European case the exchange of "favors" it is clear: “Part of the tacit compensation Europe is asking for to help the United States manage the Chinese node is America's continued partnership with Europe to manage the Russian node, which represents the most looming and persistent problem for many European governments. Biden has certainly never questioned this tacit understanding.
