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Russia-Ukraine: war is a tragedy but gives the lie to Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations

Ross Douthat's reflection, of which we publish the Italian version, on a possible interpretation of current scenarios in the light of one of the major political theories of the last 30 years reopens the discussion on Huntington's theories

Russia-Ukraine: war is a tragedy but gives the lie to Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations

Ross Douthat is a conservative-leaning columnist on the news staff of the “New York Times”. Every Tuesday the newspaper publishes his comment on the OP-ED page. Prior to joining the New York Times staff, Douthat was a senior editor at "The Atlantic”. In this speech he discusses the interpretative applicability of the theses of the American political scientist Samuel Huntington to the period we are going through resulting from the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and its causes and consequences.

In an important and justly famous book, Huntington advanced the thesis that the sources of conflict in the world following the Cold War would have been neither ideological nor economic, but linked to the culture produced by the different civilizations present on the planet. The nation states they would continue to be the protagonists of the world context, but the most important conflicts would break out between nations and groups of nations belonging to different cultures. The clash of civilizations would thus characterize the world scene. “The fault lines between civilizations will be the lines on which the battles of the future will take place,” Huntington concluded. Douthat's article - which we publish below in the Italian version - discusses to what extent this theory can explain what is happening in Ukraine and the new international dislocations that have resulted from the new state of affairs. A reflection that can not be shared, but that makes you think.

The balance of power between civilizations

In 1996 the American political scientist Samuel Huntington elaborated some disruptive theses on the path of the world after the cold war. He observed that global politics was becoming not just 'multipolar' but 'multicivilized', with competing powers modernizing along different cultural lines without converging, as was tended to think at the time, towards the Western liberal democratic model. L'balance of power between civilizations was transforming and the West was about to enter a period of progressive decline.

A "civilizational world order" was emerging within which "culturally related" societies tended to group into alliances or blocs. And the aspiring universalism of the West was setting the stage for a protracted conflict with alternative civilizations, especially China and the Islamic world.

Relevance of Huntington's thesis

This thesis was the backbone of Huntington's book "The clash of civilizations and the new world order" (transl. it. Garzanti 2000) which constituted in fact an alternative interpretation to the "end of history" by Francis Fukuyama, who advocated his own optimistic view of liberal democracy as the horizon towards which post-Cold War societies were tending. Huntington's thesis, left somewhat in the shade over the last decade, is once again being discussed in the wake of Putin's aggression against Ukraine, accompanied by the surprisingly unified answer of the West and by the uncertain reactions of China and India. In recent times Huntington is increasingly quoted on the basis of the consideration that Putin wants one clash of civilizations. In reality, Huntington's thesis seems effectively challenged and even contradicted by Putin's attempt to restore one Great Russia.

Is there really a clash of civilizations in Ukraine?

This is the argument supported, for example, by the French scholar of Islam Olivier Roy in a recent interview with “Le Nouvel Observateur”. Roy speaks of the war in Ukraine as "the definitive proof (because we have many more) that the theory of the clash of civilizations does not work" - above all because Huntington hypothesized that the countries of the Orthodox Christian denomination would hardly have clashed in an armed way. Here instead we have Putin's Russia which wages war, and it is not the first time, against a neighbor with a Christian-Orthodox majority, that is, a nation with an Orthodox culture, even if there are Muslim enclaves within Russia, it clashes with a very similar culture also in its origin.

… or is there a clash of ideologies?

Writing for the new magazine "Compact”, which brings together both left and right radicals, Christopher Caldwell (author of The Age of Entitlement: America Since the Sixties, considered by the “Wall Street Journal” the best history book of 2020) partially accepts Huntington's theses on the unity of Orthodox Christians, but also explains why the application of Huntington's thesis at the moment we are going through should be rejected. Caldwell argues that the clash of civilizations has been a useful model for understanding events over the past 20 years, but lately we are moving into a world of explicitly ideological conflict: on one side there is a Western elite preaching a universal gospel of “neoliberalism” and “wokeness”, and on the other hand there are regimes and movements that are trying to resist this narrative. This is a right-wing reading of the world landscape, a reading hostile to Western missionary zeal. But Caldwell's analysis resembles the popular liberal argument that the world is increasingly divided between liberalism and authoritarianism, democracy and autocracy, rather than divided into multiple poles and competing civilizations.

As it was 30 years ago

However, both of these arguments offer a weaker interpretative framework than Huntington's. Of course, no theory developed three decades ago can be an applicable guide to world affairs today. But if one is to understand the direction of global politics right now, Huntington's thesis is more relevant than ever. To understand why, you have to think back to the years immediately following the publication of his book – the end of the millennium, the Bush years and the beginning of Obama. In those days Huntington's analysis was often invoked to explain the rise of jihadist terrorism and Islamist resistance to Western power. But his thesis seemed difficult to extend to any other theater in the world. American power did not appear to be in decline yet. There China it was integrating with the Western world and, to a certain extent, it was liberalizing itself and was not charting its own hegemonic path of civilization. Russia's first term of Putin he seemed to aspire to alliances with America and Europe and to a certain kind of democratic normality.

In India the forces of Hindu nationalism were not yet so in the ascendancy. And also in the Muslim world there were widespread democratic ferments, from Green Movement in Iran at Arab spring, which seemed to promise 1989-style liberal democratic revolutions followed by a shift to the West.
The early years of the XNUMXst century, in other words, have provided a fair amount of cases of the universal appeal of Western capitalism, liberalism and democracy, with stated opposition to these values ​​confined to the margins: Islamists, critics of extreme left of globalization, the government of North Korea.

The turning point of the last decade

The last decade, on the other hand, has made Huntington's predictions about the conflict of civilizations much more compelling. It's not just that American power has clearly diminished relative to rival and competing nations, or that efforts after 11/XNUMX to spread Western values ​​by force of arms have often proved a failure. It is the fact that the differences between the major world powers have generally followed the model of civilization that Huntington outlined. We have seen the emergence of Chinese one-party meritocracy, Putin's uncrowned tsar, the post-Arab Spring triumph of dictatorship and monarchy over the religious populism in the Middle East, Hindu nationalism is transforming Indian democracy.

These are not all indistinguishable forms of "autocracy“, but culturally distinct developments that are well suited to Huntington's typology, that is, to the hypothesis that specific connotations of civilization manifest themselves as Western power diminishes, as American power retreats.
Most significantly, the region in which this recent trend has been weakest, and the post-Cold War wave of democratization most resilient, is theLatin america, regarding which Huntington had some uncertainty as to whether it deserved its own category of civilization, or whether it belonged to that of the United States and Western Europe. He chose the former, but the latter seems more plausible today.

There have been no alliances of civilizations, on the contrary…

What about Huntington's predictions about Ukraine, criticized by Roy and Caldwell? Well, he did something wrong there, even though he accurately predicted the internal division of Ukraine, i.e. the division betweenEastern Orthodox and Russophone andmore Catholic and western leaning west, but his assumption that civilizational alignments would trump national ones was not confirmed by Putin's war, during which eastern Ukraine fiercely resisted Russia.

That example fits into a larger pattern. None of the emerging non-Western great powers has yet built vast alliances based on civilizational affinities, which means that one of the great Huntingtonian predictions looks rather weak today. He imagined, for example, that a China in the ascendant might be able to integrate Taiwan peacefully and perhaps even attract the Japan in its sphere of influence. This scenario seems highly unlikely at the moment. Instead, wherever smaller countries are somehow "torn," to use his language, between some other civilization and the liberal West, they usually prefer an alliance with America to an alignment with Moscow or Beijing.

The West on the offensive

This is evidence of the West's resilience and of the lasting advantages Americans offer even in a multipolar world. But that doesn't mean that liberalism is ready for a sweeping return to the position it occupied when America's strength was at its height. None of the duplicitous and ambivalent reactions to Putin's war outside the Euro-American alliance suggest a sudden springtime for the liberal-international world order. And while aspects of Fukuyama's ending of the story have clearly spread beyond theLiberal West, prevailing today is the darker side of the Western view – the consumerism and childless lawlessness – rather than the idealism of democracy and human rights. The conflict in Ukraine it means that the export of American-style "wokeness", as much as Putin worries, is not ready to become the focal point of a new global ideological conflict.

The “local” scope of “wokeness

By contrast, most of the "wokeness" is inward-looking and parochial, revealing itself as a specifically Western and especially Anglo-American response to the delusions of the neoliberal period. Rather than offering a universal message, his slogans and key ideas only really make sense within America and Europe – what could that even mean”question being white” for the middle class of Mumbai or Jakarta or the young elite of Bahrain or Beijing? It seems like an ideology tailor-made for an age of perceived American decline. It offers an agenda for moral and spiritual renewal, but it's also a way to justify a certain mediocrity and torpor because, after all, too much focus on excellence or competition tastes like white supremacy.

The meaning of wokeness

Interestingly, the wokeness wars reveal that Huntington may have been wrong. His main fear was that the Western world in an age of competition between civilizations could abandon its own cultural specificity and that the multiculturalism in particular it would have been its undoing, even that the United States could fragment into English- and Spanish-speaking enclaves under the pressure of mass immigration. Some of the recent convergences between North American and Latin American politics such as the growing appeal of right-wing populism and of socialism in the United States, the rise of evangelicalism and Pentecostalism in South America fit into these predictions. The battles over wokeness are not necessarily an example of ethnic balkanization or multiculturalism gone beyond measure.

The stakes in America

Instead, the current culture war may actually reduce the ethnic polarization of American political parties, pushing some racial minorities to the right, for example, while re-emerging some of the oldest divisions in the Anglo-American politics. The "wokes" often seem to be the heirs of the New England Puritans and the utopian zeal of the Yanketudine; their enemies are often Southern Evangelicals and Conservative Catholics and libertarian descendants of the Scots-Irish. The stakes of these disputes are enormous: the foundations of the American nation, the Constitution, the interpretation of the civil war and the ideology of the frontier.

From: Ross Douthat, Yes, There Is a Clash of Civilizations, The New York Times, March 30, 2022

Ross Douthat has been a New York Times columnist since 2009. His address book appears on Tuesdays and Sundays. Previously he was senior editor of "The Atlantic". He's the film critic for the National Review. He is the author of The Deep Places: A Memoir of Illness and Discovery, published in October 2021. His other books by him are To Change the Church: Pope Francis and the Future of Catholicism (2018); Bad Religion: How We Became a Nation of Heretics (2012); Privilege: Harvard and the Education of the Ruling Class (2005); The Decadent Society (2020); with Reihan Salam, Grand New Party: How Republicans Can Win the Working Class and Save the American Dream (2008).

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