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Towards the flop of the maxi-amendment: an announced failure for Berlusconi

If the text that the Government will send to the Senate reflects the drafts (72 folders) now in circulation, Berlusconi will not be able to right the boat of our economy, nor his image - The wave of patriotism raised by the entrepreneur from Pistoia, who invites Italians to acquire Btp shows that a credible prime minister could ask for more effort

Towards the flop of the maxi-amendment: an announced failure for Berlusconi

If the maxi-amendment to the Stability law that the Government is preparing to send to the Senate will contain only the measures envisaged in the drafts already in circulation, it can be said immediately that the markets have already rejected this latest attempt by Berlusconi to straighten the boat of our economy and, above all, his personal image as a politician. The collapse of the Stock Exchange and the distrust of Italian government bonds testified by the spread, which has risen to almost 520 points, together with the severe letter from European Commissioner Olli Rehn, demonstrate that overcoming the emergency can only be set with the exit from the scene of Berlusconi and the arrival of a new government of truce or of the president who, before going to the elections, will allow Italy to overcome the most acute phase of the market crisis which, by now is evident, show total distrust in the current government and in gender in the overall Italian political class.

The measures contained in the maxi-amendment address some important issues such as bureaucratic simplification, the reform of professional associations, the transfer of a part (actually very limited) of public assets, and simplifications to speed up the construction of infrastructures. These are useful measures, which in truth would have been good to deal with before the crisis broke out, given that they are all issues contained in the PDL government programme, but wholly inadequate to put out the fire that is burning our public bonds. A bonfire that can only be extinguished with a new prime minister who has the credibility to tackle the most important problem we face today: that of rapidly bringing interest rates back to a pre-crisis level. Only in this way will we be able to ensure balanced public finances and above all give our banks a breather, which could resume financing the production system and families. Otherwise any new sacrifice and any measure to relaunch development will be thwarted by the credit crunch and the high interest that the state has to pay on its debt.

So the main issue today is rapid and drastic debt relief. We have to find a way not to go on the market with new issues for some time. And at that point the situation would calm down, rates would drop, and the prices of both BTPs and shares would recover, reducing the very high losses that all Italian savers are now enduring in their portfolios.

For some time now, many politicians and experts have suggested the idea that it was necessary to start with debt. First online hosted the opinions of Giorgio La Malfa, Nicola Rossi, the former State Accountant General Andrea Monorchio, up to Filippo Cavazzuti. To do this it is necessary to launch one or more funds through which to sell a substantial part of the public assets. Not 5 billion a year as Berlusconi says, but 100 billion a year for a couple of years! To this we can add not an extraordinary asset as Giuliano Amato, Pellegrino Capaldo and Alessandro Profumo claim, which would have depressive effects on the economy, but a forced loan to make Italians buy government bonds at much lower rates than the current ones which however they may be not too far from where the market would be at once the current panic phase has passed. The wave of patriotism raised by the entrepreneur from Pistoia, who invited Italians to buy government bonds in the Corriere, shows that a credible prime minister could ask citizens for a similar financial effort.

However, these one-off measures should be accompanied by a structural recovery of the public accounts through a "true" reduction in political expenditure and so-called current expenditure, by a shift of taxation from work to things, by a true pension reform, and a review of the labor market to obtain more flexibility along the lines of the Ichino reform.

Of course, these are difficult things. Perhaps not as painful or unpopular as they say, but which should surely lead many Italians to change old and comfortable habits and get back into the game. But the benefits would be considerable and also quite rapid. Markets change expectations quickly. The crisis began in June. In the spring, the acute phase could be overcome. But we cannot continue with old-fashioned political games that waste time and have a disproportionate cost to the country.

Surely the worsening of the Italian crisis was caused by the ignorance of the political class, the one in government, but in part also the one in the opposition. What a pity to hear Di Pietro thunder against the "social butchery" imposed by Europe, when in most cases we are dealing with things that we should do because it is convenient for us and not because they are imposed by others. Speculation and the markets are nothing but the mirror of the failure of politics, of its inability to manage this phase of globalization not only of the economy, but also of cultures and lifestyles. In truth, this is not only an Italian evil, that even in the rest of Europe sensational mistakes have been made to such an extent as to transform a small local crisis like the Greek one into a European and perhaps global crisis.

For Italy there is no more room for other political selfishness or attempts to postpone choices. The President of the Republic acknowledges that Berlusconi's attempt to hide behind the stability law only wastes time and makes the crisis more acute. He closes this page and gives the task to a super partes personality who presents himself in Parliament. And he will see that he will get many more votes than are conceivable on paper today by looking at the official attitudes of the party secretariats.


Attachments: AS 2968 MAXI 4.0.1000.pdf http://firstonline-data.teleborsa.it/news/files/262.pdf

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