The magic word that is ringing in all European capitals in recent weeks is "Minsk". It refers to a 7-year old Agreement and declined in 13 points. It is seen more and more as the key to stopping the Russia from invading theUkraine and then the war. He talks about it more and more loudly after Macron's marathon between Moscow, Kiev and Berlin, after the phone calls between Draghi and Putin and after Scholtz's trip to Washington.
It is also referred to as "Minsk II” because it followed a first version and was signed at a summit in the capital of Belarus on February 11, 2015. It was signed by the heads of state of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany, under the auspices of the Security Organization and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), at the end of a complicated negotiation process to put an end to the war in Donbass, the Ukrainian region on the eastern borders with Russia which had led the territories of Lugansk and Donetsk, supported, as we know, by the arms of Moscow, to the separation from Kiev government.
To tell the truth, the first to indicate this path was the Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi who, in a statement dated December 22, following one of the phone calls with Putin, had recalled that: “the relations between Ukraine and Russia are governed by the Minsk Agreements which have not been observed by either side. So an observance of these agreements could be the first step”.
At that moment, net of the inattention to the pandemic and quirinal concerns, it had seemed like a diplomatic way to distance oneself from the thorny subject, as we know, Italians do not excel in muscular initiatives. Instead, the real subject of the discussion had been offered, if one obviously did not want to face Moscow by deploying the armies and move on to de facto action. Since then the solution has begun to circulate in the various chancelleries also under the name of "Normandy format” due to the fact that the 4 signatories had all participated in the celebrations of the historic landing in the very year in which the war of Donbass. And today it is spoken of more and more openly.
But what does the Minsk Protocol foresee?
Apart from the ceasefire, the release and exchange of prisoners, new elections, pardons and amnesty for those who took part in the revolt, foreseen respectively in points 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, the Protocol intervenes in a profound way to modify the political state of Ukraine. For example with point 11, which provides for the change of the country's constitution to recognize ample margins of autonomy for the separatist regions.
It is worth reading: “Carry out the constitutional reform in Ukraine through the entry into force, by the end of 2015, of the new Constitution which envisages decentralization as a key element; and provide for permanent legislation on the special status of the autonomous areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions which includes, inter alia, the non-punishment and non-liability of those involved in the events that took place in the aforementioned areas; the right to linguistic self-determination; the participation of the local self-government bodies in the appointment of the heads of prosecutors and of the presidents of the courts of the aforementioned autonomous areas”.
It is the most delicate point of the Protocol, which probably prevented it from being put into practice during these seven years. Because this construction actually pleases only Moscow, neither the separatists, nor the Ukrainians were enthusiastic about the conclusion.
Let's get into the merits of the Protocol
A Putin the Protocol is fine because it not only saves his face, allowing him to withdraw his army with dignity, but allows him to kill three birds with one stone: he is recognized as the protector of the Russian "brothers" mistreated by the Ukrainians; autonomy means that his influence on a piece of Ukraine becomes permanent; and finally he doesn't have to spend a penny to restore normality to a territory devastated by war because he will have to take care of the Ukraine.
Ai separatists they don't like the Protocol because they don't want autonomy, they fought for independence. Going back under Kiev, albeit in a different way, is far from their plans. And so far they have put their foot down in the most classic way: by continuing to shoot. Because the war there never ended.
And the Protocol also resists theUkraine and precisely for the reasons that Moscow likes instead. Kiev understands well that it comes out penalized by the confrontation by losing authority over a piece of territory. And he also fears that Moscow's influence, starting from the two regions, could extend to the rest of the country. All sacrosanct reasons. But how does it come out?
In the talks with Kiev the glass is shown as half full: this time it would not go as in Crimea why did russia accept i new boundaries of the country that emerged from the collapse of the former USSR in 1991. This is foreseen in point 9 of the Protocol which orders "the restoration of full control by the Ukrainian side of the state border along the entire conflict zone which must take place from the first day of the conduct of local elections".
And it is also true that Russia must withdraw all its soldiers, as stated in point 10 of the Protocol, which orders the “withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, including mercenaries, and military vehicles. Disarmament of all illegal groups”.
But Kiev still considers the Protocol a bitter cup. Not so the Europeans because they have to square the circle: albeit with caution, they want to understand Moscow's unease in seeing countries no longer friends on its borders (of the 8 members of theformer Warsaw Pact 7 are now part of NATO); and above all they want to keep heating and lighting their homes and to do this Russian gas is indispensable. In the end the question is: to die for Donbass? It is probable that Kiev does not want this solution either.
