A very important book with a practical twist
Thanks to the Italian section of the System Dynamics Society and the publisher Guerini Next, Italian readers can finally access a fundamental study on sustainability conducted by one of the most brilliant and original scholars of the analysis of social, economic and environmental phenomena, Donella H. Meadows, who died prematurely in 2001. It is about Think in systems. Interpreting the present, directing the future towards sustainable development, Italian edition edited by Stefano Armenia with a preface by Carlo Petrini, publisher Guerini Next. This book takes up and deepens the themes raised by the first work of the scholar and of the System Dynamics Society, The limits of growth (1972, also available in Italian, Lu.Ce edition, 2018), which was such an international bestseller that the debate on human development took the direction towards the theme of sustainability.
Think in systems it is a book of a certain complexity but, for anyone who is willing to accept Meadows' intellectual challenge, it has the great merit of offering a systemic approach to sustainability which is precisely what is missing in the institutional action and in that of the operators to the various levels. However, the book is anything but theoretical, it also has a fundamental practical-operational implication. In every aspect of her argument, the author tries to identify the "leverage points of change", that is, those places of a complex system in which a small intervention can lead to large and lasting structural transformations. It's a book that anyone who considers themselves an agent of change should keep on their bedside table.
Among the many topics covered in the book, we have chosen to offer you Meadows' reflections on the theme of the commons, central to every discourse on sustainability and, unfortunately, gone a bit in the shade in recent years after having been in the forefront of the debate for a long time on the use of resources and having brought Elinor Ostrom, one of the most important scholars on the issues of governance and common resources, the 2009 Nobel Prize for economics.
We have also chosen it in relation to the release of two books (both published by goWare) which take up the themes of the commons through some writings by Ostrom and other scholars (Commons. diversity, sustainability, governance. Writings by Elinor Siege) and the international debate that has developed around the commons since the 2009 Seattle Conference (Omnia are communicate. The international debate on commons and common goods, edited by Lorenzo Coccoli).
From the book of Meadows below we reproduce the chapter entitled "The tragedy of the commons", with thanks Joshua Volpara of Guerini Next for making this text available for publication on our blog. Also deserves praise Chapters Italiano of the System Dynamics Society for bringing this study to Italian-speaking readers.
La Meadows use the game of Slinky as a paradigm of his systems theory. He writes, “At the beginning of my systems classes, I often whip up one Slinky. In case you grew up without one, the Slinky is a toy, a long loose spring, often coloured, which can be bounced up and down, from hand to hand or even sent down stairs… What makes the ball bounce up and down? Slinky?
The answer clearly lies in the Slinky itself. The hands that manipulate it hold or release a behavior that is latent in the very structure of the spring. This is a central insight of systems theory.
When the tragedy of the commons is triggered
The trap defined as the "tragedy of the commons" (Tragedy of the Commons) materializes when an escalation, or simple growth, is triggered in a shared environment subject to erosion. Ecologist Garrett Hardin described the common resource system in a 1968 paper that has become a classic. Hardin used a common pasture land as an example:
Let's imagine a pasture open to everyone. It is reasonable to think that every breeder will try to bring as many heads of cattle as possible to pasture… Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he will ask himself: «What is the use of adding one or more heads to my herd?»…
Since the farmer benefits from the proceeds of selling that additional head, the positive utility is almost +1… Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared among all… the negative utility for the particular farmer's decision farmer is only a fraction of –1…
The rational farmer concludes that the only sensible thing for him to pursue is precisely to add another animal to his flock. And another; and yet another… But this is the conclusion reached by every farmer who shares the pasture. Therein lies the tragedy. Everyone… is locked into a system that requires them to increase their herd without limits — in a world that is limited. Ruin is the point of arrival towards which everyone… runs, each pursuing his own best interest. Bounded rationality, in short words!
In every system of commons there is, first of all, a shared resource (in this case grazing). For the system to be susceptible to the tragedy of the commons, the shared resource must be not only limited but subject to erosion if overexploited. That is to say, beyond a certain threshold, the smaller the resource, the less able it is to regenerate, or the more likely it is to be destroyed. For example, when there is less grass in a pasture, cows also eat the base of the stem from which the new grass grows. The roots are no longer able to protect the soil from erosion caused by rain. With less land, the grass grows less. And so on. Another reinforcing feedback loop running downhill!
A common resource system is also characterized by resource users (cows and owners), who have good individual reasons to grow, and who grow at a rate which is not affected by the conditions of the common resources. The individual farmer has no reasons, no incentives, no strong feedback loops, such that the possibility of overgrazing stops him from adding another cow to the common pasture. On the contrary, he has everything to gain.
The hopeful migrant in Germany is eager to benefit from the generous reception laws, and has no reason to consider the fact that too many immigrants will inevitably push the German government to tighten those laws. Indeed, the very conviction that Germany is considering such an alternative is one more reason to run to Germany!
The lack of the feedback loop
The destruction of a common good occurs when there is an escalation, or simple growth, in a shared environment subject to erosion. In this case it is failure (or delayed operation) of the feedback loop which should link the resource to the growth of users of that resource.
The tragedy of the commons emerges failure (or delayed operation) of the feedback loop which should link the resource to the growth of users of that resource.
The greater the number of users of the resource, the more the resource is exploited. The more the resource is exploited, the less is the availability for the individual user. If users are bounded rational decision-makers in considering their approach to the commons ("There's no reason for me to be the only one to limit the number of my cows!"), there is no reason for anyone to limit their 'use. Ultimately, therefore, the harvest rate will exceed the resource's ability to sustain that harvest. Since there is no feedback loop to limit the user, over-exploitation will continue. The resource will decline. Finally, the erosion circuit will be triggered, the resource will be destroyed, and all users will pay the consequences.
Surely, you will think, no group of people can be short-sighted enough to destroy their common resources. Consider some widespread examples of commons that are on a path of total erosion or have already reached disaster:
- uncontrolled access to a national park can lead to such an influx of crowds as to destroy its natural beauty;
- everyone has an immediate benefit from continuing to use fossil fuels, even though the carbon dioxide produced by these fuels is a greenhouse gas that is causing global climate change;
- if every family can have as many children as it wants, but society as a whole has to bear the costs of education, health care and environmental protection for all children, the number of children born may exceed society's ability to support them all. (Incidentally, this is the example that prompted Hardina to write her article.)
All of these examples have to do with the overexploitation of renewable resources — a pattern we've seen before in the systems zoo. Tragedy lurks not only in the use of common resources, but also in the use of common landfills, shared places where it is possible to dispose of polluting waste. A family, business, or nation can reduce its costs, increase its profits, or grow faster if it can get the entire community to absorb or manage its waste. It derives a great profit from it, suffering only a fraction of the pollution it has caused (or not suffering it at all if it manages to discharge it downstream or upstream). There is no rational reason why polluters should stop doing it. In these cases, the feedback loop that influences the utilization rate of common resources — whether it is a source or a landfill — is weak.
If you find it difficult to fully understand the behavior of an individual who exploits common resources, ask yourself if you are willing to car-share to reduce air pollution, or to clean up whenever we get dirty.
Ways to avoid the tragedy of the commons
The systemic structure of common resources makes selfish behavior much more convenient and profitable than responsible behavior towards the whole community and the future. There are three ways to avoid the tragedy of the commons.
- Educate and exhort. Help people see the consequences of unconstrained use of common resources. Appeal to their moral principles. Persuade them to be moderate. Intimidate any wrongdoers with social disapproval or eternal damnation.
- Privatize the commons. Divide them so that everyone suffers the consequences of their actions. If some people lack the self-control to stay below the limits of the regeneration capacity of their private resources, they will harm only themselves and not others.
- Regulate the commons.Garrett Hardin described this option bluntly as "mutual coercion, mutually shared." The regulation can take various forms, from real bans on certain behaviors to the imposition of quotas, permits, taxes, incentives. To be effective, regulation must be reinforced by policing and sanctions.
The first of these solutions, exhortation, aims to limit the use of common resources through the moral appeal to preserve the resource.
The second, privatization, establishes a feedback loop between the level of use of the resource and who uses it, so that the advantages and costs deriving from the use of the resource fall on the same decision maker. The resource owner can always abuse the resource, but in that case it takes ignorance or irrationality to do so.
The third solution, regulation, produces a feedback loop between the state of the resource and the user through the regulator. For this circuit to work, regulators must have the expertise to correctly monitor and interpret the conditions of the common resource, they must have effective deterrent tools, and they must have the good of the community at heart. (They cannot be misinformed, weak, or corrupted.)
The best option - mutual coercion
Mutual coercion can be a good rule of coexistence and sustainability. Some "primitive" cultures have managed to manage common resources for generations by resorting to education and exhortation. Garrett Hardin, however, doesn't believe this option is reliable. Common resources protected only by tradition or "rules of honour" may in fact attract those who do not respect tradition and who have no honour.
Privatization works more reliably than exhortation, if society is willing to let individuals learn the hard way. But many common resources, such as the atmosphere and marine stocks, simply cannot be privatised. This only allows for the option of "mutually agreed, mutual coercion." Life is full of coercive agreements, many of which are so taken for granted that they are hardly thought about. Each of them limits the freedom to abuse commons, while preserving the freedom to use them. For example:
- The common space in the middle of a busy intersection is regulated by a traffic light. You can't cross the intersection whenever you want. When it's our turn, however, we can cross the intersection more safely than would be possible if the intersection weren't regulated and free for all.
- Shared use of parking spaces in city centers is regulated by parking meters, which charge a fee for the use of the space and which limit occupancy to a certain time interval. You can't park where you want and for how long you want, but you have a better chance of finding a parking space than if there were no parking meters.
- You can't take money at will in a bank, attractive as it may seem. Protection tools such as safes and safety deposit boxes, reinforced by the existence of police and prisons, prevent a bank from being treated as a common good. In return, your money in the bank is protected.
- You cannot broadcast at will on the frequencies occupied by radio and television. You must obtain a permit from a regulatory agency. If freedom of transmission were not restricted, frequencies would be a mess of overlapping signals.
- Many municipal waste collection schemes have become so expensive that households have to pay according to the amount of waste they generate — this turns what used to be a common resource into a regulated system where you pay according to how you use it. does.
Notice from these examples how many different forms a "mutually agreed, mutual coercion" can take. The traffic light regulates access to the common good on the basis of the "wait your turn" principle. The parking meter charges for the use of the parking space. The bank uses physical barriers and strong fines. Permits for the use of broadcast frequencies are granted by a government agency. The waste tax restores the missing feedback, making each household bear the economic impact of its use of the commons. Most people abide by the rules in most cases, as long as the rules have been mutually agreed upon and you understand their purpose. However, all regulatory systems must use police coercive force and sanction those who occasionally fail to cooperate.
