THEItalian Public Accounts Observatory tried to really quantify the actual impact of the Super bonus 110% on the economy and the public budget.
According to the data of theAeneas, superb 110%, since it was introduced in July 2020, is cost 68,7 billion and activated 46,6 billion in investments (62,5 billion if we also consider those already started).
The total investment in housing from the beginning of 2021 to the end of 2022, however, according to i Istat data of March 1, was of 204,8 billion. The data mentioned were used to validate the positive impact of the 110% superbonus on the economy and how much it contributed to the country's recovery. Among the hypotheses discussed, also the one that the impact on the economy would have been strong enough to generate a tax revenue of the same order of magnitude as the expenditure incurred by the State in order to be able to finance itself. Analyzing the effects of the Superbonus, however, we must take into account some elements:
- Many of the investments financing with the 110% superbonus would have been made equally. (according to a preliminary study by the Bank of Italy, only half of the investments accounted for by ENEA would have an additional nature)
- In addition to the driving interventions (such as the coat), the bonus gives the possibility of finance other interventions (such as replacing boilers or fixtures and installing solar panels) which generally come carried out in the ordinary way
- Some works, such as the renovation of the facades, would have been carried out anyway, thanks to others building bonuses including that of the 90% bonus for facades and the ordinary deduction of 36% on all building costs incurred within the ceiling of 48.000 euros
Against this, analyzing the data, according to ahypothesis of Bank of Italy, about half of the investment surveyed by Enea, i.e. 31,3 billion (out of 62,5) are additional interventions generated by the 110% superbonus. In 2021 and 2022, investments would have been lower for a total of 8 and 23 billion respectively. In essence, post-pandemic recovery would have been slower. Investments would still have reached 76 billion in 2022, with an increase of 10 percent compared to 2019.
The actual impact of the superbonus on GDP
How much have these investments really affected the GDP? It must be considered, initially, that the investment in housing (including new construction) represent just under 5% of GDP: a large increase in this item therefore has a limited effect on the overall total of GDP. In three years of application of the bonus (also considering real variables such as inflation) thecumulative effect is equal to 1,4%. At the end of 2021, the overall effect (including the incentive effect on the second half of 2020) was0,5%. In the absence of the bonus, GDP growth would have been 6,5% instead of the 7,0% estimated by Istat. In the 2022, the GDP, estimated by Istat, was 3,7%: without the additional effect of the growth of 0,9% it would therefore have been 2,8%. Certainly relevant data but far lower than what was debated.
The effects on the public budget
Il superbonus budget for the State it is far from a balance: up an expenditure of 68,7 billion I am come back, in the form of higher taxes and social contributions, just under 14 billion.
How did this loss to the state come about? In the Technical Report of the State General Accounting Office the relaunch decree (DL 34 of 2020) contains the initial estimates the introduction of the Superbonus 110% with the addition of a discount on invoices and credit transferability for the four main types of interventions. According to this report, in the period between July 2020 and December 2021, the additional expense would have been alone 3,5 billion euros. Estimates made later were considerably higher. For the Bank of Italy, from the moment of the introduction of the superbonus until the end of 2022, the expense estimate for the state it amounts to approx 34 billion.
In addition to spending, it is also important consider higher tax revenues that the government receives as a result of the increased expenditure for the superbonus. According to the estimates by the State Accounting Office, the higher tax revenue would have been only 305 million euros for the entire superbonus. However, a search of the National Foundation of Accountants highlighted that this estimate is very conservative and that the induced tax effect would be much more significant and equal to 43,3%, i.e. approximately 1,5 billion euros. This calculation is based on the idea that the tax base is due charge two rates tax, 10% for VAT and 28% for Irpeg.
In analyzing the question, it is not important to know how many taxes the subjects who carry out the works pay, since the higher GDP concerns the large number of different sectors of the economy that are activated by the higher expenditure for restructuring, through structural interdependencies. The parameter to be taken into consideration is therefore that of overall tax burden, ie the set of taxes and social contributions paid to the state in relation to GDP (equal to 43,5%). This figure is inclusive of social security contributions paid by workers and employers, which in the economy as a whole they account for almost 14% of the GDP.
The government has spent 68,7 billion euros for the superbonus, but it has received only 13,7 billion euros more than tax revenue thus losing 55,1 billion from this transaction. The main reason the trade is a loss is that one part of the expense would have been done however, even without the Superbonus. If, on the other hand, all expenditure were considered as additional, the increase in GDP would be in the order of 70 billion and the additional tax revenue would be approximately 30 billion, instead of 13,7. An operation in any case with a loss of 40 billion instead of 55.
The Istat-Eurostat reclassification
The conclusions of the Public Accounts Observatory are clear. The government has blocked the discount on the invoice and the transfer of tax credits relating to building bonuses, justifying this decision with the Eurostat rules which distinguish between “payable” bonuses e "unpayable". Non-transferable building bonuses are considered "unpayable" because not all taxpayers have the opportunity to use them, while transferable bonuses are considered "payable" because they will probably end up in the hands of operators who will use them. These are then reclassified as an expense.
A consequence of the classification of the 110% bonus and the facade bonus as "payable" credits, and therefore as an expense, is that it is necessary to apply the accrual criterion instead of cash, which means that the entire benefit is recognized in the year the government's obligation arises. This has led to deficit increases in 2020, 2021 and 2022. For these reasons, the State has decided to eliminate the discount on the invoice and the transferability of credits for avoid further increases of the deficit in 2023; also possible a return to the old classification criterion of the new tax credits. The bridging solution remains to be found to save those homeowners and businesses that relied on the transferability of credit and are now in great difficulty.
THU for the detailed survey by the Italian Public Accounts Observatory.
Deficit or debt? You can't even tell the difference. The Superbonus has lowered public debt by 10 points!