The pollsters had not foreseen it, the leaders and militants of the Nazarene party had not dared to hope for it, but the Matto Renzi-driven Pd he swept the round of European elections. A result that will weigh in Italy and above all in Europe. In Italy because the center-left party, well exceeding the 40% quota, almost doubles the second party, i.e. the 5 Star Movement, and exceeds by more than 10 points any center-right cartel, within which Forza Italia stands out below 17%. All without having sacrificed the most radical leftist grouping (the Tsipras list) on the altar of its success, which, albeit with difficulty, exceeded 4%.
But it is above all in Europe (and Renzi did well to remember throughout the electoral campaign, more than others, that this time it was not his government that was up for grabs, but the future of Europe) that this time the Democratic Party literally "broken". Faced with the collapse of Hollande and the socialists in France, the Democratic Party is today the strongest national party within the European socialist party, of which it is finally a full member. And it is thanks to the Italian result, as well as the clear advance of Martin Schulz's SPD in Germany, where Merkel holds, but loses support.
Renzi can and must now make this position of strength weigh, to the full advantage of his government, but above all of his country. All this, while even the large European countries are less and less bipolar, and increasingly forced by a widespread fragmentation to the logic of broad (?) agreements. Which then will also be called wide, but they are far from wide. It is enough to think that a possible agreement between Gaullists and socialists in France, on the basis of yesterday's results, would barely reach 35% of the votes, against 25% for the National Front. Not to mention the result of the United Kingdom, where the anti-Europe populists of Farage (first party) reduce Conservatives and Labor to historic lows in one fell swoop.
Naturally, the main question remains that of the impact of yesterday's vote on the stability of the government. Because it is true that Renzi and the Democratic Party have won hands down, but the political framework that surrounds them is anything but solidly held. Let's start with Alfano's New centre-right, which barely reached the safety quota of 4%, thanks above all to the votes of the South and Sicily, while it appeared weak in the Northern regions. Alfano therefore does not have the strength to leave the government, but his weakness is evident and this is a fact that Renzi would do well not to underestimate.
Then there is Forza Italia, so far the main partner for the reform process, increasingly contentious and with an increasingly bruised leader due to well-known events that are not only political. Berlusconi will do everything possible to stay hooked to the Democratic Party on the path towards reforms. He can't threaten early elections. Indeed, if anything, he would aspire to return to that majority from which he came out and which he was unable to blow up. But this would certainly not suit the Democratic Party.
Not to mention that for the former senator and former knight it appears problematic to be recognized as the re-founder and pivot of a new centre-right alliance. She would have to deal with his age (the very hypothesis of nominating her daughter in this picture appears more like a patch than a solution), with the aspirations of Alfano and its surroundings, and even with the League. Yes, because the Carroccio, unlike Forza Italia with Berlusconi, managed to put Bossi on the sidelines and exceeded 6%. Which is why he is not necessarily ready to re-ally with a right that continues to be centered on Berlusconi.
Last, but not secondary question: how will it end with the Italicum and the reform of the Senate? Certainly since yesterday Renzi has more petrol in his engine and he will really have to make the reforms. But the picture, especially that of the other European democracies, has changed. In France, Germany, and even the United Kingdom, the solid bipolar tradition is faltering and political fragmentation is growing. In short, alongside that of governability, there is the problem of the representation of minor forces. As if to say that a good electoral reform does not necessarily allow knowing who will be the prime minister and the government majority on the evening of the results. This was also the case in Chancellor Merkel's Germany, who had to go through exhausting negotiations with the SPD to return to government with broad agreements. It's politics, that's how it works.
