If the enormous mass of comments that economists (and various commentators) devote to the crisis of the EU along a few essential thematic focuses were simplified and ordered, a central point of consensus and two analytical interpretative variants would probably emerge. The consensus point is that the current crisis is essentially institutional in nature. The two variants say: (a) that this structural nature has shown substantial resistance and adaptability (ESM, Quantitative easing, Junker plan, etc.) and that therefore the integration process must continue like this, with slow and shared adjustments, but within the borders of the Treaties (no bail out, no European public debt, etc.), which contain all the necessary flexibility; (b) that it is instead precisely this structure that has generated the current contradictions and therefore must be modified on substantial issues.
Now, according to the supporters of (a), the main objective of integration would be “the correction of the institutional defects that characterize the countries of southern Europe, on which the instability and low growth of the Eurozone mainly depend”. Thus the future of Europe appears as an institutional political system homogeneous with the Nordic and FRG systems. This is the thesis that sees Merkel and Gabriel closely united. I would like to try to raise some doubts about thesis (a), precisely on the institutional ground that perhaps economists handle with some difficulty; the disasters made in Italy on the terrain of the so-called federalism (“that doesn't exist”) by the perverse alliance between economists and jurists, corroborate this affirmation.
If the institutional objective of the EU is the one indicated under (a), the method is crucial: precisely because the armed conflict has been preventively and definitively renounced and the questions must be resolved democratically, consensually and procedurally. In fact, the EU is concerned with verifying the level of democracy in political processes in the countries intending to join the Union and should sanction any doubts or damage to the democratic method.
Now, it seems to me that all the most authoritative literature indicates that the institutional experience of the Nordic countries is based on systems of parliamentary democracy, with a proportional basis, corrected with binding coalition pacts (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and the FRG itself) and on large parties that build and channel consensus. They are systems based on respect for collective cognitive procedures which structure reasonably informed and organized public opinions around real public policies (innovation, transport, research, university, etc.) and a sense of active citizenship.
The market is not a natural and organic structure, but one of the forms of regulation of associated life. Language and critical consensus are essential ingredients of these experiences: they constitute, in my opinion, a flat denial of the supporters, in a general and mechanical way, of presidential or semi-presidential systems, of "fortified" executives and of majority bonuses, regardless , to tame the parliamentary democracies that generate debt.
If this is true, and if it is believed that the EU crisis is institutional, the European democratic forces should support similar processes in Europe and for Europe: based on the centrality of the synthesis and (rationalised) powers of parliamentary institutions and on alliances that stabilize the topics and times of the political-legislative agenda. Now, all economic analyzes converge in indicating that a union of states with a single monetary authority independent of political bodies cannot long survive without instruments for dealing with a crisis of confidence, but above all crises deriving from the trends of increasingly influenced economic cycles by globalization and by the "competition-comparison" of monetary systems linked to state structures.
In other words, the process of convergence of the countries of the South towards a Nordic model, if it is an institutional political process, cannot by definition be governed within a mechanism which by internal structure is self-prevented by any transfer between States, via the budget and / or via the financial-credit system. And where the ECB must supervise (under the surly eye of the Karlshure Court) compliance with these constitutive rules. The FRG spoke recently through the mouth of Weideman and Schauble to indicate that any modification of the Treaties must intensify the technocratic and anti-parliamentary character of the EU.
But the economists sub (a) nonetheless argue that institutions are slowly changing and that substantial compliance with the budgetary rules, the only true pillar of the EU, together with the ECB, will allow the countries of the South to bring those of the North closer over time.
In economics, time is a crucial variable: an intelligent (guideline) use of macro models says (see also IMF studies) that numerical and rigid budgetary rules are a real absurdity and that, with these rules, convergence with the economies of the North will last thirty or forty years and perhaps in the end they will all grow by 0,… per year. The positive effects of robust public programs, directed towards investments in infrastructure and research, financed with additional net debt, guaranteed by the EU, are demonstrated with ample data and reflections: but they are irreparably obstructed by current rules.
In conclusion, it seems to us founded to maintain that the position of the economists sub (a) is essentially of a "moral" nature: it ignores the data and the methods of analysis and expresses a disaffection (certainly partly justified) on the ability of our political class to autonomously and equally defend our national interests in a global world. So while the historic leaders of the PD are studying (perhaps to make up for lost time), it is better in the final analysis to rely on Merkel and Gabriel rather than look for difficult new alliances.
The writer's conclusion is that economists are better off trying to do their job; if the crisis is institutional, the word must return to politics, and future developments must be removed from a technocracy closed in a cul de sac; but this precisely requires a theory and a practice for a European democratic political class, which for now is not seen: our Prodi has clearly put his cards on the table, but a swallow alone does not make spring.
And above all, it is necessary to build a viable and concrete political perspective for the coming years, based on the strength of democracy and on clear-cut points that are understandable to citizens and young people, and not on tactics and the slow but losing defense of what exists. At the heart of this perspective should be the focus of a substantial modification of the Treaties.
