To play a key role in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict it might just be there Germany. This is one of the ideas that emerged during the round table held at the Sioi, which was attended by various experts on geopolitical issues linked to the former Soviet countries, in the presence of the President of the Sioi Franco Frattini and the leader of the Northern League Matteo Salvini.
Germany, which is not experiencing a golden moment as an international image after the issues relating to migrants and above all the Volkswagen case, is therefore perceived in Moscow as a more authoritative interlocutor than the EU and more neutral than the United States. Despite Angela Merkel itself promoted and voted for trade sanctions against Russia, "sanctions which however - as the Director of the international politics magazine Limes recalled, Lucio Caracciolo – it was also the first to outflank, much more than Italy did”.
To intervene in the debate were the Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Italy, Sergey Razov – who denounced that "dialogue is no longer fashionable, but the model must be the positive one of the nuclear agreement in Iran" – accompanied by the Director of the NGO "Institute for the Commonwealth of Independent States", Konstantin Zatulin, and by journalist Vitaly Tretyakov. All three convinced on one line: the mistake was the temptation to bring Ukraine into the NATOtoo prematurely (in 2008): "it was a red line that shouldn't be crossed, just like with Georgia," said Razov.
The Russian line is clear: Ukraine, with the borders established since independence in 1991, has no sense in existing. “The solution is the transition to a federal-type state, which remains at least neutral with respect to the Russia, and not as hostile as it became after the Orange Revolution first and Maidan Square after were manipulated by the United States, which is in favor of a state thus constituted, which prevents Russian hegemony in the area”, he maintains Zatulin. “Ukraine will fall apart within 20 years: because as it is now, it never existed,” he echoes Tretyakov, on whose thesis Giancarlo agrees in part Aragon, President of the Institute for International Political Studies: "It is a fragile country, and its fragility does not derive only from external influences but from the many mistakes made in the post-Cold War reconstruction phase". Caracciolo di Limes shares the same opinion: "Building a Ukrainian state with the 1991 borders was impossible".
From there arises a situation of instability which, according to the point of view of Russian commentators, plays into the hands of the United States, which according to Zatulin "intimidated the Ukrainian governments". “It's always difficult to explain things to the United States – Tretyakov reiterates – because they don't want to listen to them: better the dialogue with Germany and France”. The crux is always Crimea, not only because now, like the areas of Donetsk and Lugansk and following the referendum, it has returned under the control of Russia, but even earlier for historical and strategic reasons: "Not only in some areas of the 'Ukraine's population is pro-Russian, but in cases like the Crimea they are indeed former Russian citizens, who after independence in 1991 found themselves in another country”.
The seed of discord was planted in 1954 by the then leader of the USSR Nikita Khrushchev, who decided, “without telling anyone, to assign Crimea to Ukraine. Until 1991 this didn't pose a problem, but after that it did. Yet despite this, Russia never made claims to Kiev in those years, indeed it was a period of great economic collaboration, in particular with the supply of gas to Ukraine at very advantageous prices. But we would have expected at least a neutral attitude in the face of pressure from the West to join NATO”, argues Zatulin. “In Crimea – adds the journalist Tretyakov – there are still citizens who feel 100% Russian, so much so that all the dozens of times I've been there in the last 30 years, people asked: 'But when are you taking us home?' . The truth is that Moscow did indeed commit an act of force in Crimea, but that region would never have given up on independence".
The crux soon became the interference of the West and the United States, precisely in the years of the rise of Vladimir Putin, who wanted everything except a Russia with a supporting role. And for this Crimea was more than strategic: “Sevastopol – explains Zatulin – is one of the most important ports of the Black Sea and was founded by the Russians. Its history and its fleet belong to us”. No Ukrainian or European Union exponent is sitting at the Sioi table, but an authoritative interlocutor would be identified in Germany: “Berlin he has changed position – explains Tretyakov -: he has understood that the policy of the West in Ukraine has no prospects for Ukraine itself, it will lead it to be annihilated by all these divisions. For years, Ukrainian politicians have played a double game: I am thinking in particular of Yanukovych, who said he loved Russia, didn't even speak the Ukrainian language, and then went to Brussels to complain about Moscow and perhaps even the USA, and then went to Washington to denigrate the EU”.
Which solutions so? According to some, none. “The Ukrainian crisis – argues Caracciolo di Limes – is a crisis in the category of those with no solution: it can be managed, controlled, but not resolved. However, Italy would have every interest in not following the NATO line too much in letting the current instability go: a dangerous axis of instability is being created from the Adriatic to the Black Sea and then also in a large part of the Mediterranean, from the Middle East to North Africa; is an area with which theItaly borders and has historical relationships, so it should hope for a rapid return to political and economic stability".
Italy's role has been evoked several times also when recalling the summit of Sea Practice, promoted in 2002 by the then prime minister Silvio Berlusconi and indicated by some speakers as a starting point for the resolution of the US-Russia tensions and the Ukrainian conflict. “Of course we need to go beyond the Minsk agreements – explains Aragona, who was present at Pratica di Mare – but without repeating what in the end was basically a big misunderstanding: at that summit, Putin's Russia expected that the invitation would be a first step to enter the NATO security system. But that was not at all the intention of the USA, which, however, had the presumption of taking for granted that Moscow he would accept a subsidiary position, cadet. And all this at the very beginning of Putin's rise”.
