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Hydrogen revolution: this is how the geopolitics of energy will change

The book by Marco Alverà, CEO of Snam, "The Hydrogen Revolution" is out today, published by Mondadori - We anticipate chapter 7, dedicated to the new geopolitics that can arise from the affirmation of hydrogen as a clean source, while the post- Covid accelerates decarbonization

Hydrogen revolution: this is how the geopolitics of energy will change

On with the "Hydrogen revolution, the small molecule that can save the world" (Mondadori, 141 pages). This is the title of the book by Marco Alverà, CEO of Snam, of which we anticipate the seventh chapter below dedicated to the new energy geopolitics that this source of energy, which has quickly come to the attention of the markets, can favor and stabilize.

Anyone who deals with energy in the new millennium knows that they have to deal with the climate emergency: without interventions, the global temperature will rise by 4 degrees in 2100 - this is one of the premises of the book - and we know very well that going beyond 2 degrees would devastating consequences. This is why the splitting of the H2O molecule into H2 and O, especially when achieved thanks to the energy produced with renewable sources, makes hydrogen revolutionary and potentially available in unlimited quantities.

The positive factors of the revolution that Alverà has decided to ride concern availability, as has been said; but also the strong reduction in costs due to technological progress and the ease of storage and transport given that hydrogen can be mixed with natural gas within the 34.000 km of pipes that Snam owns. According to the company, hydrogen could cover 25% of Italian energy consumption in 2050.

If the goal is the zero emissionsHowever, hydrogen is not alone. It has to face the competition from renewables and the electric car. Furthermore, hydrogen is currently produced – almost entirely – from fossil fuels (70% thanks to methane, the rest with lignite or coal). It's more gray than green but the race to change is very fast.

The purpose of the book is to accompany the reader in the great energy revolution underway, assuming that the pandemic has accelerated the transition towards decarbonisation. AND unveil the potential of hydrogen especially thinking of those sectors that are difficult to electrify or the reduction of emissions from trucks, trains, ships, planes, heating in cold areas. Marco Alverà's basic idea is to a partnership with Africa which, in the Sahara, could become the real reservoir of solar and wind energy on the planet and make green hydrogen available for Europe, with an advantageous gas exchange for our more efficient plants. Hence the premises for a new energy geopolitics that holds together, stabilizing them, the various protagonists on the world stage.

Here is Marco Alverà's vision in "Hydrogen Revolution", chapter 7.

7. THE GEOPOLITICS OF HYDROGEN

“My dream is to create a partnership with Africa to generate and store a large capacity of energy, transform it into hydrogen and transport it to other parts of the world and to Europe through existing infrastructure. It is not so difficult to change the current gas networks to hydrogen networks”.

Frans Timmermans, October 2019

Oil and gas have played a key role in international geopolitics since 1912. That year Winston Churchill, the Royal Navy's Secretary of Marine, decided to convert the fleet from coal to oil to keep pace with the fast German ships. He believed that the speed of the new Queen Elizabeth frigates should be at least 25 knots to escape enemies. A speed impossible to achieve with coal, which has a lower energy density. Furthermore, coal logistics made replenishment at sea impossible. The gradual conversion of the fleet to oil made the logistics of oil production, storage and distribution a strategic priority. One of the reasons that in 1914 prompted Churchill to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian oil company (ancestor of the current BP) was precisely the need to guarantee supplies to the Royal Navy for twenty years. For his part, in World War II, Adolf Hitler did everything, with Operations Barbarossa and the Battle of the Caucasus, to get his hands on Baku and Astrakhan and the greedy oil reserves of the Caspian. In the summer of 1941, England and the Soviet Union invaded Iran, deposing the king of Persia Shah, accused of being close to Hitler.

Wars, colonialism, races to create regional and global spheres of influence have often had access to energy sources as their ultimate goal. The “energy cold war” narrative has seen the United States pitted against Russia and Iran and courting Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states for energy interests. The recent increase in US domestic production due to the shale it has led to a rapprochement between the Saudis and the Russians, historic producers who today find themselves dealing with a market flooded with shale oil and gas.

What was once a flood has become a tsunami with the Covid emergency, which has reduced oil consumption by about a third, and temporarily led to negative prices in the United States. The suffering of American producers has changed the balance, bringing the United States to the same side of the table as traditional producers. Hence a historic event: in early April 2020, President Donald Trump telephoned his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, asking him to find an agreement with Mohammed bin Salman's Saudi Arabia to cut production and raise prices. The agreement was made, with a cut also by the American producers who for the first time, after opposing OPEC, found themselves cooperating with their historic antagonists. At the basis of the different approach to international politics undertaken by the US administration is the fact that it went from being a major importer of oil and gas to the main producer and exporter of hydrocarbons after the success of the revolution. shale.

In common thought, energy dependence is a negative factor: no country likes to be hand in glove with another for such essential resources. Energy dependence is often perceived as a game that gives producing countries an undeserved competitive advantage from which consuming countries should free themselves. A more recent example are the initiatives implemented by the European Union to reduce its dependence on gas from Russia, which currently satisfies over a third of the consumption of the member countries. Security of supplies is one of the issues at the top of the political agenda of the European Union and of every energy importing country.

The question that arises today is whether renewable energies can ease these tensions. For many analysts, in fact, one of the reasons that make solar and wind energy interesting is precisely the possibility of producing it locally, guaranteeing self-sufficiency. This is at least partly destined to happen: the distribution of energy resources will undoubtedly be more equitable.

However, the idea of ​​moving from an integrated energy system to a completely local or national one is less convenient than it might seem. First, renewable electricity cannot be produced locally everywhere, in any case not in the quantities necessary to achieve net zero emissions. In many countries there is simply not enough space. Furthermore, a heterogeneous mix of local and national energy systems, each with its own specific characteristics, and with limited international commercialization capacity, would be detrimental to the competition which is essential for lowering prices, for economies of scale and for security. of supplies which today is based on energy solidarity between countries if there are problems in one of them. Finally, pursuing energy self-sufficiency would not free us from geopolitical problems: on the contrary, it risks increasing tensions.

Energy dependence, in fact, is not only that of those who need energy. Even who sells it depends on who buys it.

Producing countries such as Algeria, Libya, Egypt and, to a lesser extent, those in the Persian Gulf area, have a common problem: the demographic explosion, a multitude of young people with growing expectations. This situation puts pressure on budgets, which are entirely financed by the sale of oil and natural gas. What would happen if these countries saw the profits deriving from the production of hydrocarbons decrease to zero? The real risk is that their delicate internal balance could be compromised, with negative repercussions on migratory flows and security. It is a concern also felt in the European Union, an area which has limited energy resources and which depends almost entirely on a small number of neighboring producing countries, such as those of North Africa, Russia and Norway. As the recent tensions on the immigration front show, the European Union could have great difficulties in managing any imbalances in neighboring countries.

Hydrogen is a solution capable of combining the fight against climate change with regional cooperation and the reduction of geopolitical tensions. Thanks to hydrogen, the low-cost use of renewable sources from areas of the world with ample availability of sun and wind but far from the point of consumption can become reality. The IEA has calculated that it would be cheaper for Japan to import green hydrogen from the Australian desert or the Middle East than to produce it locally. Europe could import it from North Africa, Norway and Russia, the same trio that currently supply it with fossil fuels. This could balance the progressive reduction of gas and oil imports and prevent possible tensions.

The six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) have already launched some of the world's largest solar energy projects for tens of gigawatts. When these initiatives are associated with an equally ambitious hydrogen programme, the Gulf countries will be able to maintain their energy leadership. The abundance of territory for vast photovoltaic plants, the strategic geographical position and the great industrial and intellectual skills in the sector oil and gas make this area a natural hydrogen pole. This could offset the reduction in oil and gas revenues. It is estimated that if 20% of the territory of the United Arab Emirates were used for solar plants for the production of green hydrogen for export, the same revenues currently guaranteed by gas and oil could be achieved30.

The gradual transition to a hydrogen economy would enable local businesses in the sector oil and gas to have new business opportunities, enter into agreements and partnerships with companies in the clean energy sector and to maintain, or even increase, current jobs. The existing infrastructure represents a key factor in accelerating the development of hydrogen and therefore a competitive advantage for countries that currently export oil and gas. Of course, a global hydrogen market can only be developed through international cooperation, involving both producing and consuming countries, as well as international organizations such as OPEC, IEA and IRENA.

Much of the existing energy transport infrastructure is already transnational in nature and can encourage cooperation, as the experience of importing natural gas from Russia and North Africa has shown. This system could even push the most reluctant countries to join the global effort against climate change.

The African Union and the valorisation of deserts

One of the crucial issues in addressing the challenge of climate change is its reconciliation with economic growth. The solution we adopt should not only be able to solve the climate change but it will also have to take into account another global challenge: the one against inequality.

As already underlined, the production of renewable energy would allow the European Union to import green energy and move closer to achieving national emissions abatement targets. As confirmed by a recent analysis by Hydrogen Europe31, North Africa, and in particular the Maghreb area, offer immense potential for this import. Solar energy resources are abundant in the region and the Sahara desert has immense generating capacity, from both solar and wind. But what matters most is that we are already connected: the Maghreb exports natural gas from Algeria and Libya, with numerous pipeline connections to Spain and Italy. In addition, there are two electricity cables, each with a capacity of 0,7 gigawatts, between Morocco and Spain.

It would therefore be very interesting for Africa and Europe to unlock the export potential of renewable energy in North Africa, if the Maghreb countries converted this electricity into hydrogen and transported the energy through the existing grid. As we have already pointed out, some of that of natural gas could be converted to accommodate hydrogen. It would be a cheaper option than building electric cables to carry renewable energy across Europe.

These considerations can help spark closer partnerships between Europeans and their African neighbours, a development which could usher in the integration of the 'African dimension' into the European Green New Deal. This would free up bottlenecks that have already established themselves in Europe's electricity grid, which risk hampering the ability to supply more renewable energy into the energy system.

The first executive vice president of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, has already declared his dream of seeing Europe and Africa united in an energy collaboration to develop the enormous potential of renewables. Hydrogen is a key tool to make it happen. In this geopolitics of hydrogen, Italy too will be able to play a leading role thanks to its geographical position, its entrepreneurial skills and the sensitivity of its institutions to the issue of climate change.

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