In my opinion, the Italicum is a bad law. For many reasons that I will illustrate, but starting from what I agree with: the blocked list. I remain convinced, in fact, that the mechanism of preferential voting is the classic opportunity that the thief makes, ending up by multiplying the costs of politics, favoring corruption and above all rewarding, not the best, but the best organized (through the availability of resources, indeed). However, I cannot understand the fact that the so-called "short" list constitutes a substantial difference compared to the "long" one of the Porcellum, only because the names of the candidates (from 2 to 6) would be printed on the ballot; as if the voter didn't know that even in the infamous Porcellum only those who were at the head of the list that was public and posted everywhere were eligible.
The expected majority bonus is of dubious constitutionality, because it does not meet, in my opinion, the criteria of reasonableness required by the Consulta. It does not seem reasonable that the list or coalition that achieves 35% of the valid votes should receive a prize higher than 50% of the votes obtained (until proven otherwise, 18 is equal to more than half of 35). And what about the recognition of the majority award at the national level also for the Senate? In this case the violation of the Constitution (which provides for elections "on a regional basis") is clear, so much so that it was the President of the Republic Carlo Azeglio Ciampi who demanded that the Porcellum order the awarding of the prize at the level of each region.
Then there is the issue of minor lists, for which prohibitive access thresholds are envisaged even if these lists were grouped into coalitions. Considering the combination of what has been established for the threshold for access to the majority bonus and those valid for the distribution of seats, an unacceptable trap emerges not only for the minor lists, but for the system as a whole. Obviously, 35% will normally be reached by the sum of the votes of all the coalition lists that have obtained 5% or less. Votes will all count. Let's say that, in a coalition, only the "X" list has achieved more than 5% in the Chamber; therefore, the majority bonus obtained thanks to the contribution of all the other coalition lists should go to it alone.
Let's take a concrete example. List "X" gets 22% and the other linked lists 13%: none of them, however, reaches 5%. It is not only a theoretical hypothesis (which in any case should be taken into consideration in a law), but it constitutes a probable outcome for a possible centre-right coalition, in the light of the polls. Going back to theory, if this coalition is successful compared to the others, as we have seen, it would obtain the majority bonus of 18%, which however would go entirely and only to list "X", in addition to the 35%, despite having achieved actually only 22%. In other European countries there is a barrier threshold, if not reached a list remains outside the Parliament. But a majority bonus is not usually indicated, in a formal and explicit way.
Roberto D'Alimonte has something to say in Il Sole 24 Ore that Tony Blair obtained 55% of the seats with 35% of the votes. This was possible as a result of the distribution of single-member constituencies. The same goes for François Hollande. If in the first round he had only 29% of the votes, in the second round he had to earn an absolute majority. With us, however, the votes of those lists that do not exceed the threshold would all go to a different list, thereby distorting the voter's will. It is true that the same principle was envisaged in the "Porcellum", but this is not a valid justification, because in that law the threshold was only 2%, with the recovery, however, of the best-ranked list below this percentage (of which both the UDC and the FdI were used in their respective coalitions).
If we then considered what could happen if no list or coalition reached 35%, the situation would become even more paradoxical. Let's assume that no coalition gets 35%, and that list "X" gets 15% and the other lists linked to it get 14%, none of them getting 5%. If the coalition headed by list "X" were to win the ballot, this coalition would be entitled to the majority prize sufficient to obtain 53% of the seats. Well, this prize would go exclusively to list "X" (which in the first round had obtained only 15%!!!) even if the victory in the ballot was determined by the voters of the other lists. All this in defiance of the sentence of the Constitutional Court.
