The text of the government decree on the reform of cooperative credit is not known because it was approved with the formula "subject to agreements", to be finalized, before presentation for conversion into law by parliament, after further discussions with the main players in the field . So every critical analysis of what was decided by the last Council of Ministers suffers from a significant knowledge gap.
As far as is known, the controversies immediately skyrocketed and, above all on the subject of the so-called "liberation of reserves", the clash became very hard with the sector of cooperation, because it is as if the strengthening of the system had moved on to modification of the property rights on the assets of the cooperative bank.
With a 20% tax on reserves, mutual banks with assets of more than 200 million, transforming themselves into non-prevailing mutuality cooperatives (popular banks) or joint-stock companies, would make the shareholder, now holder of rights to the capital alone, owner of the entire assets (capital plus reserves) of the bank.
A tenfold increase in wealth, achieved ope legis. Someone, by making a simple calculation applied to one of the BCCs potentially involved, demonstrated that shares now worth 1000 euros, as compared to the capital, would be valued up to 30 times, in relation to the total post-enfranchisement reserves.
The recovery of the 20% withdrawal of the reserves following an even significant extraordinary taxation, by means of a possible capital increase for the same amount, could be immediate, as it is extremely convenient for the shareholder. Moreover, the bank would return to its initial financial position, subject to the commitment to distribute profits to a very different extent from the current one.
It has been observed that the vulnerability to the cardinal principle of cooperation, the so-called indivisibility of reserves, would open up a scenario of absolute discontinuity with respect to the history of the cooperative, with hypotheses ranging from the unconstitutionality of the law to its classification as state aid, also attracting ( as if it were needed!) the anathema of the European Union.
We will soon see the developments of this confrontation (the need was not really felt), given the need to intervene quickly and clearly on the fragility of the system, even if it could not be expected that the reformist intentions would immediately find all agree.
Yet, having studied the question a little, the theme of strengthening the cooperative banking movement (with the establishment of a single group and the new cohesion pact) and that of the freedom to leave, to be granted to certain subjects under predetermined conditions, could find a different conciliation, without invalidating the canons of cooperation, actually leveraging them.
We had already talked about it in this journal both on our own initiative and by commenting favorably on the opinions of other much more qualified experts. Even more was done, informally verifying its feasibility with the heads of some cooperative banks (Confcooperative) and with those of the cooperative banking movement itself (Federcasse), finding positive feedback.
What is the proposal about?
It consists in the possibility of a BCC transferring bank assets and liabilities en bloc to a banking entity (to be established or possibly already existing) having the legal form of a joint-stock company, on the basis of what is already possible under art. 58 of the Consolidated Banking Act and the civil legislation.
The proposal is corroborated by the numerous successful experiences practiced for years in the world of production and consumer cooperatives, in full compliance with the pillars of cooperation. The BCC, authorized to follow this path, would renounce the banking license, becoming a shareholder of the joint-stock bank, but, in cooperative continuity, would retain the title to the conservation of the reserves accumulated up to that moment in the more favorable tax regime.
The ceding cooperative, after having changed its corporate object by losing its status as a bank, would continue to benefit from those concessions where it remained mutually prevalent, providing services to its members (assistance, cultural, enhancement of the territory, and other), as well as managing the bank participation formed as described.
In short, this hypothesis would seem entirely feasible in a given system, with minimal regulatory interventions, except for the explicit provision of the en bloc transfer of bank assets, as an alternative to joining the cooperative group, to be included in the text of the reform alongside the other exit hypotheses.
The second important aspect of the proposal is that of establishing which subjects to leave this path open, without nullifying the objective of strengthening the cooperative system as a whole, as proposed by Federcasse, from which, given the structural criticalities of the BCCs, no can absolutely ignore.
This opportunity could be limited to a few subjects qualified on the basis of dimensional criteria other than assets, in order to overcome the criticisms referred to above regarding the impacts on property rights. An objective limit, as established at European level, could be the one that separates small banks from medium-sized ones, currently equal to 3,5 billion of balance sheet assets: in fact, at the moment, the BCCs potentially involved would be no more than six or seven and not 15, as the newspapers report, with reference to the parameter of 200 million assets.
The most restrictive condition must in any case consist in the fact that the derogation cannot only be of an objective nature, but be supported by the demonstration that, being able to use this possibility, the bank achieves an unequivocal condition of greater robustness of the capital, income and asset management profiles risks, compared to what he would get by joining the cooperative group proposed by the movement.
In this regard, both the matter of mergers and that of the reliability of the industrial plans underlying the authorization requests must be the indispensable technical basis for obtaining the way out from the Bank of Italy, which, as must remain the sole arbiter of the merits of situations of autonomy.
The mere obligation to submit merger proposals in support would be enough to further reduce the number of possible interested parties. Bearing in mind the characteristics of the system, in terms of both the territorial distribution of the major BCCs and the full adherence to the choices of the movement of most of these, the possible non-adherence to the single group would actually be reduced to a few units.
For them, other peculiarities could not but be rewarded, such as the history of independence gained over time with respect to the federal movement or, above all, the success for having developed original solutions, of an industrial nature, translated into greater allocative and operational efficiency compared to the average of the system. In our opinion, these are the basic conditions for cultivating a reasonable biodiversity.
In conclusion, this brief essay aims to propose a recomposition of the contrasts that have just been highlighted, including the justified recriminations of the world of cooperation, which does not seem to accept that, through a tax, the arduous search for solutions for relaunching the fate of the cooperative credit in Italy can be thwarted, but above all that its centuries-old history can be put to an end.
