The Constitutional Referendum is occupying a role in the political debate that cannot be reduced to its real contents: in fact it is identified with a vote of confidence or no confidence in the Renzi Government. For this reason, the merits of the law submitted to the popular vote are often disregarded, except for spreading alarms of a real democratic emergency.
The specific contents of the reform can and must be the subject of an open debate that does not hide its limits and contradictions. It would certainly have been more linear to abolish the second chamber or to take the opportunity to supersede the Regions with special statutes and the reorganization and return of powers to Local Authorities, just as the electoral law could have left ample space for single-member constituencies, but the The fundamental question is: is the institutional political context so compromised, as NO supporters claim, that it recalls the darkest times for our democracy?
With due respect to all opinions, we do not believe that the electoral law approved by Parliament can produce the effects of the Acerbo Law of 1923 nor that our country today runs the risk of authoritarian adventures. Still less does it seem reasonable to fuel such an exaggerated opposition with the purpose, in itself completely legitimate, of changing the Prime Minister.
The same decision of the Constitutional Court to effectively postpone the judgment on the electoral law in force, currently defined as "Italicum", until after the referendum vote returns any decision on this matter to the responsibility of Parliament.
However, it is clear that, also due to the weakness of the political and cultural debate and the scarcity of convincing alternative programmatic proposals, the consequences of the referendum vote on the political framework, conditioned by the forcing and exploitation put in place, must be taken into due consideration and not one may delude oneself that this is simply a measured confrontation between constitutional doctrines. However, those who work in the field of production and work have a direct interest in the merits of the referendum question. The Law deals with knots of the constitutional provision that have concrete effects on the economy.
Indeed, it is known that among the obstacles to the country's economic growth there are a whole series of issues attributable to the institutional architecture that find their foundation and legitimacy in the Constitution. Between these the slowness, repetitiveness and uncertainty of the legislative process, mainly caused by the system of perfect bicameralism which on the one hand causes a back and forth from one Chamber to another of Projects and Drafts of Law, and on the other hand establishes in practice a strong power of veto and exchange which does not always take place in the light of the sun. This is, among other things, the reason why the most important reforms, which are "divisive" by nature, are often set aside and lobbies, even small but fierce ones, manage to prevent the approval of measures they oppose.
In matters of work it is necessary to resume a reflection on the non-implementation of constitutional norms (also taking into consideration the legislation and jurisprudence that has gradually stratified) of the articles 36, 39, 40 and 46 of the Constitution, with the consequent confusion and uncertainty regarding representation rights, negotiating ownership, field of validity of collective agreements and guarantees regarding the provision of essential services.
As well as the fragmentation of competences between the State, Regions and Local Authorities instead of a healthy subsidiarity, it produces a procedural and regulatory labyrinth that generates a concrete and widespread right of veto, substantial or de facto, such as to make decision and implementation times extremely long in the field of public works, energy, tourism, transport.
The end of perfect bicameralism, the limits to emergency decrees but at the same time certain times for the parliamentary vote on government initiatives, the extension of the instruments of direct democracy envisaged by the Reform produce a system of counterweights aimed at taking decisions, and not preventing them, a certain timing in the decision-making processes and therefore a more favorable "climate" for the economy.
The modification of title V starts from the observation that the confusion of competences between institutions has led to continuous disputes on issues that have a high rate of interpretative questionability, with continuous appeals to the Constitutional Court, the Council of State and the TAR. The suppression of concurrent legislation serves to rationalize the allocation of materials from a dual point of view. Giving certainty about the legislation in force produces direct economic effects because it brings predictability and stability in the decisions of the public administrations.
After all Title V reform, which leaves power over health and social services to the Regions, and provides for the possibility of attributing forms of autonomy on matters including active labor policies, allows for the safeguarding of the positive things regional autonomies have produced.
Moreover, the text submitted to the voters' judgment does not solve all the outstanding problems and in all probability will require further maintenance and adjustments to the constitutional framework. It would be desirable for this to take place in a context characterized by wide-ranging strategies and not be conditioned by tactical choices that have often characterized the process of revising the Constitution. The reason for our "YES" lies in the need to achieve an initial result after decades of initiatives and discussions aimed at constitutional reform. We do not intend to associate ourselves with those who consider the victory of the "No" vote a catastrophe, but it is equally certain that institutional and political stability would certainly not benefit from this result, nor, as experience shows, would it be possible to build a sufficiently shared new constitutional reform project.
