Gustavus Zagrebelsky he is a distinguished professor of constitutional law. Together with the professor Francesco Pallante of the University of Turin has published a small and agile volume to explain the reasons for the NO to the referendum on the constitutional reform (They will say, We say - Editori Laterza - 10 Euros).
It is an interesting reading that clarifies - in my opinion - even to non-experts on the subject and to those who doubt why it is vital for the future of Italy to vote Yes. The heart of the thesis supported by the two illustrious professors is summarized by themselves in like this: “One thing is clear: the centralization (of powers) in favor of the State and in the State in favor of the Executive to the detriment of parliamentary representation". And again: "The Italicum-constitutional reform combination makes it clear that the real objective of the reforms is the shift of the institutional axis in favor of the Executive".
Now, apart from the denunciation of the restriction of citizens' representation, which leads the two scholars to fear the creation of an oligarchic government dominated by latent authoritarian instincts which it corresponds neither to the letter of the constitutional reform nor to the Italicum, a streamlining of political procedures through the reduction of government levels, the cut in the number of parliamentarians and above all a more effective distinction between the tasks of the state and those of the regions, is precisely what our country, blocked for over twenty years of vetoes between the various levels of government, is urgently needed. We must vote Yes precisely because this reform finally achieves what we have wanted to do for thirty years, namely give more capacity for action to the central government, abolish some useless entities such as Cnel and give the Regions a clear space for action and representation in a Senate that will do few things, all aimed at a better connection between central government and local autonomies.
Beyond some technical aspects that certainly could have been better specified (but here too we need to see in which direction), the basic thesis of the two Turin professors is that with these reforms there is the risk of an institutional structure that restricts the spaces of democracy and popular participation. Now, this is a completely unfounded thesis and also - excuse me the illustrious jurists - a little laughable. The abolition of equal bicameralism brings our country closer to what happens in most western democracies without giving rise to dictatorships of any kind.
The centralization of greater responsibilities in the Government of Rome follows a request made for years by all economic operators and especially lays the foundations for putting a stop to uncontrolled spending by local authorities, whose cheerful (often patronage) finance has been a non-secondary cause of the country's near-bankruptcy in recent years. If we then consider that the government structures, such as for example the powers of the Premier, have not been affected and that the role of the Head of State has even been strengthened, while in any case the Senate will continue to exercise powers of interlocution and check, it seems unrealistic to cry out for the “authoritarian turn”.
In this sense, the reflections, much more detailed, contained in a book by a historian are comforting Guido Crainz and a lawyer Charles Fusaro on the reasons for updating the Constitution (Donzelli Editore, Euro 16) with a preface of high civil and political value by Donzelli himself. The two authors demonstrate with a wealth of data and international comparisons that all the changes made bring us closer to the constitutional experiences of the countries with which it is reasonable to deal. And also as regards the so-called "combined provisions" with the electoral law, it does not seem at all reasonable to think that the will of the elector citizen is distorted by the fact that there is a prize for the winner which allows for a certain majority to be reached and therefore to be able to launch a government.
It is worth remembering what happened in other countries: in France Le Pen took only 2 seats with 18% of the votes and in Great Britain UKIP only had one seat with almost 10% of the votes. With the Italicum, the party that wins 10% of the votes will be able to count on about 40-50 seats. Above all, the majority prize will award the winner 340 seats, i.e. 25 more than the majority of the members of the Chamber, therefore everything will depend on the unity of the majority party which, as we have seen in the last twenty years, is by no means certain.
It therefore appears evident that the criticisms of the Boschi reform are unfounded or specious as that relating to the length of the new article 70 which regulates the tasks of the Autonomous Senate. But if so far two lines were enough to say that the Senate does exactly the same things as the Chamber, in the new text it was necessary to clarify in detail what the representatives of regions and municipalities must do. Did you choose to go into too much detail? As always happens, it will then be political practice that will clarify the operating procedures of the two Chambers.
As regards the merits of the reform to be voted on, it is clear that the reasons for a YES are far superior to any imperfections that could lead someone towards a NO. After all, two innovations are enough to push you to vote in favour: equal bicameralism is overcome with the miracle of a Senate voting in favor of its suppression (which will not be repeated easily) e the powers of local autonomies are regulated repairing the mistakes made under the pressure of a ramshackle federalism.
Finally, the NO vote is driven by purely political reasons. Raggi said it candidly: after the no to the Olympics, it takes a second NO to send Renzi home. In short they want to throw overboard a good reform to cripple the government. But for that there will soon be political elections. Then there are the NI, like the pathetic ones of Parisi and Tremonti, who together with D'Alema argue that we need to vote NO to then do better reform. Wishful thinking. Rejecting this reform, which in any case technically has nothing contemptible, means keeping the current system for who knows how many more years, or making it much worse with a new purely proportional electoral law that would not give rise to any government. And this would not help Italy. And perhaps not even the NO Brancaleone army led by Brunetta and the revived Landini.
