The devil is always in the details. The proverb also applies in the case of a possible government program that keeps the M5S and the League together: a solution all in all not only probable but also desirable because it represents the fastest way to get rid of this strange majority whose acts will send, within a few months, Italians to queue in front of ATMs to withdraw the 50 euros per day allowed for you understand.
Let's say that in this program there is a way to combine the two "strong points" (citizen income and the flat tax) which have led the populist forces to victory (at least so analysts say), in the opinion of the writer it will not be sufficient to solve only the problem of the huge resources to be found. The practical consequences that these measures would have in the real context of Italian society and the labor market are not addressed in the debate.
Let's start from Basic income. By now there are many - converts on the road to Damascus - who are scrambling to explain that in reality it is a conditional income support for the search for a job. Basically, a sort of platypus which has both the characteristics of a purely welfare measure and an instrument of active employment policy. So much so that the ''grillina'' proposal provides for a strengthening of the employment centers which, here, are quite unguarded.
A survey by the Labor Commission of the Chamber, in the past legislature, highlighted the great limits relating to the effective intermediation capacity of operators due to the weakness of the employment services system, both on the public and private side: public services contribute to placing only 3,1 per cent of new employees, compared to a European average of 9,4 per cent, while private agencies place around 0,6 per cent of new workers, compared to an average equal to about 1,8 per cent. The observers, in the first place, underline the organizational problems that characterize the employment services system and, in general, the employment policies, noting, in particular, the existing misalignment between the INPS centralized system, which pays the subsidies, and the decentralized system of employment centres, responsible for carrying out active policies. Not to mention the fact that the lack of constitutional reform has left the Regions with exclusive powers in matters of active policies, largely nullifying the founding plan of ANPAL.
What is the problem then? Such a substantial operation is manageable on an economic level (the allowances are very high and increase in relation to the family nucleus) characterized by a very lax conditionality (since the protected subjects are able to evade job offers) and by an administrative system inadequate to implement that same conditionality, moreover in a country where it is estimated that there are 3,5, 30 million undeclared workers? Take the experience of the Youth Guarantee Program co-financed for three years at European and national level as a reference: as at 2017 September 1.239.833 there were 81,1 registrations, net of all official cancellations. Compared to the registrations, the acceptances by the competent services amounted to 55%. 19% of those taken in charge referred to young people aged between 24-34,7, 25% is represented by over 10,3s and the remaining 18% to young people up to 52,4 years of age. As far as the implementation of the program is concerned, 573.076% of the young people taken care of by the services was initiated into an active policy intervention. A total of 61,5 were provided, of which 21,2% is represented by extra-curricular internships. Employment incentives follow with 12,6%. Training is the third most common path (7.974%). With reference only to the interventions managed at the national level, there were 45,7 volunteers sent to the National Civil Service, mainly engaged in projects in the field of Assistance (35%) and Education and cultural promotion (XNUMX%).
In ''Growing Entrepreneurs'', a specific sub-programme, 1.986 young people started the training course aimed at entrepreneurship. The bottom Self-employment admitted to funding 530 applications for business start-ups, committing 17,2% of the total revolving fund. Compared to employment incentives, there were 63.858 recruitments encouraged with the occupational bonus, those with the super bonus 10.945 (the difference between the two forms of subsidy lies in the degree of disadvantage presented by the young person).
For the Incentive ''youth employment'' there were 46.763 confirmed applications for employment. 48,6% of those who concluded an intervention are employed and 68,3% still had work experience at the end of the intervention itself.
These data – in any case referring, in the opinion of the writer, to a non-negative experience – highlight the difficulties that would be encountered in managing millions of people, guaranteeing them a respectable income while training, integration or redeployment at work they would remain in the dossier of good intentions.
Furthermore, the M5S project envisages a possible integration – up to the level established for basic income – of lower wages. This could give rise to fraudulent maneuvers between employers and workers, placing part of the salary at the expense of the community. Proponents of the measure note that illegal practices are punished harshly. But even this aspect is included in the practical difficulty of managing the operation. It should not be forgotten that, during 2017, the inspection services reported 240 irregular work situations, of which 48 totally undeclared.
Coming to flat tax some observations need to be made, even regardless of the question of the progressiveness of taxation as reaffirmed in the Constitution. In this regard – beyond the obvious unsustainability of the League's proposal – more serious projects have been presented (I am thinking of the Bruno Leoni Institute) which entrust the tax with a function of rationalizing the tax system. To this end, not only are there cuts to the forms of tax rebates envisaged by the law (for 54 billion, of which 40 billion for the benefit of natural persons), but also significant increases in VAT (to 25%), without prejudice to the reduced rates .
In essence, the introduction of the flat tax would not be a gala dinner where everyone is celebrating, but a redistribution of the tax levy from income to consumption, with the addition a broadening of the tax base. Then there is another consideration to be made: 60% of Irpef revenue is paid by taxpayers whose income is taxed at the rate of 38% and higher. How do we put it if this rate were reduced, even just to 25%? It is advisable, then, to act with caution and gradually so as not to cause imbalances that could upset public budgets.
