Everyone knows that Italy urgently needs reforms; among these the most urgent is undoubtedly that of public administration. Finally, last Friday after more than a year and three parliamentary passages, the enabling bill got the go-ahead.
Not even twenty-four hours have passed since the approval, however, that a first limitation of the reform has already emerged. This is the article – introduced last summer with Law 114 – which prohibits those who have retired from assuming "managerial or managerial positions in governing bodies of the administrations in companies controlled by the state". With a modification, inserted in these days, the rule has been "softened" allowing the conferment of ipublic offices also to retired workers, but only for one year and only free of charge. The goal is clear: to encourage generational turnover.
If we take the case of Rai's new board of directors, this would mean that four out of nine directors - as they are already retired - would have to carry out their duties without compensation and be replaced two years in advance of the deadline set by the company's statute. A nice mess, which adds to the already many controversies (starting with the one on the alleged usual party subdivision of state television) in progress.
The Treasury offices are already working to make amends. And, as often happens in these cases, there is no shortage of ways out: the rule should not be applied to Rai because it would not be a public company in the strict sense of the term (Istat does not include it in the companies that make up the consolidated account of the public administration) and then because the appointments were decided by the parliament which is not part of the perimeter of the public administration. In short, it is safe to bet that a solution will be found and that the four new directors - guilty of being retired - will not be "affected" by the prohibition established by the Madia Law.
However, it is also to be hoped that the “mess” Rai, this rule is eliminated completely. Because it does not respect two fundamental criteria for the proper functioning of a board of directors: that of diversity and that of fair compensation.
Numerous international studies show that the “diversity”, ie the heterogeneity of the directors (gender, skills, age), helps to produce value within companies. As far as gender diversity is concerned, Italy is undoubtedly one of the countries that has made the greatest progress, thanks to the Golfo-Mosca law, which provides for companies listed on the stock exchange and those under public control that at least one third of the members of the council (one-fifth in the first term) belongs "to the least representative gender", which, needless to say, at least at the moment is female.
The new Rai council, with two women out of nine members, respects the law. Of course, something more could have been expected from a government that has made the strengthening of the female presence in investee companies a strong point, such as that of already anticipating the one-third quota envisaged for the second renewal: that is, three women (such as in the previous advice) instead of two.
Age diversity has also proven to be a source of enrichment for boards of directors. Getting young directors and older directors to interact is the best way to mix dynamism with experience, an innovative drive with pragmatism. Exactly what the Madia Law - in fact - forbids, with the declared aim of favoring the presence of a single class of directors: young people. In this way, the public sector deprives itself of a wealth of knowledge, experience and wisdom and, in some cases, also of intellectual freshness (much greater than that of some young people) which would be precious if placed at the service of the community. Service that, however, must be remunerated. And here we come to the second critical point of the provision in question: the gratuitousness of the role of adviser.
It goes without saying that the proper conduct of the board of directors requires adequate compensation and, above all, the same for all directors. Indeed, article 6.1 of the Code of Self-discipline prescribes that the remuneration of directors must be "established in an amount sufficient to attract, retain and motivate people with the professional qualities required to successfully manage the issuer". How can one think of fulfilling this aim, if retired councilors are forced to work for free?
Therefore, dividing the boards of directors between those who do temporary volunteer work (retirees) and those who instead get paid (young people) risks not being the most suitable way to - effectively - increase the efficiency of public companies, the key objective of public administration reform.
