While newspapers, television and social networks noisily deal with immigration, TAV e CBI, the path of some constitutional reforms is silently proceeding which will be able to substantially and profoundly modify the functioning of our institutions and of our democracy.
A little under the radar, but with a certain speed, Parliament is thus working on the constitutional revision bill which explicitly pursues that model of "direct democracy" to which the 5 Star Movement, when constituting the government, even asked (and obtained!) to name the Ministry of Institutional Reforms. For the Movement, therefore, this is the institutional model to strive for (as widely preached, on the other hand, by the Casaleggio father and son). Direct democracymind you; Not participatory democracy, the latter model to which the current articles 71 and 72 of the Constitution refer, respectively, to the popular initiative bills and the abrogating referendum. It is certainly true that while the institution of the abrogative referendum has been widely used and has become, in various periods of republican history, the instrument for great civil and political battles, the popular legislative initiative has been almost ignored. Both of these institutes would certainly require an extraordinary maintenance intervention that would restore their vitality and effectiveness: a revision of the quorum for the abrogative referendum which, with the current regime, has often frustrated the participation of millions of citizens in the referendum consultation, and a stringent obligation for Parliament to express itself and deliberate on the issues raised by the popular initiative.
However, the reform, already approved by the Constitutional Affairs Commission of the Chamber - and which will also soon be approved by the Chamber - is quite another thing modifies article 71 of the Constitution with the aim (AC1173 A) of introducing the proactive referendum. The original text has improved slightly thanks to the work of the Constitutional Affairs Commission which, paradoxically, on this very occasion confirmed the importance of that work of in-depth study, comparison, correction, impact assessment which is typical of parliamentary work. Under the new mechanism, all bills presented by at least 500.000 voters must be approved by Parliament. Mind you: Parliament is under an obligation not to discuss them, but to approve them. Therefore, hypothetically, the Parliament that has created a centre-right majority would be obliged to approve a proposal typically inspired by the values and objectives of another political alignment.
If the Parliament does not approve, then a referendum is called; if the Parliament then approves the text of popular initiative by introducing changes, then the referendum would concern the two texts, the one promoted by the citizens and the parliamentary one. An absolutely destabilizing mechanism: not only, as many constitutional lawyers have underlined, would there be a continuous opposition between Parliament and the people both on the basic choices inherent in the individual bills and on the possible work of adjustment, rationalization carried out by Parliament on the initiative text popular, work that would be immediately and irrevocably accused of technocratic tampering with the popular will. Furthermore, through the propaganda of social networks, a simplified and superficial, demagogic and populist way of discussing individual issues would be emphasised, a way that would inevitably also drag the Parliament fearful of losing contact with the people and its legitimacy.
On the political level, the effect would be that of a constant continuous fibrillation and precariousness of the Parliament, continually placed in comparison with the people and with the verification of its harmony with the popular feeling. At the risk of perhaps having to note that the political majority that governs the country is not a majority among the people. Obviously no Parliament could realistically legislate with a perspective other than today's immediate one and opt for serious choices, made in the country's interest if viewed in the medium term but unpopular in the immediate term. In this way one of the great problems of our political and institutional system, inherent in the instability of governments, majorities and political direction, would become an unsustainable pathology in the long run.
It is true that during the examination in the Commission some aspects regarding, in particular, the quorum for the approval of the proactive referendum (which is now established in a quarter of those entitled to vote) and in the entrustment to the Constitutional Court improved of the task of a (preventive) verification of the admissibility of popular law proposals, a verification to be carried out, moreover, with respect to criteria - indicated by the law itself - which are extremely unstable. But in this way, since that text for Parliament will be unchangeable, take it or leave it, there will be a sort of political-legislative co-responsibility of the Constitutional Court which will have contributed to authorizing in advance the approval of questionable norms.
There is no doubt that the quality of the legislation, which is already very poor, would suffer a further collapse. Not to mention the financial and hedging profiles that should be indicated by the proponents, who will be very unlikely to be able to quantify the direct and indirect costs of a legislative provision and to trace the means of financial hedging in the budget. Operations that require a level of knowledge of public budgets and of somewhat sophisticated technicalities and which, precisely for this reason, are defined during the legislative process through the relationship and comparison between the Government and Parliament which make use of highly professional apparatus and support structures.
Up to now, only a small number of constitutionalists have contrasted with clear and sharp arguments a proposal which, apparently, seems to broaden the democratic spaces by widening the instruments of popular participation in the activity of the institutions and increasing their incisiveness. However, very sneaky tools, because, behind this appearance, they hide their true nature: that is, that of being a lock pick, a lever for blow up the delicate mechanisms of representative democracy and the parliamentary form of government already made fragile and put to the test by the incapacity of the ruling classes, in the last twenty years, to introduce reforms which, by making the institutions more efficient, would also strengthen their popular legitimacy. The question is grave and serious because up to now I do not know that democratic systems exist in the Western world that are governed only through forms of representative democracy. If the model that inspires the government of change is the South American one so loved by Di Battista then that's another story.
It is therefore not a small reform but a change which, if approved, will have a strong impact on the entire constitutional system. So it's good to discuss it because this awareness increases in Italians.
°° The author was Minister of Regional Affairs in the second Prodi Government and Vice-President of the Senate
