What makes the Italian labor market so inefficient and unfair, in addition to the persistent gap between guaranteed and unsecured, is also the disconnect between the system of social safety nets, the policies of re-employment and the recovery/re-use of factories for employment and development purposes and brownfield sites.
A pro-active employment policy should aim to realign these three moments and bring them back to a synthesis.
– On them social shock absorbers the Fornero reform has already intervened effectively by making a first, clear distinction between those that are essential for the proper functioning of businesses and the safeguarding of employment in moments of temporary crisis (ordinary redundancy fund) or in the restructuring phases (CI for restructuring ) and those which, on the other hand, are aimed at protecting the worker's income during the period of temporary unemployment and which therefore have a welfare nature. The latter (CI for crisis, cessation of activity, in derogation or mobility) should be gradually replaced with a single type of unemployment benefit valid for all workers who find themselves in the same condition. When fully operational, the indemnity should have a limited duration in time and be linked to the active search by the worker who benefits from it for a new job and to the obligation to accept any job offers that may be made to him, on pain of losing the subsidy (as proposed by the British Labor Party). To be able to work and, above all, to be socially sustainable, this reform should however be accompanied by an extraordinary strengthening of active employment policies. In other words, the State and the PA should implement Tools, Incentives and Structures such as to really help job seekers find one. Which today, unfortunately, is not. We have accumulated a delay in this area which will take years to overcome.
– At the origin of this delay is the defense to the bitter end by the trade union organizations and the main political forces of the Public Monopoly of employment. Until 97, the year in which the EU forced us to overcome it, the intermediation of manpower by private structures was considered a crime or, at best, a disguised form of illegal hiring. The Employment agencies, both public (such as Italia Lavoro) and private, have only recently become operational. "Employment Centers", on the model of the English or German Job Centers, that is spread throughout the national territory and able to match the demand and supply of work on a national and, soon, also European scale, there are practically none. Instead, we have provincial employment offices, which are, however, places of unspeakable ineffectiveness and which should be replaced by a network of truly professional employment centers capable of managing not only regulations but projects and social problems.
Apprenticeship and Training and Employment Contracts are still viewed with distrust just as the idea (which is instead the cornerstone of the German system) of the Employment-oriented training because it presupposes a synergistic relationship between the School and the business system which for many, trade unions and political parties, still represents a taboo. In short, there is a great void to fill and to do so it will take time, a strong political will and a good dose of realism. In the immediate term, the instrument that could give the greatest results seems to be that of providing incentives for the hiring of young people and women. A significant reduction in labor costs and an extension of at least three years of the protections provided for by the current art. 18 in exchange for permanent employment could prove to be the best weapon to increase youth and female employment and also to counter the abuse of fixed-term and undeclared work. Even the incentive for companies (in practice 50% of the cost) to resort to outplacement to relocate redundant workers could prove useful not only for workers but also for the State which would save on the cost of social safety nets.
– But the most difficult gap to fill is that relating to the recovery of abandoned industrial areas for employment and production purposes. In the second half of the 90s, the problem of restructuring basic industry arose throughout Europe: chemicals, iron and steel, metallurgy, etc. The resulting problems – closure of large plants, rationalization of the production cycle, privatizations, redundancies to be relocated – were managed by the States in agreement with private entrepreneurs and with the help of the EU. The reclamation has been accompanied by an enhancement of the areas and their total or partial reuse for new production facilities which, in many cases, have created more employment than what existed previously. This was the case in the United Kingdom (particularly in Wales), in Germany, in France and, albeit partially, also in Italy. However, unlike other countries, in Italy, with rare exceptions, the reclamation, rather than being preparatory to the reuse of areas for employment purposes, was limited to making them safe. In other words, the subject responsible for the reclamation was not the same one that should have promoted the areas. Except in the case of Campi (Genoa) and Bicocca (Milan), in all other cases there was no single person responsible for the project as a whole. This explains the failed redevelopment of Bagnoli and the substantial inability to manage the recovery and reconversion of large areas such as Porto Torres or Sulcis. Still today there is a lack of an authoritative political direction and a public entity truly capable of mobilizing private investors, of using European funds and of coordinating initiatives with local authorities.
Yet there are structures such as Invitalia or Fintecna which, suitably directed and coordinated, could very well grapple with these problems. On this terrain, however, at least up to now, we have moved with great difficulty. Legislative Decree 152 of 2006 which allocated 3 billion euros for these policies has never become operational because the Ministry of Development and the Environment have not reached the necessary agreements. In the meantime the 3 billion have ended up in the bottomless pit of exception boxes. Restoring it today does not seem possible while it seems more realistic to start, in agreement with the local authorities, recovery projects for smaller abandoned industrial areas. In recent days, the Ministry of Infrastructures has co-financed 28 projects for the recovery of degraded urban areas (many of which are abandoned industrial areas) which envisage the reclamation, infrastructure and the establishment of new businesses in both the services and in the manufacturing one. The criteria chosen by the Ministry to contribute to their realization were very simple:
a) the project had to be ready for construction immediately;
b) private investment had to be available already;
c) the State contribution was to be used to cover the "last mile", ie to allow its completion.
A similar initiative, dedicated to abandoned industrial areas scattered throughout the national territory, involving local authorities, large national agencies (Invitalia, Finteca and others) and the central government could help transform what are now critical issues into a leverage to create new jobs and promote development.
