But really the problem of competition in Italy passes through the abolition of professional orders, and the liberalization of access to the profession of lawyer provided for in art. 39 bis of the manoeuvre? And how can this prediction be reconciled with the statements of those who complain that in Italy there are more than 200 lawyers and in France about a fifth, and that this overabundance of professionals is one of the causes of the dysfunctions of our civil justice?
Of course, Italian lawyers are like public debt: too many. And like the public debt resulting from abuses that have characterized access procedures for decades. So that in certain areas of Italy, where flourishing competition tourism activities had developed, 99 percent of the candidates passed the competition. But it's hard to say that this inflation has restricted competition. Also because after the Bersani reforms and the self-reforms of the Advocacy, many things are changing. Just the exchange between offices in the evaluation of the competition papers has drastically reduced the access percentages. While, having established the derogation of the minimum fees, the entrepreneurial spirit of some professionals has revealed itself in the "shops" of street lawyers who are reducing costs and facilitating access to consultancy. There is resistance, but that's what the Antitrust is for. Provided that the reform under discussion in Parliament does not take the world back forty years.
Instead, are we sure that the persistence with lawyers, strengthened by a large crowd of parliamentarians, is not a way to confuse the waters and thus avoid addressing the real knots of the world of professions? Which are the exclusives, the limited number and the limits on the methods of carrying out the activity, in particular the protective rules on the minimum rates, on the prohibition of advertising and the limits on professional companies.
Exclusives: they are justified when they respond to a public interest in that a certain activity is carried out only by those with specific training. This certainly applies to medical assistance and defense in court, but does not appear so evident in many other cases, ranging from legal consultancy to the transfer of real estate or registered assets (or shares and quotas in companies) in which the performance could well be provided by at least several competent professionals.
Even where an exclusivity can be justified, as in the case of the sole pharmacist authorized to sell medicines, the ways of exercising it are often unjustified. For example, the law provides that pharmacies can only be managed by individual pharmacists: this provision "one pharmacy, one pharmacist" therefore prevents aggregations of pharmacies that could exploit economies of scale or vertical integrations with distribution companies, making it possible to reduce the intermediation margin on medicines, also established by the rules.
The anti-competitive effect of the exclusivity is amplified by the closed and very limited number that characterizes some professions: even in the presence of existing exclusivity, if anyone who had passed an extremely difficult notary exam could practice the profession, it would be difficult to maintain professional rates at current levels . But the limitation of the number of notaries to less than 6000 (among other things never fully covered) often with exclusive territorial de facto guarantees the absolute rigidity of the market for notarial services.
Finally, the methods for carrying out the professions. Naturally the professional tariffs: which should represent at most a point of reference for the user, and therefore be maximum and derogable, and which instead are used as an instrument of competition discipline, under the cloak of professional decorum. Then, the ban on advertising, which often extends to all forms of communication. And the limits to the provision in an associated and corporate form, which prevent us from structuring the provision of services efficiently. Then, the stroke of the pen on Orders and access limits of art. 39 bis only risks being a diversion. It galvanizes the electorate on an unattainable and in any case undesirable goal: it does not help the user to be able to choose among so-called professionals whose competence there is no guarantee. There is a risk of repeating the inflationary experience of the legal profession elsewhere. Instead, the way forward is to eliminate the exclusive rights and the restrictive provisions foreseen by the different statutes of the professions. It's not a difficult task either. Since 1995, the Antitrust Authority has sent dozens of reports on the subject: it is only a question of reading them with a clear mind.
