Un Turkish protectorate with Russian enclaves and recognition for the Kurds. Fantasy politics? Or could this be the political future of Syria in the aftermath of the end of the Assad regime, his escape to Moscow and the birth of a new power in Damascus? Obviously it cannot but be, at the moment, a matter of geopolitical analysis since the actors are all on stage playing their part, starting with the main ones, the rebels who have taken power, gathered in the Hts, the dominant movement of the galaxy that goes under the name of “Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham”, that is, “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant”, the ancient name for Syria and its surroundings.
Their leader, Al Jolani, continues to reassure the world by inviting people not to fear his government because, not only does it not intend to introduce persecutory rules, but it is in time, it will back down in March, when, it is understood but has not been said, there should be elections.
Let us then return to the hypothesis of the new Syria under the influence of Türkiye, with significant Russian and Kurdish presences.
The Turkish protectorate is in fact already a fact, first of all because the rebel forces that now sit in the halls of power in Damascus have been armed and supported by Ankara since the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011. And so they have objectively become its “non-state intermediaries”, the “agents” who pursue its interests on the territory, according to the unwritten rules of the so-called “proxy war theory”.
To put it more simply, the puppeteer was Erdogan and it would be strange if it did not continue to be so. The proof of this reasoning is provided by Valeria Giannotta, scientific director of the Turkish Observatory of Cespi (Italian Center for International Political Studies), university professor in Istanbul, Gaziantep and Ankara, great expert on Turkish dynamics and brilliant popularizer (Editor's note: in the photo below)
It was not a given – the scholar argues – that the new masters of Syria would win, encountering practically no resistance. If it happened, it is because something went wrong in the Sultan's relations with the Rais of Damascus.
Syria and Türkiye: Let's reconnect the threads of analysis
Turkey, which militarily occupies a strip of territory north of Aleppo in Syria, given the heated times in the entire Middle Eastern region, between real wars (that of Israel in Gaza and Lebanon) and feared (Iran's reaction), has an interest in maintaining its influence in the area, if only to ensure a buffer zone for the security of its borders. This area is actually Turkish in all respects: Turkish currency circulates there, electricity and telephone services are connected to the Turkish network, and school textbooks are in Turkish.
It is plausible to imagine – explains Giannotta – that Erdogan asked Assad for some sort of green light to officially remain in that area in exchange for stopping the militiamen who had started marching in the meantime.
And it is equally likely, given how things went, that Assad did not want to hear about it, probably counting on thePutin's support, his main protector, to stop the Turk's aims. Without realizing that times had completely changed and that Syria had disappeared from the Tsar's political horizon, who was now much more interested in weaving the threads to close the Ukraine dossier, in order to emerge from that quagmire as little bruised as possible.
And certainly the astute Erdogan, who in these years of war has carved out the role of mediator between Moscow and Kiev, could be useful to him when he has to line up friends and enemies.
Syria and the Russian Enclave Hypothesis
According to this reasoning, Putin would have put a good face on a bad game in the confrontation with Erdogan, leaving Syria without a fight and also taking away the cumbersome former dictator. A sort of: "I'll let you do Recip, but you owe me a favor".
Because it is true that Putin did not make a good impression, humiliated by the ease of the rebels' victory, but it appears equally clear that he is not willing to lose anything beyond his face.
Let's think about the military bases that Moscow occupies in Syria, the naval one of Tartous, on the Mediterranean coast, and the air one of Khmeimim, not far from the port city of Latakia. Indeed, it is likely that this was also part of the exchange with Erdogan and, through him, with the new arrivals, who, moreover, immediately rushed to declare that Moscow's bases would not be touched.
And there is another reasoning that the Turks are making in these hours, the effects of which are already visible, and it concerns the four million plus Syrian immigrants who were welcomed into the country following the civil war. Also thanks to the agreements with Europe (Eu-Turkey Joint Action Plan, 2016) that Ankara paid (6 billion euros) to keep. Agreements signed again in 2020, but which Erdogan would do without because – as Giannotta reminds us – the The immigration issue is a loose cannon for the Turkish government (and not only) so much so that last year it dominated the electoral campaign. Now, with the fall of the Syrian regime, there is a concrete possibility that the refugees will return home, something that is already happening and that Erdogan is facilitating.
And theKurdish enclave? The issue in this case is more complex. First of all we are talking about the second largest ethnic group in Syria after the Arabs, more or less 4 million people, distributed in the north of the country, but also in the surroundings of Aleppo and Damascus. Forced to flee or take up arms following the Syrian government's policy of "Arabization" (60s), which intended to make the national ethnic group homogeneous, The Kurds have been looking for their place in the sun for years. They do it in Syria, but also in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, where the policies of homogenization of populations have been the same.
In Syria the Kurds have (almost) found a place
It is called the “Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria”, a de facto autonomous region, also known as “Rojava”, which in Kurdish means “West”, perhaps because it is mainly the US and Westerners who guarantee its existence. The date of its establishment is March 21, 2014, but in reality “Rojava” was born starting from 2012, initially in areas with a Kurdish majority, while the civil war was exploding and the Islamic State occupied a large part of Northeast Syria; then, by chasing away the ISIS militias, it also expanded into areas occupied by Arabs, Assyrians and Turkmen. As everyone admits, it is also thanks to them that the Islamic State in Syria was defeated: will they be rewarded? Or abandoned this time too, as happened after the Iraqi wars?
Syria: How Turkey's Role Comes Back into Play
“Yekineyen Parastina Gel”, that is, “Military Protection Unit”, an actor that is perceived by Erdogan as an outpost of the Communist Party, the PKK, Enemy of the Past and Present.
But in the Middle East nothing is forever. For example, something unpredictable until recently is happening in Turkey and it could lead to big changes, in Damascus as in Ankara.
It all started – Giannotta tells the story – on October 22, when Devlet Bahçeli, secretary general of the nationalist party (MHP), from the podium of parliament, invited the leader and founder of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, to declare the end of the armed struggle. Öcalan, let us remember, has been imprisoned for 25 years, the only inmate, on the prison island of Imrali, in the Sea of Marmara. A historic speech by Bahçeli because he is one of the most influential politicians in the country, a man of the right, who does not expose himself for mere reasons of political convenience.
This means that Ankara intends to return to the negotiating table with the Kurds after years of numerous failures. Why does it happen? Because the Türkiye fears serious political instability in the region, caused, as we know, first by the terrorist attack by Hamas on October 7 last year; and then by the terrifying reaction of the Israeli state, which extended the war to Lebanon with targeted attacks on Iran.
Erdogan needs peace first and foremost within his borders, and first of all with the kurdsi, to face any eventuality. And to do this Öcalan's role is crucial. Will it actually happen? It is impossible to say, but it is true that history in that region of the world is at an important crossroads, which means that change has as much chance of succeeding as stalemate.
In short, it could even happen that the new Turkish Constitution that Erdogan wants recognizes the autonomy, identity, culture and language of the Kurds. In addition to obviously, the possibility for him to stand again for election, as Giannotta concludes. It seems like fantasy politics, but who can say they are certain that it is?
