For a classification of populisms
These days the latest book by is available in bookstores and on online platforms (in paper and digital format). Ferruccio Cappelli, director of the Casa della Cultura in Milan, and attentive commentator on modernity who, still one of the few to do so, observes from the field of vision of humanism. If Italians aren't looking at the world from this observatory, who else could they be? Ferruccio Cappelli's latest book has a rather claustrophobic and somewhat Kafkaesque title, but it conveys the current state of things well, it is called "The future on you. Uncertainty, fear and the populist drug” published by Guerini and associates.
In its own way, this can be a book that ascribes to the vein, which counts many contributions and titles in the Anglo-Saxon world, of essays of all kinds on crisis of liberal democracies and political liberalism in its different and extensive vulgates. A theme that we too have dealt with with various posts and to which the English magazine and think-tank, “The Economist”, is dedicating spasmodic attention. Of course, Cappelli's approach is different and reflects the political sensitivity, experiences and history of the societies of continental Europe which differ in many respects from those of the countries of Anglo-Saxon formation and culture. But the theme is common, because the problem is common.
Of this intense, participated and beautiful book, we would like propose chapter 12 to the readers which, with a good imagination, tries to classify the various types of populism, a phenomenon that has a higher liquidity than water. Therefore, Cappelli's attempt at enlightenment can only be applauded.
Here is the excerpt:
In common parlance the term "populism" is used indifferently in the singular and in the plural: for understandable reasons. Populism indicates a mood, a style, a mentality: in the previous chapter we enucleated the messages that populisms have in common. At the same time we have to deal with the fact that it manifests itself in a thousand different forms, often in conflict with each other.
Forza Italia and the League, two formations with evident populist traits, are electorally allied but have very different programs and objectives, to the point that the League has formed a government with the 5 Star Movement which Forza Italia considers the most dangerous opponent. Again: the League points to Orbán's Hungary as its political model, but Orbán is the most stubborn opponent of that common European responsibility on immigration loudly claimed by the populist Italian government.
Or, looking overseas: Trump and Obrador, presidents of the United States and Mexico respectively, are both blatantly populists, but pursue opposing interests. Indeed, the political turnaround in Mexico with the election of a progressive populist like Obrador is clearly a response in the name of national pride to Trump's aggressive rhetoric against Mexican and South American immigrants.
The populist camp is extremely plural, variegated: you need an interpretative grid to orient yourself. This is why the problem of classifying populisms, i.e. of subdividing and grouping them into different tendencies, cannot be avoided. An operation that presents many difficulties given the fluid nature of populisms, ideologically indefinable and politically very flexible.
With a careful work of comparison six trends can be identified. But with a caveat: none exist in their pure state. They can mix and overlap with each other: the difference lies in what prevails. This fluidity, a real headache for scholars, is probably one of the reasons for the strength of populism, or rather: of populisms.
National-populism
There is no doubt: the most widespread and most significant trend is national-populism. easily understandable reasons: the reference to the national community is the first and most natural protection against globalization. It should be noted that the United States, the country which has played the leading role in the construction of neoliberal globalisation, is also one of the countries which, with the presidency Trump, has taken the path of national-populism with more determination.
Europe follows closely: the Brexit it is the most clamorous result of national-populism which, however, is spreading in almost all European countries. The European Union has become the catalyst for the national-populist arrows, portrayed as a bureaucratic organization, distant from the citizens, insensitive to the requests for flexibility from national governments, subordinate to the most powerful country, Germany. Among the consequences of national-populism: the return of border controls in Europe. Indeed, the borders between some countries belonging to the Union have been sealed again to prevent the movement of immigrants and refugees.
Nationalism is making a comeback in many countries of the world and, generally, it is supported by new formations with marked populist traits. Who, in order to restore voice and power to citizens, to limit the power of global finance and giant multinationals, re-propose national sovereignty: neo-nationalists, in fact, love to define themselves as sovereigns.
Identity populism
Many populisms raise the banners of ethnic and cultural identity. They are waved as a barrier to immigration: against Islamic immigration, or, in the largely prevalent variant, against any type of immigration from poor countries.
Identity populism can also serve to mark the difference with internal minorities, such as, for example, the Roma minority, where, especially in some Eastern European countries, the presence of Roma has historically been significant.
Ethnic identity can also be flaunted to support the independence claims of national and linguistic minorities. Europe abounds in regionalisms that have gradually transformed into identity neonationalisms: the claim to ethnic and cultural identity has become radicalized in these years of rampant populism and claims to national independence have multiplied.
Patrimonial populism
This is the most appropriate definition for populisms that aim to defend tangible and intangible heritage, i.e. a condition of well-being threatened by newcomers. The populism of the Scandinavian countries, with the request to limit the right to welfare to the "true" Finns and so on, is largely attributable to this trend.
The same theme runs through so many other populist narratives. The national-populists of the Front National, for example, make full use of the argument that only the French are entitled to the protection of the nation state. In this case it becomes a request to strengthen national-populism.
There are also independence claims that move within this framework: a region as rich as the Catalonia it wishes to detach itself from the Spanish nation-state by virtue of its linguistic and cultural tradition, but also in order not to share and not redistribute its tax revenue with the poorest parts of the country. In this case it is a question of populist style and mentality used to reassure the concerns of those who benefit from relatively privileged conditions.
Anti-political populism
This is a trend that permeates many populisms, even substantially different ones: movements that propose a radical critique of the political system have been spreading in many countries. The themes proposed have an even surprising recurrence not only from country to country but also between different historical phases: the party that has just triumphed in the Indian state of New Delhi is called the Common Man's Party, a name almost indistinguishable from the Party of the Everyman which raged in southern Italy after the war.
Two different impulses can be identified in this trend: a demand for a radical renewal of democracy or the proposition of the darkest anti-democratic moods. There are populisms that are strongly affected by only one of the aforementioned thrusts, while in other populist movements the two thrusts can coexist, meeting and mixing.
Generally all these movements wave the fight against corruption as their first banner. But in an instant this criticism extends to all politicians and easily ends up leading to criticism of the party system as such. One step further and we arrive at the critique of parliament itself, portrayed as a place for exhausting discussions and mediations that a strong man or government could resolve in an instant. Anxiety for renewal and reactionary impulses can therefore mix in a disruptive mixture.
In reality, this populism proposes a critique of politics in the name of another politics: a cleaner, more direct, or even more determined politics. The success that this populist trend is enjoying sounds like a scathing denunciation of the impoverishment of politics in the age of neoliberal globalization.
Media populism
This definition does not look at the contents of the populist narrative, but at the means by which it is imposed, i.e. the unscrupulous and overwhelming use of the media system.
In this regard, the story of Berlusconi and Forza Italia is exemplary: at the time of his "entering the field" Berlusconi's arguments did not differ substantially from the neoliberal vulgate. The novelty lay in the use of the media, of the televisions owned by Berlusconi himself, through which he was able to build a direct relationship with his constituents. Berlusconi in the media he built «his» party, he invented «his» people, he chose «his» enemies. Forza Italia in a quarter of a century has never needed a congressional verification: the leader, protected by the barrage of his televisions and strong in his personal assets, has decided, organized, chosen, unmade at his pleasure. Forza Italia has changed its name several times and changed its alliances several times thanks to the protective barrier of the media power of its leader.
Recently, the category of has also been proposed digital populism, really just a variation of media populism. The Internet radicalises some populist tendencies: virtual contact via social media accentuates the bond between the leader and his people who feel involved in the decision-making process despite having only a binary option: «like» or «no like». At the same time the virtual contact without the direct personal one allows to exacerbate the aggression against the enemy, to insert notes and tones of authentic barbarism. Without personal contact with the interlocutor, unimaginable freedoms can be granted: unrestrained insults and aggressions. From this point of view, there is no doubt that digital populism represents a further evolution, an exacerbation and barbarism of media populism.
Populism by contagion
In an environment saturated with populism, even those who do not have a populist narrative can resort to a populist style. This is exactly what happened to the center-left leader Matteo Renzi who made full use of populist techniques and styles.
With a different climate in the country it would not have been possible to unleash a campaign within his party for the "scrapping", against the "owls" and the "rosiconi": these tones, unusual in the internal dialectic of a party, have been legitimized by the general populist context. The same can be said for political choices which Renzi often resorted to during his presidency of the Council. Like the donation of 80 euros to workers, not foreseen in any electoral program, without discussion and negotiation with the social partners, on the initiative and personal decision of the leader: a typical act of populist government.
The Italian experience amply demonstrates that, when populism takes hold in a country, it is difficult to escape its grip. It conditions all public life; immerses her in a climate and style that tend to be transmitted to all political protagonists.
Right-wing populisms and left-wing populisms?
In an era in which the ordinary right-left classification is often denied, there are indeed populisms that can hardly respond to this type of classification. Giving voice to the insecurity and isolation of sections of the people can lead both to the right and to the left: it can lead to resentful revenge against those who are even weaker, against immigrants, against the last and very last, or in the planning of a social protection system. The same goes for the critique of politics: it can flow back into the suggestions of the party of order and the strong man, as it can also blossom into a project of democracy revitalized by transparency and participation.
In any case today populist formations mostly assume right-wing connotations. The questions they raise are in fact tackled by evoking closure, retreat, going backwards, with a cultural approach that tends to merge with the more conservative thrusts: nationalism, safeguarding of privileges, limitation of the civil rights of foreigners, liberalization of carrying weapons, militarization of public spaces, etc.
However, this outcome is not always and necessarily obvious. As demonstrated by the few existing left-wing populisms, it is possible to tackle the same issues with other cultural frameworks, under the sign of openness, equality, universalism, a confident gaze towards the future. In this way they arrive at political objectives and programs that effectively fall within the scope of the left.
In Europe Podemos and France Insoumise, formations that claim their populist origins, are undoubtedly located on the left. The same is true for some Central and South American populisms, such as those of the Mexican Obrador and the Bolivian Morales. But classifying populisms according to their position on the right-left axis would be simplistic.
Populisms, in fact, are not formed to position themselves on the right or on the left: the concern of populist leaders while forming «their» people is not to position themselves along the right-left axis. Their operation generally arises and develops for other reasons: to give protection and representation to sections of the people, to defend and represent ethnic and cultural realities, to heal and reinvent politics. Their place on the right or left of the political spectrum depends on how these demands combine and on the context in which they fit.
The prevalence of one or the other option depends on many factors: on the choices of the management groups, on the general context, on the cultural orientations prevailing in society. In short, the game of orienting the various populisms in one direction or another always tends to reopen.
A definition
There are many definitions of populism: evidently it is not easy to encapsulate a tumultuous, complex, ambiguous phenomenon such as populism in a few words.
But, at the conclusion of these three chapters dedicated to the analysis of populism and populisms, it becomes inexorable to summarize briefly, as in a definition, the conclusions we have reached.
From which it can be deduced that populism is a mood, a style, a mentality which, in its many expressions, re-proposes the centrality of the people, enhances the function of the leader and defines itself through the invention and identification of the enemy. It, in its thousand different embodiments, has become the predominant political form at the time of the crisis of neoliberal globalization, in the era of disintermediated democracy, of loneliness and insecurity, of disorientation, when the gaze of human beings turns to the past because the future seems to roll over them.
