Il collapse of the Genoa bridge it was a tragedy that will remain in the memory of Italians for a long time. A very serious fact, perhaps emblematic of the mismanagement of public affairs, the confusion of powers, the lack of real controls. It is true that catastrophes of this kind are not exclusively Italian (just remember the collapse of the Miami bridge last February) but here everything appears more catastrophic both for the characteristics of our territory and for the insane management that the public authorities make of the post-event.
Il Minister Toninelli, but rather the whole Government, instead of immediately thinking about how to deal with the emergency and above all how to quickly organize the reconstruction of that fundamental artery for Genoa, its port, and all of northern Italy which has to send its goods by sea, started in fourth gear at the “search for the enemy” to the identification of the “guilty” to point out to the anger of the population, however slipping into a tangle of contradictions that will make reconstruction longer and more expensive. So much so that more than a month after the tragic event the decree to support Genoa has not yet been passed and to start the rebuild. Even on the extraordinary commissioner to be appointed to do the work quickly, it is still pitch dark, or rather a dispute between the two government partners.
We got to the absurd that Prime Minister Conte, a fine jurist, declared: "we cannot wait for the times of justice to punish the guilty". Minister Toninelli, as well as the two vice-presidents, waved their arms to accuse Autostrade of all wickedness and to say that the reconstruction of the bridge cannot be entrusted to the Benetton concessionaire, but must be done directly by the State. Not realizing that in this way they risk lengthen the time dramatically due to the need to tender for tenders and above all to finance the work immediately from the state budget as well as compensation to the Autostrade company which they would like to cancel the concession.
A mess from which it will be difficult to get out quickly and well. To try to shed some light on the labyrinth and perhaps identify a solution characterized by speed of time, safety of the building and no expense charged to the public budget, the Reformism and Freedom Foundation, chaired by Fabrizio Cicchitto organized a conference in Montecitorio which was attended by, among others, Ettore Incalza and Vito Gamberale.
One came out pragmatic and effective path with which to deal with immediate problems as well as a series of notations on the organization of our concessions and authorizations for major works, which should be taken into consideration by a responsible government which does not only want to make short-term propaganda but which aims at an effective recovery and revitalization of the country.
First we need to clarify that the Autostrade company has "objective liability" of the disaster and who therefore has the duty, not only the right, to remedy it in the shortest possible time, except then, once the judicial, civil and penal responsibilities have been ascertained, to respond fully.
For the moment, the motorways are providing emergency support to the people involved in the disaster, but it would be necessary to reach an agreement for real compensation (in this case without waiting for justice) to both the people and the companies involved as soon as possible.
The idea of not having Autostrade build the bridge encounters technical obstacles and judges formidable. And it's not just a question of finding the funding to repair the damage, but also those for a possible revocation of the concession or for a nationalization which, according to preliminary estimates, would amount to almost 20 billion euros.
A lengthy judicial dispute would open which not only would cost the state coffers dearly, but, and this would be even more serious, it would lengthen the reconstruction times and thus bring Genoa and Liguria to their knees, which have already suffered greatly from the long crisis of last decade. Instead it would be much wiser, as the Governor of Liguria Toti claims, have Autostrade pay for everything immediately both the reconstruction of the bridge, and those of the houses that will be damaged by the works, and perhaps even all or part of the compensation to all those damaged. And this would not affect any disputes on the revocation of the concession or on other problems that the investigations of the judiciary should highlight.
Instead it appears Fincantieri's position is ambiguous which proposed itself as the builder of the bridge but which has no specific experience in that sector. And in any case, it would not be possible to entrust the work directly to Fincantieri but an international tender would be required, according to European rules. Which means at least two years of delay.
A government that does not want to speculate on this enormous tragedy in order to consolidate in the minds of the voters the idea that everything that came before it was tainted by incapacity or theft, but which favors the general interest would therefore act pragmatically by obtaining Autostrade all the compensation due, and maybe something more, and above all avoiding isolating Genoa from the rest of the world for too long.
Then it is clear that this experience must teach us at least two basic problems which must not be dropped. In the first place it is necessary review the functioning of the relationship between the grantor (the State) and the concessionaire so that there are more checks and more quickly; and secondly to rethink all the rules that regulate large contracts and which, as a result, require very long times before the work can be completed.
The experience of the Gronda di Genova and in the past that of the bypass of the Florence-Bologna section should teach something to a ruling class that is farsighted, that is, one that knows how to imagine future dangers and act in time to prevent them.
