Just a few weeks before the first riots broke out in Tunisia, the International Monetary Fund had published a report which showed how much the countries of North Africa and the Middle East (Mena) had easily overcome the economic and financial crisis. In the 2010 the Egyptian and Syrian economies had grown at rates of more than 5%, while the Tunisian and Moroccan ones had touched 4%, almost double the growth in America and above all in Europe. Thus the unemployment rate of many Arab oil-importing countries was declining, albeit slowly, from the traditionally high values. The rise in oil pricesor, which was close to USD 100 a barrel at the end of the year, they also made the development prospects of the Gulf countries excellent, which depend very significantly on crude oil prices. Certainly the increase in the prices of agricultural commodities, exceeding 30%, raised some concerns, but the network of subsidies set up was more than sustainable by public budgets and comfortable official reserves.
Even from a political point of view the situation appeared apparently relatively calm. In Egypt in November 2010 the parliamentary elections gave Mubarak's NDP a triumphant victory in a climate of uncertainty regarding the president's health conditions and the usual electoral fraud. In Tunisia and Syria the position of Ben Ali and Assad appeared solid, while nel Yemen political life was punctuated by the usual attacks, but Saleh's position was not questioned by anyone, also because he was unconditionally supported by the Saudis.
Yet a delay in the socio-economic development of the area could already be registered then. And at the basis of this backwardness there is, in our opinion, the lack of openness to the rest of the world and a development model based more on import-substitution than on export-led. In this way, the MENA countries have not been able to take advantage of the globalization process which has affected the planet in recent decades and which has played a fundamental role in determining the extraordinary growth of Asian countries.
In the last thirty years many countries of the globe have undergone a democratic evolution, thanks to the fall of the Soviet empire, the end of many military regimes in Latin America and the crumbling of numerous Asian dictatorships. The Middle East, from this point of view, has not experienced a similar evolution at all and represents, in this respect, a regrettable exception. The longevity of governments is nothing more than an indicator of political sclerosis.
How do you explain such a delay? There is ample empirical evidence showing that richer countries tend to be more democratic and less rarely turn into authoritarian dictatorships. This is the so-called "modernization theory”, which has its roots in the Enlightenment philosophers of the XNUMXth century. Obviously this is not a deterministic relationship since many other factors influence both the economic development and the political regime of a country. From our point of view the most interesting aspect is that almost all Arab countries seem to have exceeded the income threshold considered essential for the development of democratic institutions. This is, of course, especially true for oil producers who have higher per capita incomes.
In these countries what many scholars call la is amply confirmed curse of the state reindeer: low economic growth, strong probability of civil wars and low propensity to develop democratic institutions. Neither the theoretical-doctrinal analysis, nor the historical and econometric evidence, which we have revisited, seem capable of giving definitive answers regarding the contribution of Islam to economic-institutional development. On the other hand, it would seem that Islamic countries present somewhat differentiated socio-economic situations and depend, rather, on the geographical area to which they belong. Typical is the case ofIndonesia, which has managed to join the chariot of the Asian tigers, or that of Turkey, which fortunately still maintains strong ties with Europe.
In recent years economic and political science have also shown how ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious fragmentation can be a strong obstacle to the process of economic growth and to the creation of efficient and democratic institutions. From this point of view we show how the Arab countries are much less homogeneous than it might appear in the eyes of a Westerner. This strong heterogeneity of the area seems to be a factor that helps explain the poor economic development and the backwardness of the institutions.
All this allows us to build some scenarios for the future. And especially the most important game will be played on the macroeconomic terrain in the coming years. If it is true that the main problem of the countries of North Africa and the Middle East has been a development model that is too closed and unwilling to integrate with the rest of the world, only a different political-cultural attitude towards the outside world will allow the economies of Arab countries to find the right pace of growth. This was, moreover, the attitude that accompanied the Arab world in the moment of its best splendour. This would also be the best vitamin to strengthen the young shoots of Arab democracies.
