It is difficult to understand whether in the latest controversy on pensions are prevalent bad faith or l 'incompetenceAt first glance it should be attributed the first vice to political and trade union opposition, the second in government; in reality there is a transversal mix of bad faith and incompetence that could be easily traced back to the penal code (article 656: ''Spreading of false, exaggerated and tendentious news capable of disturbing public order''), in the knowledge that when we talk about pensions the result is guaranteed. Where is the weak point that has turned politics upside down?
Pensions and INPS, what happened?
INPS would have taken responsibility for deciding on its own and in secret an increase in the retirement age that is, from 2027 the eligibility requirements for early retirement, regardless of age, would rise from the current 42 years and 10 months and one year less for women to 43 years and 1 month of contributions; while from 2029 they would reach 43 years and 3 months. Presumably, in both cases, with one year less for women. There would also be increases for the old-age pension, with the minimum age rising to 67 years and 3 months in 2027 and to 67 years and 5 months in 2029. Just thinking that this is possible is proof of widespread confusion not only among those who spread this information, but also among those who take it seriously. A XNUMXth century sage used to say that the height of human stupidity was to be surprised in the morning to wake up the same way you went to bed in the evening: a biting consideration to describe the latest scandal... by chance.
Because there is nothing in the matter that was not foreseen under previous legislative acts. Let's take a look at history. The Dini/Treu reform (law no. 335/1995) introduced the so-called contributory calculation, integral for new insured persons from 1 January 1996, pro rata for those who at the end of 1995 had not yet accrued 18 years of contributory seniority (and therefore with the mixed calculation for two periods). Those who had passed 18 years remained in the retributive regime. The Fornero reform of 2011, in practice, introduced, for everyone, the pro rata contributory calculation starting from 1 January 2012, so that all future pensions not entirely contributory, were regulated by the mixed system: retributive calculation until the end of 2011, contribution from the beginning of the following year. In practice, today all pensioners have at least 12 years in a growing contributory regime, while the part still regulated by the retributive system is decreasing.
We know how the contributory system works (in whole or in part): the contributions paid and credited (in a financing system that remains pay-as-you-go) constitute the so-called amount that is multiplied by the so-called transformation coefficients adjusted to the retirement age; the operation gives rise to the economic treatment that is generally added, in the mixed system, to the portion that remains in the retributive regime. The transformation coefficients are subject to periodic review with an effect inversely proportional to life expectancy.: if this increases the multipliers – the reasons are obvious – they are reduced to compensation for a longer period of pension payment. In 2010 it was established that between the two increases – limited to the retirement age – an automatic mechanism was introduced after a three-year periodic check.
The 2011 Fornero reform extended the automaticity also to the contributory requirement required for early retirement regardless of the age restriction and with a biennial review. Legislative Decree no. 4 of 2019 (in which the yellow-green government presented its credentials) moved – as far as pensions are concerned – to favor, as the League wanted, seniority retirement and allow for the lowest possible age requirement. The measures aimed at these objectives were two: share 100, the most spectacular, for the duration of three years; the freeze on requirements until 2026 at the point they had reached at that time, that is, 67 years for old age (subject to the minimum requirement of at least 20 years of contributions); 42 years and 10 months for men and one less for women to access early retirement.
In the meantime, some secondary escape routes were also introduced and reconfirmed, perhaps with some modifications. Particular attention should be given to the so-called quotas which, after the three-year period of quota 100, were supposed to guarantee the transition and which, in the space of a few years, became a disincentive to advance. In a fortunate recovery of wisdom, in its budget laws, the center-right government brought forward by two years the deadline for the blocking of the automatic adjustment to the increase in life expectancy.
Thus, instead of 2027, the mechanism – which regains the central role it had in the Fornero reform – has started again from 1 January of this year. However, the entire caravan of contributory calculations had not been blocked. In fact, while the requirements for access to retirement had been blocked, the periodic review of the transformation coefficients had continued, to be multiplied by the contributory amount for the purposes of the amount of the treatment, also adjusted to life expectancy. In fact, it had been published in Official Gazette n. 147 of 11 June 2020 with the decree of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies of 1 June 2020 the three-yearly review of the transformation coefficients of the contribution amount, of which the complete act is reported below. The competent minister was Andrea Orlando in the yellow-red government (those who scream the loudest today).
TRANSFORMATION COEFFICIENTS
Age | Dividers | Values |
57 | 23,892 | 4,186% |
58 | 23,314 | 4,289% |
59 | 22,734 | 4,399% |
60 | 22,149 | 4,515% |
61 | 21,558 | 4,639% |
62 | 20,965 | 4,770% |
63 | 20,366 | 4,910% |
64 | 19,763 | 5,060% |
65 | 19,157 | 5,220% |
66 | 18,549 | 5,391% |
67 | 17,938 | 5,575% |
68 | 17,324 | 5,772% |
69 | 16,707 | 5,985% |
70 | 16,090 | 6,215% |
71 | 15,465 | 6,466% |
(NB discount rate = 1,5%)
The mechanism relating to the coefficients (not to be confused with the requirements) was then continued with other biennial checks, from which – all other things being equal – a downward adjustment arose (in a direction inversely proportional to the increase in life expectancy and other parameters, compared to the effects of the previous coefficients. Thus the new coefficients that determine the contributory share (total or partial) of the pension allowance they decreased by between 1,55% and 2,18% (all other things being equal). But it doesn't end there: and this is where the problem lies.
In two years, during the new adjustment from 2027, it is likely that there will be some changes that require adjustments to the access requirements., in the amount anticipated at the beginning, for both types of pension, ordinary and early. These are the adjustments to the demographic forecasts, regarding life expectancy, which are unanimously shown by all the simulators (Istat, Inps, Rgs). Although demography is increasingly appearing as an exact science, it is not a given that the trends will necessarily be these. They will be certified in due time by Istat and to be assumed an administrative provision of the government in office at the time will be necessary. In the meantime however - we hope not - the legislation could also have changed.
Towards the end of the XVII legislature, two authoritative parliamentarians from opposing sides Cesare Damiano e Maurice Sacconi (both former Ministers of Labour) proposed to block the revision of the coefficients in view of a redefinition of the matter, obtaining the block only for those who were already classified in other provisions (social bee, early retirement) as they were exposed to work or personal situations of hardship.
But it would be wise to use caution., given that this legislation, now reintroduced, is able to guarantee a greater containment of pension expenditure due to thecorrect balance between pension amount, contribution payments made, calculation according to actuarial criteria of life expectancy and the consequent provision and collection of the benefit. In essence, INPS had limited itself to modifying the simulator, implementing the new regulations (deriving from the unblocking) and relating it to the hypothesized increases in life expectancy in the coming years. The complicit fury of the CGIL and the Lega demanded and obtained the cancellation of a trivial actuarial exercise.