The history of the (early) old-age pension is woven into the same watermark as the history of the country. To realize this, it is sufficient to go back to its origins (sheet 1).
Card 1
1965 – With law n. 903, early retirement with 35 years of contributory seniority was introduced into the Ago regulations. Any prohibition on accumulation was also abolished, so that seniority pensioners could have access to the benefit without even interrupting their employment relationship.
1968 – It was immediately understood that, in perspective, the introduction of the old-age pension had been a mistake, even if the expenses incurred were substantially modest (170 billion lire were spent in less than three years, the equivalent of around 750 million euros today). The Government tried to exchange the abolition of early retirement with the concession of linking the pension to salary, strongly requested by the trade unions. At first the confederations accepted, then the CGIL withdrew its membership and proclaimed a general strike which, surprising the observers, had a plebiscitary outcome. The workers - albeit still young - had already understood that this would be their "emergency exit". In the legislative decree n. 488 (in implementation of the enabling law n. 238) the salary formula was established (65% of the salary for the last three years, the old-age pension was abolished (except for a transitional treatment until 1970 in the case of involuntary unemployment, with liquidation according to the previous contributory formula), a strict prohibition of accumulation was established.
1969 - In the law n. 153 yes strengthened the calculation of wages (74% of the best three years in the last five, then from 1976, 80%; when fully operational they have now become ten), the effectiveness of the automatic equalization system was guaranteed, the prohibition of accumulation was relaxed and the social pension was introduced , the old-age pension was restored after 35 years of payments, including the notional contribution and regardless of age.
After then retirement became something of a mausoleum of work that no one dared to violate (moreover, at the beginning of the 70s, baby pensions were instituted in the public sector, reducing, in some cases, the existing requirements that were already too generous). Thus, while the life expectancy of Italians was lengthening (and with it the period of collection of the pensioner allowance) the age at which it became possible to enter retirement was reduced (do not forget that even the The legal retirement age was totally inadequate being - with a minimum of 15 years of payments - equal to 60 for men and 55 for women). The season of reforms struggled to overcome the Berlin Wall of early retirement (which was (a) abused in the decade of the great industrial restructuring through early retirement: 400 for 50 billion lire). In 1992, the Amato government tried to raise the contribution requirement to 36 years, but was forced to backtrack.
The first Berlusconi government, in 1994, collapsed on the attempt to introduce an economic penalty to be applied for each year before the expected age for old age (a somewhat crude solution, but which would perhaps have solved the problem without having to resort to the arabesque solutions which were adopted later). It fell to the law n.335 of 1995 (the so-called Dini-Treu reform) to also insert a personal requirement (which ranged from 52 to 57 years until 2008) to be enforced together with the classic 35 years of seniority in competition with a contribution-only channel (and therefore distinct from the demographic parameter) moving towards the achievement, in the same period of time, of the limit of 40 years of service. Subsequently, the Prodi government adjusted further the shot and above all promoted, as regards the advance treatment, the alignment of the public sector with the private one. Further events were characterized by symbolic aspects: Roberto Maroni's ''staircase'', Cesare Damiano's ''quota'' system, up to the 2011 reform to which the seven (imaginary) plagues that struck Italian pensioners (indeed, pensioners).
All this said, despite the urban legends that continue to circulate, even in the current legal system it is possible to anticipate access to retirement (so much so that currently - especially among male workers and residents in the North - the number of those who make use of the advance is higher than those who resort to the ordinary old-age treatment: in private employee work, in current flows, out of 100 pensions of old age there are 201 of seniority). Basically, in 2019-2020, according to current legislation, it is possible to go to early retirement at 43 and 2 months for men (at 42 and 2 months for women) regardless of age. The average effective age at the start was – it is a fact, not a requirement – around 62 years. Furthermore, if there were a ceiling (as hypothesized at a maximum of 2-3 years) for the figurative contribution useful for ''doing seniority'', there is no one who fails to see that the periods requested, today and tomorrow, would tend to approach and almost coincide.
It should also be remembered that now there is an overall context that has changed the structure outlined by the Fornero reform. The Ape sociale (which would need refinancing) allows the unemployed and those belonging to 15 disadvantaged job categories or subject to particular family conditions, to retire at the age of 63 (with a reduced contribution) at state expense. With the voluntary Ape you can obtain a convenient loan, in advance of the treatment due, at 63 years with 20 years
of payments. If those who are entitled to the Ape sociale were also "precocious" (holders of 12 months of payments before the age of 19) they could avail themselves of leaving work with 41 years of contributions. More favorable regulations apply to workers subjected to strenuous tasks. Once fully operational, 200 workers will then benefit from the treatment reserved for the so-called redundant workers (ie they will retire under the rules in force before the Fornero reform).
It is in this context, at the end of a story as long as the Thirty Years War, that a new episode has begun in the soap opera of yellow-green pensions: Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini (immortalized on the cover of Time, with a effigy that recalls that of Henry Landru) specified that, to form the quota 100 (one of the new exit parameters), a minimum age of 62 would intervene, while to take advantage of the pension access channel on the basis of seniority service, regardless of age, 41,5 years would be sufficient (the second alternative parameter to the first).
Of the necessary burdens, of the effects on the sustainability of the pension system, of the number and type of subjects who would benefit and of those who would instead pay the bill (rather salty) has been written in spades these days, so much so that it is not worth insist, because – as the saying goes – there is no person who is more deaf than someone who doesn't want to hear. It is difficult, however, even for the yellow-green descamisados, to avoid a question: does it make sense to invest a good deal of billions to retire some people who are still young, mostly male and residing in the northern regions, inserting them in blocks of hundreds of thousands in a system in which they will remain for a long time (given life expectancy, an element that has completely disappeared from the debate, despite the fact that it is crucial for sustainability), at the expense of generations who will have to bear the greatest expense without feeding any hope of being able to avail themselves, when their turn comes, of requirements similar to those they will be required to guarantee to previous generations?
It is not necessary to attribute the "arduous sentence" to posterity. One of the biggest binges in the history of Italian pensions is preparing - it is already clear - one of the biggest binges in the history of Italian pensions: the baby boomers are preparing to leave the job market, perpetuating in retirement - like the light of a star that continues to reach us even if the star has long since been extinguished – the aftermath of a working condition now archived by history. Perhaps it would be appropriate to ask oneself not only about the effects on public finances of the counter-reforms of the De Rege brothers and Mr. Nobody. Are we sure that the exit from the labor market of still young people will not create problems on the supply side in those regions where there is substantial full employment? Could it be that in the end, in the industrious Northern League, it will be necessary to resort to additional foreign labor to "run" the machines in the workshops?
