In recent days, the Court of Auditors presented the ''2018 Report on the coordination of public finance''. It is a document that should be adopted as a subject for examination (and permanent training) for journalists and talk show hosts who, in this way, could avoid floating on the news by hearsay and be able to correct, immediately , the bestiality that many of their guests display with a big bronze face in the debates.
A chapter is also dedicated to the topic of pensions; it is therefore important to point out some considerations in this regard, now that the time has come to sum up the years of coarse accusations against the former minister Fornero and the reform that bears his name.
The Court took into consideration all the measures taken in this matter in the XVII Legislature, dividing them into two basic guidelines: the first was to adjust (especially with the eight pro-exodus safeguards) the effects of a sharp adjustment made with law no. 214 of 2011 and with the parallel measures which have given (with the Ape and Rita package and the benefits in favor of precocious and disadvantaged workers) flexibility to the system without tampering with the basic structure of the new discipline; the second is to monitor the trends of the system itself in the delicate five-year period (2013-2017) following the Fornero law.
A careful reflection on the recent past has allowed the Report (thanks to a sample of positions of active policyholders further enriched with data) to take into consideration not only the financial sustainability of the system, but also the social one, in view of the risk of a high number of ''poor pensioners'' in the next few decades.
Indeed, if in the short and medium term pension expenditure, in nominal terms, was lower than expected (in 2017 by 20 billion compared to what was indicated in the 2013 Def), some concern is looming in the long term, as confirmed by the new long-term projections of the Rgs, according to which, compared to the assessments of the Def 2017, the pension expenditure/GDP ratio will increase by 2 percentage points and up to 2,6 points around 2045.
The reasons behind the deterioration - again according to the Report - are to be attributed to the worse prospects for long-term economic growth (from the previous 1,4 to 0,7 per cent on average per year), in turn due to demographic and productivity factors . In this regard, some data are sufficient to account for the challenges that Italy will have to overcome in the long term in order to gain better growth prospects: the expected reduction of the population, between now and 2070, by around 6,5 million inhabitants and the reduction of the workforce in the order of ten million.
On the demographic front, the EPC-WGA (EU Economic Policy Commission) scenario assumes, compared to the previous forecast (Europop 2013), a significant contraction in the net flow of immigrants (the average number for the period 2017-2030 was 360 units against 176 in the current scenario, while in the period 2017-2060 it stood at 306 against 194 in the current scenario).
Even more marked are the deteriorations of a macroeconomic nature and in the productivity growth rate. It therefore remains essential to direct policy choices towards strengthening the macroeconomic and demographic variables that lower the pension expenditure/GDP ratio: in this regard - the Court argues - policies in favor of the birth rate, balanced management of migratory flows, capable of increase participation in the labor market.
It is also necessary to strengthen our productive machine through the strengthening of tangible and intangible infrastructures and greater investments in new technologies and human capital crucial for the growth of total factor productivity. We must be aware that some of these policies produce returns in the short term. Also for these reasons - in the opinion of the accounting judiciary - it is important to preserve the basic structural improvements that the social security system has made in recent decades: any possible flexibilisation of the current structure should necessarily provide for compensations that ensure long-term financial sustainability.
It is a priority not to create additional pension debt and at the same time manage possible pressures on short-term pension expenditure. And therefore - after the safeguard measures (exodus) and the parallel pension advance measures - "the spaces for further mitigation of the effects of law n.214/2011 are to be considered exhausted, unless there is an overall rethinking of the system".
Another important aspect that the Report clarifies concerns the effective age at retirement. The reforms - and above all that of 2011 - have helped to raise the average figure, but we are far from what is longed for in the urban legends that describe a country of old people eager for a quiescence that has become possible only for old people.
With regard to the effects of the social security policies of recent years on the average age at the commencement of pensions paid starting from 2011 and up to 2017 (the last year available), it can first of all be observed that the increase in personal data and contribution requirements has obviously, and by definition, it has led to an increase in the age for old-age pensioners, but it has also led to an increase in the age for early retirement.
Between 2011 and 2017, for all private sector workers insured with INPS, there was an average growth of 2,9 years in the case of old-age payments (from 63,6 to 66,5 years) and 2,2 .58,8 years in the case of payments based on seniority/advance (from 61 to XNUMX).
Ultimately, with the introduction of law 214/2011, it is observed for the entire system (which is the one that is relevant for the purposes of overall public expenditure), that in five years the average effective retirement age has grown by 2,3, 2,5 years in the private sector (1,9 for employees and 0,6 years in the self-employed sector) and XNUMX years in the public sector. A further notation is dedicated in the Report to the pensions paid with the fully contributory calculation.
In the three-year period 2015-17, approximately 196 pensions of this type were paid, almost half (105) to semi-subordinate workers (30 women). If we consider that in the three-year period approximately 92 concerned women, we conclude that the pure contribution was applied to 62 women not belonging to the management of parasubordinates.
It is presumable that many cases who exercised the so-called "women's option" fell into this significant share (62 out of 92). As for future pensions, from all the data examined, the Report confirms that the prospects for large segments of the population will be able to improve in the coming decades only in the presence of more robust growth in incomes and an increase in the continuity of contributions: in a word , thanks to a significant improvement in the overall conditions of the economy and its labor market.
You know the court will be right, but if a petona, and it's not me, has paid 40 years of contributions because she can't retire if she's 60 years old? And can someone else retire with less than 5 years? It's a mystery! As my grandmother used to say!