While I appreciate that the conviction is gaining ground – even in hitherto reluctant political parties – that the issue of raising theretirement age effective is an indispensable step to deal with demographic imbalances and their consequences on the labor market itself and that this happens within the majority even before the political and trade union left (still chasing butterflies under the Arch of Tito) , we cannot help wondering - limited to the technical level - about the usefulness of the experimental solution adopted by the government in the budget bill, which introduces, for 2023 only, a new access to early retirement strengthened by an incentive to keep workers in service . The provisions (articles 53 and 54) seem aimed at reconciling different needs of a political nature (such as the assassination of Matteo Salvini for quota 41), of a nostalgic nature (such as the return to the myth of the super-incentive of Roberto Maroni referred to in law n. 243/2004) and cost containment, given that it is very questionable to allocate resources of a certain importance to older/young workers who have many emergency exits should they find themselves in conditions of actual hardship or need for themselves or their family (think of theSocial bee, for forty-year-olds/precocious and women's options).
QUOTA 103: THE CONDITIONS TO BE ABLE TO USE IT
Access to early retirement requires, at the same time, at least 62 years of age and 41 years of contributions (quota 103). Furthermore, a conditionality is envisaged (the influence of the Social Bee is felt) according to which the pension treatment can be paid on condition that the gross value does not exceed five times the minimum treatment. This conditionality is aimed at discouraging excessive use of the pension advance tool to avoid determining any shortage of personnel for particular professional sectors. The contribution requirement can be achieved by accumulating all the non-overlapping contribution periods chronologically at all INPS managements free of charge, consequently excluding all professional funds. Similarly to "Quota 100 and 102", from the effective date of the treatment a prohibition of income accumulation is triggered up to the old age retirement age with the only exception of a cumulation threshold of 5.000 euros of occasional self-employment.
QUOTE 103: HOW THE INCENTIVE TO REMAIN IN SERVICE WORKS
The provision provides for an incentive to retain in service for employees who, despite having accrued the pension requirements of the "quota 103" measure (i.e. they have reached the age of 62 and paid at least 41 years of contributions), decide to remain in service to delay access to retirement. This incentive provides for the possibility of receiving a salary, including the share of contributions payable by the worker due to the AGO of employees and to forms that replace it (equal to 9,19%). This measure is smuggled in analogy to the so-called "Maroni bonus" introduced for the period 2004-2007. But these are different operations: the Maroni bonus lasted three years and consisted in the transfer of 32,7% of the salary to the paycheck, moreover tax-free (see table 1 as regards the real benefits which constituted for 95 thousand adherents a real ''booty'').
| Annual salary | nominal benefit | Real benefit |
| 24.000 | 32,7% | 45% |
| 35.000 | 32,7% | 48% |
| 59.000 | 32,7% | 52% |
| 80.000 | 32,7% | 54% |
The recognition of the new bonus is not automatic, as it is the interested party who has to decide whether to use it or not. The employer cannot in any way impose this solution on the employee. As for the future pension, when the employee exercises this option, he no longer accumulates his own social security payments, consequently the individual amount on which the pension will then be calculated remains unchanged. PMI.it also indicated the advantages and disadvantages of the operation.
''The advantage for the worker who chooses the latter option is that, despite having accrued a pension right, he continues to receive a salary, which will indeed be higher because he also forfeits social security contributions (those at his expense amounting to 9,19 ,XNUMX% of the salary, ed.).
The downside, however, is that in the end he will have one board lower than the one it would have by continuing to pay social security contributions, benefiting from a lower amount and applying a lower master data transformation coefficient.
There is also a second disadvantage, of a fiscal nature: here we have to wait for the details, but if (as it seems) the law does not provide for concessions in this sense, the extra sums that flow into the paycheck are to all intents and purposes elements of remuneration and taxed as such. In practice, therefore, the worker will pay more taxes''. Then there is another aspect that has escaped in the comments. The beneficiaries of quota 103 and, upon accessing the pension, those who - by renouncing it - collect the incentive, will have to pay it, at least in part, out of their own pocket, because they will incur the cut foreseen on the automatic equalization. The bill goes to Parliament and therefore it is plausible that there will be some changes.
QUOTE 103: DIFFICULT TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PROS AND CONS
At present it is very complicated for a worker to choose the most convenient option for him: he must make use of an algorithm that takes into account the tax aspects (the possible transition to a higher rate) and the effects of the incentive on the salary against of the consequences on pension treatment, bearing in mind that the calculation will take place with the contributory system at least from 2012 January 2026. One then wonders why, if it is believed that the incentive may be useful to postpone retirement, it has not been extended also to those who take advantage of the ordinary early retirement requirement (blocked until the end of 42) of 10 years and 62 months for men and one year less for women regardless of age. It is by no means excluded that many of these subjects are able to mature that requirement before they have completed the canonical 100 years. Finally, it should be realized that – as happened with quota 102 and quota 103 – it is quite difficult for the two requirements, both necessary and rigid, to coincide in the same year. It follows that those who ripen only one must wait, perhaps for a few years, to ripen the other as well. In the case of quota XNUMX, a higher contribution requirement inevitably drags up the personal data too.
PENSIONS: THE SNAPS OF THE COUNT-SALVINI GOVERNMENT HAVE RELEASED SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE
Then there is the big question of the structural reform which should come into force in 2024. It is a question of resuming that reform process interrupted in 2019. Report No. 23 on the trends in pension and health care expenditure by the General Accounting dello Stato (RGS) highlighted the ''issue'' of the pension system. The reform process of the last few decades - according to the RGS - has contributed and still contributes significantly to sterilizing the current effects and those expected in the coming years of the demographic transition on public spending. However, the forecasts under current legislation which incorporate the effects of Legislative Decree 4/2019 (quota 100 and surroundings) and the subsequent transition measures, if compared with the forecasts based on the immediately preceding legislation, highlight that, for the first times since 2004, they have led to an increase in spending and a downgrade in the process of raising the requirements for access to retirement, producing in the period 2019-2034, further higher costs equal to an average of 0,23 points of GDP per year. The deviation from the level of pension expenditure in relation to GDP which discounts the legislation immediately in force is particularly accentuated in the first years of the projection and, in particular, in the period 2020-2023, in correspondence with the greater use of early retirement by individuals who mature the joint requirement for retirement with at least 62 years of age (64 for 2022) and 38 years of contributions. The higher incidence of expenditure in relation to GDP amounts, on average, to 0,5 percentage points. In subsequent years, the profile of new pension costs as a percentage of GDP shows a decreasing trend. The deviation with respect to the level resulting on the basis of the immediately preceding legislation would have been zeroed in 2035. To then begin a gradual descent in the following years. Basically, in this period of time the system would have recovered from the ''snags'' produced by the yellow-green government measures. It is to be hoped that, following the new structural reforms announced by the Meloni government, the system, which is about to return to the correct route after the detours, is not pushed back to the high seas.
