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Anti-establishment parties: did everything stem from the economic crisis?

Where did the voters' revolt against the establishment come from? From the economic crisis or from the crisis of democracy? Or has the former changed the latter? Here's what the survey by political scientists Morlino and Raniolo published by "il Mulino" reveals

Anti-establishment parties: did everything stem from the economic crisis?

Historical analyzes of past crises suggest that these were ultimately "an opportunity for change and for the reinvention or regeneration of democracy". What happened and is happening as a result of the economic crisis that began in 2007 and which the authors define as the Great Recession? The investigation carried out by Leonardo Morlino and Francesco Raniolo, which later became the book "How the economic crisis changes democracy” published by “il Mulino”, is mainly aimed at studying the «crisis in democracy», in its procedures and results, as well as in its contents, or «in the mix of freedom and equality that it manages to guarantee».

Subject of study were the countries of Southern Europe, those that in a negative sense were indicated with the acronym Piigs, now GIIPS: Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. The same ones that have suffered more from the negative effects of the crisis itself, as well as from the measures taken to overcome it, even compared to the Eastern countries, such as for example Poland and the Czech Republic, which have suffered less setbacks. For sure, in the management of the crisis "the European Union has acted as a contributing factor in the accentuation of its effects and in its duration". A constellation of situations that "has put the governance system (of the EU) in tension", but also the cohesion between the member states and, in a certain sense, "European self-awareness itself". In summary, the European Union risked "and still risks a real implosion".

The crisis but, above all, the measures imposed to overcome it have facilitated the formation and electoral success of "new political entrepreneurs and formations"as well as the discrediting of those in government. The economic crisis, underline Morlino and Raniolo, has magnified latent tendencies that were already present in party systems and in the models of relationships between citizens and institutions. The decline of parties it can also be read as a "decline in the legitimacy of the electoral-territorial representation channel itself", with the consequence that citizens and elites "are looking for other ways to convey their questions".
The greater participation that developed in the years following the crisis was characterized by the greater weight of anti-establishment political positions,opposition to anti-austerity policies and for attitudes against the European Union. In a nutshell, participation "has become increasingly radical and protestive."

New "significant party players" who in three out of four cases directly threatened control of the government and, in one case, actually conquered it.
The parties and movements indicated as protesting under investigation are:
Syriza: coalition of the Radical Left in Greece.
Five Stars movement in Italy.
We can in Spain.
Regular, Terra Party e Republican Democratic Party in Portugal.
Chrysi Avgi (Golden sunrise) in Greece.
Alloy in Italy.
Ciudadanos in Spain.
The particular case of Portugal demonstrates how voters could also have chosen to adopt "attitudes of alienation or simply indifference and apathy".

These parties define themselves and are perceived by public opinion as protest parties. All but one have been successful recently, but only a few are genuinely new starters. Finally, all are considered populists or neo-populists. Overall "it is as if the voters of Southern Europe had become more sensitive to disappointment". In the four democracies analysed, «but in reality not only in these», we have witnessed the unusual growth of a political offer capable of channeling the protest and resentment of voters. “Such transformations they need not necessarily be considered as a risk to democracyon the contrary, they could be considered signs of the fact that "democratic regimes have a high level of flexibility and resilience to external challenges".

Not all new parties are genuinely new, those that are represent "outsiders who are not the product of parliamentary tactics and dynamics" and therefore "constitute a threat to traditional parties". Following this logic, one can easily understand how a key element of these new parties is «to present themselves as anti-establishment parties» and, in a certain sense, as «anti-party parties». From this point of view «the paradigmatic model of a genuinely new party is probably represented by M5S in Italy and Podemos in Spain».
As far as sociological representativeness is concerned, the political class of the M5S is characterized by its young age. Young MEPs (men and women), including those from Podemos, are "highly educated".

What transpires from these data is the activation of "a generational cleavage previously latent in the politics of European democracies" and which is at the basis of the "voter revolt that now seems to characterize the elections of Western democracies". This dividing line overlaps and intertwines "with the excluded-guaranteed or winner-loser cleavage of globalization".
The politics of protest "it is structurally exposed to the disappointment of the voters" and this explains the volatility of electoral fortunes and "the need for radicalism as a competitive and communicative strategy". It's not just about "political hypocrisy" or the cynicism of the leaders. First of all, "organisational institutionalization introduces new internal and external constraints to which the party must also adapt its objectives".

As Stein Rokkan had already opportunely pointed out, two channels of influence operate within every democracy: «The electoral-territorial channel and the corporate-functional channel». The first is characteristic of «partisan politics», while in the second «interest groups and economic actors» prevail. The four democracies investigated by Morlino and Raniolo were generally characterized by «a hypertrophy of the electoral-territorial channel», this aspect being central «especially in the Italian case», and show a relative weakness of the functional channel. This asymmetry between the two channels was «favored by the absence of a regulatory role of the State and by its permeability to sectoral interests». It is no coincidence that, precisely in relation to Southern Europe, there has been talk of an informal state (Sotiropolus 2004), of a distributive drift (Ferrera 2012), of neo-caciquismo (Sapelli 1996) and, in more neutral terms, of party gatekeeping (Morlino 1998).

The authors underline how it should always be remembered that «democracy is not only the form of government of a state, but also a regulation or governance mechanism of a certain socio-economic structure which in the West is some variant of the market economy or the capitalist system». The question becomes "the role that the state and the institutions of political representation have had and still have in these economic and social systems". The variety of State/economy relations that distinguishes the cases analyzed acts as an "intervening variable", in the sense that it "defines a set of (mostly institutional) conditions that make the countries of Southern Europe more vulnerable to external shocks", aggravating the the effects of the recession at the same time and making "crisis management less effective". All with the necessary variables and differences between the various countries.

Materialist (economic security, inflation, unemployment) and post-materialist (participation, direct democracy, self-realization, commons) themes ended up overlapping and mixing in protest movements. In the opinion of the authors, this hybridization could constitute the point of contact between various movements which in the last decade have given rise to talk of a great «cycle of transnational protest» which has invested Europe, the United States, Chile and the Brazil, North Africa and even Hong Kong. A sort of «crisis of legitimacy of advanced democracies».

In the case of the countries under investigation, government policies as well as and above all those of the central government had a great impact. The Europeanization process has brought about "two perverse effects".
It has fueled a new conflict that has affected relations between countries in and outside the euro area, between strong countries and weak countries within the euro area, between strong countries in the same area. When austerity policies are considered, “the reality has been one of choiceless democracies”, with major fiscal, budgetary, public administration and labor reforms decided by external actors and implemented by internal actors.

«The real mechanism triggered by the crisis is the catalyst», while the «agency of democracy» component has adapted to the new situation of delegitimization, with all the load of deriving actions, transformations and consequences.

 

The field research conducted by Leonardo Morlino and Francesco Raniolo in the four countries under investigation (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal) was financed by the Ministry of University and Scientific Research (Protocol n° 2010 WKTTJP).

Reference Bibliography

Leonardo Morlino, Francesco Raniolo, How the economic crisis changes democracy. Between dissatisfaction and protest, ilMulino, 2018. Translation by Valeria Tarditi from the original English edition The Impact of the Economic Crisis on South European Democracies, published in Great Britain by Palgrave Macmillan and in Switzerland by Springer International Publishing AG.

Biography of the authors

Leonardo Morlino is full professor of political science and director of the Center for Studies on Democracies and Democratizations at LUISS in Rome.
Francesco Raniolo is full professor of political science and director of the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Calabria.

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