In his speech at the PD Assembly Enrico Letta surprisingly re-launched a topic that had been absent from the debate for a long time and apparently forgotten even by the Union: the participation of workers in decisions and in corporate profits. The participation model that Letta has in mind is that of German mitbestimmung, the classic formula of Rhenish capitalism, as he himself declares in his recent book "I learned".
In fact, the Rhenish model, introduced in the Federal Republic in 1952 and reformed in 1976, is intuitively one of the foundations of the success of German manufacturing, even if Andrea Garnero underlines that "the results of the available studies are unable to provide convincing arguments on the causal and in any case do not even show a clear correlation between the presence of employee representatives at board or supervisory board level and company performance. However, Garnero himself points out that “workers' representation at board or management level is not a form of collective bargaining, but it can nevertheless help strengthen workers' voice and their bargaining power. Above all, it could help improve cooperation between the parties."
In addition to the remarkable results of German industry in terms of productivity, the participatory formula has allowed that the harsh reforms introduced by Schroeder when the German economy was the "big sick of Europe" were implemented without causing a social conflict. And this, for Italy, could already be a good reason to implement a co-management system (or codecision, as we say in Italy so as not to offend some political and union susceptibilities). Over the years there has been this suggestion, promoted above all by the UIL since the days of the Welcome Secretariat. However, it has never had success beyond seminars and conferences. Probably because the mitbestimmung is not a place of bargaining but of codetermination, based on two pillars: an Executive Council (BoD) and a Supervisory Council, where shareholders and workers are represented.
The two bodies are established by law, which also determines their composition and functions. it is probable that this was experienced as an obstacle by the Italian trade unions which have always had a difficult relationship with legislation, essentially admitted only when it "supports" bargaining, and above all very careful to preserve a binding and centralized model of collective bargaining . Simply put it was difficult to link power to responsibility. On the other hand, without legislative support, the (few) attempted experiments foundered in the face of the unwillingness of the social partners to resize the purely negotiating relationships in favor of a more explicitly cooperative relationship.
It should be remembered the IRI protocol, which in the 80s established for the whole group, at the level of individual companies and groups, a system of information/preventive consultation, which theoretically recognized some powers of interdiction to the Joint Consultation Councils. It was abandoned soon enough, above all because it was seen as a bureaucratic procedural loophole by both companies and unions, much more at ease at explicitly negotiating tables at which to assert the balance of power.
Not that trade union relations are necessarily of a troglodytic nature: the empowerment of workers and their involvement in business decisions is increasingly frequent, in parallel with the spread of company bargaining, and in particular it has materialized in performance bonus agreements, strongly encouraged by the tax exemptions and decontributions established by successive governments.
In fact, performance bonuses, even in the increasingly widespread version of corporate welfare, create a much more collaborative and innovation-friendly climate in companies. They are actually the only concrete practice of a participatory type that has developed in Italy. Attempts have been made both towards the inclusion of workers' representatives in corporate bodies: Alitalia and others, Eni (it was even envisaged by the Statute), without this causing substantial changes in industrial relations.
Recently Stellantis had formally reserved two seats for workers' representatives (hypothesis postponed to the future expiry of the current board), also due to the differences that have arisen between the trade union organizations in relation to the methods of appointing representation and the direct involvement of employees. No more significant, if not for the financial benefits of the workers involved, are the share ownership experiences of the workers. The granting of shares to employees (ENI model from the 80s) was octroyeè, and not seen by the workers as an opportunity to become active members of the company; most of the time they ended with the sale of the shares by the employees. In general, there has been a complete lack of willingness on the part of the union to organize the shareholder-workers as a pressure force in the company.
Another thing are the experiences of companies in crisis acquired and restored by employees which most often form cooperatives. These realities are similar to the widespread model in the United States of ESOP (Employee stock ownership plan) which makes use of strong tax incentives. The number of these companies is limited, even if these are particularly important situations that deserve an effort to gain knowledge and study primarily by the trade union organizations themselves.
In essence, the practice of participation today passes almost exclusively through the direct relationship between the company and the company union, even in the most advanced cases in which the consideration for the collaboration consists in the distribution of shares to employees (Luxottica and Campari, not surprisingly two multinationals). And above all it is no longer a negotiating practice, activated or not according to the will of the social partners and their relationships. Naturally, one can acknowledge that the culture of Industrial Relations in Italy does not allow for more, and choose to strengthen and broaden the already existing experience. However, if we want to make a leap in quality, the problem of moving from a purely contractual and voluntary practice to a system that has a legislative foundation and establishes a minimum of rights and obligations is inevitable.
And this also in view of the changes that are gradually (but not very slowly) being introduced in the business world by Industry 4.0 and ESG criteria (Environment Social Governance): the structure of collective bargaining will have to become more flexible, supplementary and subsidiary with respect to programs for the involvement of certain professionals and methods of providing work services that can no longer be measured with the instruments of "times and methods"; ESG criteria will oblige companies to include environmental and social objectives in their policies, and in some way to represent these interests in their governance. These are innovations that are difficult to deal with with the traditional tools of collective bargaining, and which suggest the need to support them with governance tools that allow the company-system to identify adequate and shared policies.
There is no doubt that a legislative intervention in this sense would also be necessary to prevent the union relations system from crumbling in the face of the new complexity of production organization and professionalism. And it is to be hoped that Letta, with all the appropriate steps and seeking the consensus of the social partners, will proceed in this direction and implement a historic reform. Which, among other things, would be an opportunity for the trade union organizations of workers and entrepreneurs to rethink a contractual system that is increasingly struggling to represent the reality of interaction between interests, and to take responsibility for addressing the innovation rather than enclosing itself in the defense of the protections acquired from previous generations.
°°°°The author belongs to the Anna Kuliscioff Foundation
