"Changing the functioning mechanism of the state to increase the competitiveness of the country" this is the goal that the government has set itself with the Reform of the Public Administration. A reform that the premier intends to implement during 2016, with the first implementing decrees to be approved in the middle of the month.
Among the most urgent rules, there is the one on reorganization of the companies owned by the Regions and local authorities but also by central administrations (for example Consip, Sogei, Invimit, Sogin, Anas, Invitalia). The government would intend to rationalize the universe of subsidiaries through the deletion of some – empty boxes or companies that have not filed balance sheets in recent years -, and the merger of others – those without employees or in the red for several years. The aim is to go from the current seven thousand to about a thousand in a few years. Furthermore, enhanced controls, salary cuts and liability actions for tax, patrimonial and non-pecuniary damage against managers are envisaged.
The most eagerly awaited novelty is certainly the standard that allows you to cut the armchairs. The squeeze on investees should include, in fact, the annulment of all board meetings, both locally and nationally. No more BoD with ranks of directors sometimes even higher than the number of workers, but a sole director, except - of course - exceptions decided by decree. However, this measure, if it is confirmed, leaves us perplexed, however two orders of reasons.
First, publicly held companies differ in size and scope. Therefore, if for some the zeroing of the BoD may be appropriate, for others, however, the lack of collegiality in decisions can prove to be a limitation in the management activity. Applying the same rule to all investee companies therefore risks penalizing those with a particular "mission" or with significant dimensions. In private companies, in fact, it is substantially the medium-small ones (often family-run) that appoint a sole director who, then, often coincides with the shareholder.
Even in the public sector, and here we come to the second point, with a sole director there is the risk of a concentration of powers, because local or national politics will nominate him. It will therefore become more difficult, in the absence of other directors, to guarantee a real separation between the policy activity that falls to the shareholder - in this case the State - and that of management and control that falls to the director. We would therefore return to a politicized and inefficient system. What should be changed, therefore, is not so much the number of directors - which certainly needs to be reduced in some cases - as much as the method of appointment: merit and independence instead of political loyalty.
To increase the country's competitiveness - the latest Eurostat data place Italy at the bottom of the rankings - also through a more efficient public sector, sponge shots risk not being the right way. This has already been done with the law – in force since last year – which prohibits seventy-year-olds from sitting on the boards of directors of public companies for more than a year and subject to payment. In this case, the body that manages the company has been deprived of “diversity” – fundamental for building value. In the case of the sole director, if the law were approved in a generalized way, one would be deprived of "collegiality", an element which contributes to enriching the decision-making process.
Basically, in the case of the boards of directors of investee companies, cutting does not necessarily guarantee greater efficiency. Moreover these cuts nor would they translate into a reduction in public spending because, as specified by the government, any savings would go to the Municipalities.
