The plan remains inclined towards the abyss and humanity remains one step away from horror, but faced with the last, serious news coming from the Ukrainian front, with Moscow threatening to use the weapon atomic, a cold analysis is needed because "if the Russians had wanted to do it in Ukraine they would have done it, but they would have committed a clear crime against humanity; while if they had attacked nuclear NATO or United States, should take into account the possible equally nuclear response”. In short, it would not be, for Moscow, a cost-free action. “Conclusion: the objective of the threat remains that of mutual dissuasion and deterrence”.
Professor Stefano Silvestri, president emeritus of the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) and expert on military affairs, returns to the Russo-Ukrainian war more than a thousand days after the invasion launched by Moscow and a few days after the Ukrainian counterattack towards Russian territory with missiles supplied by Westerners. A move that has pushed Putin to announce that he has changed the doctrine on the use of nuclear power.
First of all, professor, let's define the concept of deterrence: can we say that the one we knew during the Cold War still holds up?
“In my opinion, the concept of deterrence as we knew it during the Cold War still holds. The point is that Russia has militarily engaged in an operation that it cannot conclude with conventional weapons, and therefore it is desperately trying either to intimidate Ukraine's allies or to prepare the ground for its own escalation that will allow it to win this war that it cannot win because it is too weak”.
But does something have to be changed after Putin's decree or not?
“Yes, there are some changes. In the previous nuclear doctrine, there was talk of the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons if the survival of the state was in danger, regardless of the type of attack. In the updated doctrine, however, there is talk of a threat to Russian sovereignty. Sovereignty is clearly a less precise concept, more subject to interpretation, than that of the survival of the state. What does it mean? All sovereignty? Partial sovereignty? There is a worrying degree of vagueness in this concept. To this first novelty, another is added, completely new because until now Russia had fought the principle, applied by the Americans, of extended deterrence. In the American doctrine, deterrence also covers NATO allies or other allies, such as Japan. Now Russia has applied this same principle to its allies. This certainly applies to Belarus, but it could also apply to other countries, because Moscow already has defense agreements in the former Soviet space, for example with the Central Asian republics. If the coverage were to be extended to other countries, it could create big problems. Imagine, for example, that Moscow decided to apply it to North Korea…”.
What is the purpose of this change of doctrine?
“This Russian position tends to make us forget the escalation that Moscow has imposed not only by increasing the bombing of civilians in Ukraine, but also by bringing North Korean troops to the front. It is an attempt to shift any responsibility for possible escalation onto the West, but also a type of threat that Putin has been making since the beginning of the conflict. That said, it is still significant that it has been put down in black and white in a new nuclear doctrine, in line with a certain legalistic formalism typical of the Russians. In any case, it is a lowering of the nuclear threshold”.
We have always lived under the threat of nuclear war: why does it seem more dangerous now?
“The nuclear threat has always been there, it’s true. The point is that during the Cold War, from Cuba onwards, a series of dialogue mechanisms were developed with the aim of avoiding situations of misunderstanding due to the vagueness of the documents. This allowed us to know what the real red lines were, not the rhetorical or interpretable ones. Unfortunately in these years, after the end of the Cold War, many of these mechanisms are no longer functioning. Only one remains, but it is semi-paralyzed: the Start, which concerns strategic weapons. While the diplomatic and dialogue parachutes are in crisis. It would be a good idea to restore them urgently, regardless of the positions of the individual States. Because first of all there should be the absolute need to understand each other”.
Why didn't the Americans revise their doctrine once the Russians did?
"The Americans have no need to revise their doctrine. The problem for them is to understand what the Russians think. I have not even seen, in the texts I have read, distinctions between Russian strategic nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapons."
What's the difference?
“The difference is that strategic weapons are those with a longer range, while tactical weapons are those on the battlefield, which however, as far as NATO in Europe is concerned, can have a strategic value: if they drop a tactical nuclear bomb on Berlin or Milan, the difference between tactical and strategic, for us, does not exist. Tactical nuclear weapons are very powerful, they can even reach 200 kilotons, 20 times Nagasaki. It is not even clear what strategic role the Russian conventional missile and air arsenal that could attack NATO will have. They are all question marks”.
Could Trump Change Everything About the Approach to War?
“I think that the new US administration’s approach to the war in Ukraine will have to be somewhat gradual. Trump cannot even be seen as someone who gives in across the board. To be able to make an agreement with the new American president, Putin will have to be able to offer something, and not just demand. We’ll see.”
Let's get to Kiev's reaction. Meanwhile, President Zelensky has defined the Russians' war as a psychological war, what do you think?
“It is likely so. Putin wants to take Ukraine, either as a satellite country or directly dominated. At this stage, from a military point of view, I would have expected – rather than attacks on Kiev – a greater push on the Odessa axis, given its strategic importance for Russia. The fact that this is not happening, while attacks aimed at terrorizing the population in various ways are increasing, suggests that Russia is not that strong after all”.
Zelensky also said, during an interview with American TV Fox News, that “we cannot lose tens of thousands of men for Crimea”. Advancing the hypothesis that the peninsula can be retaken through diplomacy and not weapons. How do you consider his words?
“It is possible that the Ukrainian president will try to predetermine the possible concessions that Ukraine could accept with less suffering. It would be entirely logical.”
How do you interpret Putin's decision to cut compensation for the wounded in Ukraine by two-thirds? Until recently, each of them was entitled to three million rubles (28 thousand euros), now that amount is only available to the most serious cases. The other soldiers will receive one million rubles, less than ten thousand euros. Is this a sign of a serious economic crisis in the country?
“Possibly. While a war economy can continue for a long time, Russia is not an empire with endless resources. It is a regime that depends on oil and its ability to continue producing weapons with inflation at 9%, official interest rates at an astronomical 21%, with an increasingly scarce workforce and slowing investment. And Western observers are no longer saying that anything is changing. The Bank of Russia says so, forecasting growth next year revised downwards to between 0,5% and 1,5%. The secret until now has been oil, with revenues equivalent to about 190 billion dollars in 2024 alone. But since April, the price of Russian crude has fallen by 22%, to almost 60 dollars a barrel: below that threshold, the current war effort is estimated to be, in the long run, financially unsustainable for the Kremlin.”
Does this whole picture lead us to think that we are at the end of the conflict?
“I would call it a stalemate. Which Putin cannot politically sustain. The Russian president must try to end this conflict for his own survival. Possibly with a victory or at least with some sort of success.”
How far can he push to give in without having internal problems?
“I think he has strong internal control, he can allow himself almost anything. Although it is always difficult to read the consistency of a dictatorial regime from the outside. He has certainly exposed himself to such a point with this attack on Ukraine that he must seek a serious justification if he gives up. The issue is that he may also end up keeping the occupied territories and Crimea, with an armistice and not a peace treaty, therefore not with official recognition, but that is not what he wants. Or rather, it is not only this. Putin also wants to politically control the rest of Ukraine. And this is a border that I think is difficult for the West to abandon”.
From a geopolitical point of view, where will these events lead us? What kind of Europe will be designed?
“The most sensational and unwise conclusion of the conflict will be the exclusion of Russia from Europe. Unwise, but I would say inevitable after the invasion. With the consequence that Moscow will end up in the arms of China. Thus the new alliances are crystallized: on one side the USA and the Westerners; on the other Beijing and its people. Could it have been done otherwise? The exercise remains theoretical and remains in the field of historical analysis, going back to the consequences of the Soviet collapse and the opposing interpretations that were made in the two camps of that imposing event. Both actors seem to have played a written role: the West unable to stop the legitimate ambitions of the former Soviet countries to return to Europe and join NATO; Moscow, once the idea of reaching out to the Europeans itself, of locking itself in the nightmare of encirclement and fear, proved vain. Could something have been done? Yes, because geopolitics walks on the legs of men. There was a time for compromise, I am talking about ten years ago, when the events of Maidan Square took place, perhaps it was still possible to consider Ukraine a buffer zone in the heart of Europe. Instead, each of the camps tried to wrest it from the other until the inevitable was reached. All this is not intended to justify anything, much less a war. Just to remember that when armies set in motion everything becomes more difficult and tragic. Now, of course, it is too late to dig up the past, what is done is done. However, we can avoid causing further damage by returning to use the art of Politics, the only way to stop the race on that inclined plane that can only lead to disaster”.
