Many, different war they fight intertwined with each other in Middle East. Each has different tactical goals, in the short term, from controlling a fraction of territory to changing a government regime, or a ruler; from the imposition of religious orthodoxy or ethnic supremacy to the more classic change of national borders. Such goals almost always contradict each other.
However, these wars also seem to have a common long-term strategic goal: the imposition of a new order to the whole Middle East and, thanks to this, the conquest of the leadership of the wholeIslam. An enormous ambition, which seems to animate all the main contenders, with respect to which, however, the means at their disposal are inadequate, insufficient or unsuitable.
This ambitious objective is more political and ideological than territorial, but none of the contenders, to date, seems to have the ability to coagulate the broad transnational and inter-ethnic consensus essential for establishing a truly great new 'caliphate', or whatever one wants to call it, in able to govern the consensus of the vast majority of the Islamic world.
The interweaving of slippery and contradictory alliances
On the contrary, this ambition breaks up into a thousand rivulets and a thousand different tactics, depending on who implements it and where they operate, multiplying and exacerbating its internal contradictions. Thus, for example, the Turkey she finds herself with Russia, Iran and Bashar al-Assad: three allies she doesn't love and who don't love her.
THESaudi Arabia instead it goes with theEgypt (which, however, is forced to buy back billions at every turn), with an American administration of dubious reliability and even with Israel, despite the 'desecration' of Jerusalem, for which the Guardians of the two Mosques expose themselves to the accusation of abandoning a third of no less importance and sanctity. Furthermore, the Saudis are also unable to ensure their leadership over all the small emirates of their peninsula and on the Yemen. At least a low efficacy.
THEIran is also grappling with strange bedfellows, from Turkey to Russia, which could include, depending on developments, even North Korea or China, and must find ways to consolidate its grip on slippery and difficult countries , like theIraq or the Syria.
Russia wants to pivot, the US doesn't have a plan
La Russia tries to take advantage of America's strategic absence to stand as a candidate as the new "pivot" in the Middle East, playing on its presence in Syria, on the resumption of good relations with Egypt, on diplomatic and commercial collaboration with Turkey and Iran and on collaboration in the field energy with Saudi Arabia.
But it has limited resources and important fronts still open in Europe, from Ukraine to the Caucasus (as well as having to manage its delicate role as junior partner with China). It can make it until it faces a greater challenge, but how long will its current state of grace, granted by Barack Obama's military prudence and Donald Trump's strategic inconsistency, last?
- United States are rapidly transforming from an "indispensable power" into a "maverick power", a maverick, occasional and erratic, whose moves can upset all the cards on the table every time, but without, at least for now, a strategic plan. So they can ally with the Saudis, attack Iran, throw the Jerusalem stone, but not follow up on these moves with other actions that strengthen, prolong or correct the initial impact. In continuity, the US seems content to reduce itself to distributors of air raids and dispensers of missile attacks in ongoing wars, with rather dubious overall results and certainly poor yields.
China waits, Europe remains absent
In all of this (and without prejudice to the China, which still does not seem to have decided what to do and whether to do anything in this region), Europe remains absent, represented only by the reduced presence of its major powers, however in a strictly national key. Yet our countries are also the most interested in this region developing in a peaceful and orderly way.
Certainly the European presence in Africa is increasing, there are common positions both on Iranian nuclear power and on Jerusalem and at times there are interesting diplomatic initiatives, such as the one conducted by French President Emmanuel Macron on Lebanon. However, a strategy would be needed that would bring together these decision-making fragments, giving a significant political role to Europe in relation to both the Middle East and the Islamic populations as a whole.
Currently, Europe looks at these countries according to three prevailing perspectives: the fight against terrorism, energy security and the control of migratory flows. It is necessary to overcome these sectoral approaches, albeit important, in order to look at the whole of the conflicts and wars in progress and try to strengthen and stabilize a coalition around which all other local problems revolve. This is what Russia is trying to do, but Europe certainly cannot delegate its future to it.
