The recent moves of Giorgia Melons on the European chessboard, in particular the vote against the reappointment of Ursula von der Leyen, they aroused disconcert among those who were beginning to have a favorable opinion of her. They also aroused a strange euphoria bordering on schadenfreude on the part of her opponents who were quick to claim that she had thrown away the mask and that she had definitively placed herself on the margins of European politics. All of this requires a bit of caution, if only because the national interest is at stake and because, like it or not, Meloni is destined to remain at the head of the Italian government for the foreseeable future.
Meloni: the abyss between rhetoric and realpolitik
According to the famous definition of Mario Cuomo, long-time Governor of the State of New York, in politics everyone campaigns in poetry then governs in prose. A certain distance between the two registers is therefore inevitable, especially when one is in opposition. For Meloni the distance between the rhetoric of speeches and the practice of government immediately revealed itself abysmal; in particular but not only on European politics. Marine Le Pen has recently significantly softened her anti-European rhetoric (the poetry), but the program (the prose) remains highly incompatible with EU membership on some key issues. Meloni did the opposite. Before her but also after the elections that brought her to her government, her rhetoric was the most populist e sovereignist you can imagine. The “prose” however was very different. It is enough to remember that on some fundamental issues for the EU but also for its political image such as Ukraine, transatlantic relations, immigration, management of public finances and the modification of the stability pact, Meloni in the wake of Mario Draghi it has largely entered what can be defined as the European mainstream. Even compared to his “friend” Orban, the dialogue continued but in a form that, rather than protecting him, pushed him to seek compromises with the majority. His closeness, for some almost friendship, with Ursula von der Leyen it hadn't escaped anyone's notice. Finally, significant for professionals but not only, all the appointments of the technostructure that manages Italy's European policy in places like Bankitalia, Tesoro or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were of the highest quality and not dissimilar to what an avowedly "pro-European" government would have done.
The paradox of the European elections
Then came the European elections. “Poetry” was the same as always. Many, including myself, expected that, once the elections had ended with predictable success on a national level and the humiliation of the competitor Matteo Salvini, the “prose” would have reaffirmed its rights. It was not so. It all started with the discussions within the European Council on the designation of the new heads of the institutions and the consequent vote against by Meloni on two of them and the abstention on the name of von der Leyen for the Commission; move preceded by a speech in Parliament which took up all the Eurosceptic themes of the electoral campaign. This was surprising, but it could legitimately be observed that the behavior of the other countries that had managed the operation had been clumsy compared to the Italian government. The general expectation was that everything should be evaluated in the context of the formation of the new Commission and negotiation for the role attributed internally to Italian member, but that Italy would then join the majority. As we know, this was not the case. In the European Parliament, while the deputies of Forza Italia voted in favor consistently with their membership of the EPP and the deputies of the League voted against consistently with their declared Eurosceptic position, the the vote against was surprising also of the deputies of Brothers of Italy. Vote fully taken personally by Meloni.
Like many, I am deeply convinced that it was a big mistake. At first glance, prose aligned with poetry instead of the reverse path everyone was hoping for. The suspicion was confirmed by a second vote, which this time brought together the representatives of the entire governing majority in Italy, which was against allowing Ukraine to strike Russian territory for defensive purposes with weapons supplied by its allies. In truth, this vote is worthless because none of the weapons supplied by Italy can serve this purpose and it was in any case decided within NATO that the methods of use of the means supplied to Ukraine are decided on a bilateral level. However, it was a stance that did not go unnoticed. Before deciding what it is errors irreversible which undermine Italy's role in Europe and which reveal the true face of Meloni, it is however good to reflect on possible motivations, which in truth remain as multiple as they are mysterious.
Meloni's votes and choices: mistakes or strategy?
An first reason, frankly the least credible also because it is undignified for both parties involved, is that it was a party game between Meloni and Ursula von der Leyen, a prelude to an agreement on the name and the role of the Italian Commissioner. Equally less credible is the idea that Meloni felt linked to solidarity with other member parties of her ECR group in the EP, in particular towards the Polish Pis. It would truly be the first time that a national group in government in its country subordinates the national interest to that of its European allies. The same judgment can be given on the thesis that Meloni wanted to avoid being "overtaken on the right" by Salvini's League, precisely after humiliating him in the elections.
Much more serious, also because expressed from the mouth of the interested party, is the motivation that the majority that elected von der Leyen would be "in contradiction vote cast by voters”. In fact, no one can interpret the European elections, despite sensational phenomena on a national level such as in France, as a resounding success for the sovereignist forces. Not even Salvini can believe it, much less a normally lucid person like Meloni. There was one doubt shift to the right of the electorate, but a lot content as far as the populists are concerned and from which the EPP has also largely taken advantage. However, the informal satisfaction with which Meloni welcomed Marine Le Pen's success in the European elections and then in the first round of the national elections was noted. Almost as if it were a wind that she herself can no longer escape. It is certainly true that the growth of populists in some countries is accompanied by the weakening of the French governments e tedesco, are phenomena that should not be overlooked. However, the wind, if there is any, is certainly not a tornado, but at most a gust of mistral; which perhaps requires reducing the sail a little and multiplying the edges, but it certainly doesn't prevent you from sailing. Apart from the well-known phenomena of Budapest and Bratislava, none of the other governments in which sovereignists participate in some way, in Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands, show signs of wanting to change their European policy. After all, a cursory glance at the map is enough to see that all of those countries would certainly not welcome an Italian hegemony to safeguard their national interest.
Meloni's contradictions: ecological refusal or pro-Trump calculations?
There remains a more concrete explanation. After having said during the election campaign that he would not have wanted to vote with "the socialists", he then justified his vote against with the Greens' support for von der Leyen. This is consistent with an electoral campaign in which the rejection of "ecological ideology" figured prominently. But here too there are notable doubts. In several countries, not only populists, but also centre-right and centre-right forces and governments have gathered well before the elections the reluctance of a part of the economy, agriculture and public opinion towards a green deal judged to be too expensive and binding. Meloni was therefore in a certain sense in good company. However, all it took was a careful reading of the keynote speech by the new President to see that the green deal announced in 2024 and although strongly reiterated in its objectives, it is more pragmatic and in many respects different from the one conceived with Timmermans in 2019. So much so that the greens were not unanimous in their vote and many of them did so less for enthusiasm than to secure a place at the table. Ultimately, an approach that suited the EPP, which carried out a very critical campaign on the Green Deal, should have also suited Meloni. Unless she has decided to marry one thesis admittedly climate-sceptic, a position that in Italy is now solidly occupied by Salvini. Which would obviously be disturbing.
Finally, there is the thesis according to which Meloni is simply preparing for Trump's victory, whose main objective regardless of the methods and contents, would certainly be to divide Europeans. There are some signs of this in the comments on the American situation in some media close to the government. It would be a very dangerous calculation for Italian interests. On the one hand because it is by no means a given that Trump will win. On the other hand, because being marginalized from the rest of Europe would certainly not help a country that is particularly behind in its commitment to military spending in negotiations with Washington, while instead enjoying the second largest trade surplus with the USA after the German one.
Italy's next challenges and the evolution of prose
Faced with these uncertainties, common sense should encourage us to wait upcoming deadlines concrete before judging the quality of the prose; which is what matters. In the next few weeks there will be the story of designation of the Italian member of the Commission and its scrutiny by the EP. Then two more passes from the entire Commission to the EP and the European Council. Even more important will be the first acts of the new Commission, on which Uvdl has made important promises for the first 100 days. This will particularly concern theimmigration and the green deal. It will also concern, on a bilateral level, the management of Italian public accounts, debt relief program and the implementation of reforms related to Pnrr. Italy's position will also need to be decided in the face of the deliberate desire of the Commission and many governments to increase Orban's isolation. As many deadlines to understand the evolution of prose. In the longer term, but not much longer, the reforms necessary to achieve the new enlargement will arrive on the table. Among these, the problem of extending majority voting cannot be avoided. Then, obviously there would have been the American elections.
Meloni's emotional labyrinth and the risk of self-isolation
All 'uncertainty on motivations and goals di Melons Added to this is the disturbing sensation that, to paraphrase the beautiful book by Dominique Moïsi, we have entered a phase of "europolitics of emotions" for Italy's relations with Europe from which it will not be easy to escape. The media scrutinizes with anxious attention any sign of the country's weakening position in Europe. Even the distribution of the vice-presidencies of the commissions in the EP or an altogether secondary issue such as the designation by NATO of an envoy for Africa. Even the objectively most important question of the portfolio of the next Italian member of the Commission is taking on proportions beyond realism. That the Italian opposition amplifies these issues is understandable, although one may question the medium-term wisdom of such a tactic. Less understandable is the emotional reaction of some members of the government and of Meloni herself to every even marginal episode; confirming that Italy would find itself faced with aHostile Europe who can only see us in opposition. A Europe that will satisfy our legitimate needs only through conflict and not through dialogue. All this accompanied by the abuse of an alleged privilege that we are entitled to as the only "founding country" with a government whose stability has been confirmed by recent elections. With public opinion already too inclined to the "Calimero complex" on European and international issues, it is a very dangerous. All the more dangerous that our European partners are now without a clear key to understanding Italian politics. Until recently in the allied capitals there was talk of the possibility, in reality illusory, of "melonising" Marine Le Pen. Now they feel deprived even of the meaning of the word "melonize". With the risk therefore that their behavior will worsen rather than break the vicious circle.
