The debate that has developed over the past few weeks in the light of the various challenges that the European Union is facing and the various proposals put forward at various levels, including those contained in the MEF document of recent days, raises the issue of the opportunity both in the Eurozone a spending capacity of the institutions in relation to a series of issues for which the management of the national level is insufficient or is in any case conditioned by problems correlated above all to the amount of sovereign debts of the individual member states.
These issues concern:
– the implementation of a public investment program in infrastructure and for innovation, which goes beyond the completely insufficient levels of the Juncker plan, capable of contributing to increasing aggregate demand with the consequent spin-off of private investment and at the same time to stimulate and facilitate the best functioning and effectiveness of supply factors;
– support for an industrial policy based on innovation which is also consistent with the commitments undertaken in the context of COP 21 on the green economy and the fight against climate change;
– the establishment of a European unemployment insurance;
– participation in a guarantee scheme within the banking union which goes beyond or complements the “bail in”;
– the contribution in financial terms to the management of migratory flows and external borders;
– the contribution to a part of security and defense expenditure, with a view to progressive processes of "pooling and sharing" of assets, capabilities and the related industrial base, as repeatedly stated in various conclusions of the European Council, as well as to those for the common costs of military and civilian crisis management operations.
This list is not exhaustive, it could be integrated or reduced according to the wishes of the states concerned and it is probable that its territorial areas in relation to migration and security and defense issues are different (but predictably not much) from that of the Eurozone . And it is evident that it implies a spending capacity, and therefore a specific budget of the Eurozone, separate from that of the Union (equal to 1% of the EU's GDP) and parallel to it. Its political management should be entrusted to a specific body: the "Common Treasury for the Eurozone" proposed by the governors of the French and German central banks (or a "Minister of Finance" as the concept has entered current parlance), regardless of this headquarters gives an assessment of its other possible powers of coordination and supervision of national budgets. And this in a context of sharing of sovereignty with regard to the specific competences identified and of parliamentary control and co-decision within the European Parliament but with a differentiated specialization and participation with respect to the competences referring to the Europe of 28. This budget should be in also capable of guaranteeing European bonds for the financing of initiatives in the sectors considered.
In relation to skills, this spending capacity could be a few points of the Eurozone's GDP. At the time of Letta's government, Minister Bonino had proposed up to 5%, when President Hollande was also proposing the creation of a similar capacity. It should realistically be recognized that, at least at this stage, this is an extremely ambitious goal, but an intermediate goal could be identified. For this budget it would be necessary to make use of own resources, according to the modalities on which the special high-level group led by President Monti is working. For example, one could draw on part of the proposed taxation of ICT multinationals in the context of at least partial equalization of taxation on corporate income among the countries of the Eurozone. This is certainly not an easy task, but a robust political initiative should be set up in relation to it, building the necessary alliances well and using the "momentum" that with President Obama's impetus has emerged in this regard in the G7 and in the G20 on the subject of tax avoidance and evasion at an international level and which should be consolidated. In this regard, much will naturally depend on the outcome of the forthcoming American elections.
To achieve the above, that with a specific capacity with regard to certain types of expenditure in the hands of a common structure would nullify above all the risks of moral hazard, the strengthened and structured cooperation already envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty could be used, pending the the political conditions for its revision.
