There are, at the latest, 9 months to the natural expiry of the Legislature and the Italians are not yet able to answer three questions: 1) when will we vote? 2) with which electoral law? 3) for which parties and subordinately for which alliances? The impossibility of giving certain answers to the three questions demonstrates how the uncertainties deriving from the serious economic and financial crisis, which the Monti government is trying to remedy (with some success), correspond to an analogous political-institutional crisis, to which the parties (with varying degrees of responsibility among them), have so far failed to give convincing answers. It is therefore little wonder that on one point the polls are all converging: the number of citizens-voters oriented towards abstentionism and those oriented towards abstentionism is always higher.
Let's go back to the three questions. The first (when you will vote) is the one which seems easier to answer. Even if there is no certainty, everything suggests that the times of the natural expiry of the Legislature will be respected. The vote should therefore take place in April. But if the institutional deadline is respected, this will be due to the exact opposite rather than the good health of the system. That is to say the uncertainties, in some cases bordering on a boycott, which some parties (particularly the PDL) have shown since the beginning of the Legislature by not putting a hand in electoral reform. Reason why, if early elections were to be held, these would be governed by the notorious Porcellum, which all parties (at least in words) say they want to reform.
Here it is worth opening a parenthesis: the electoral reforms should be made, at least according to logic, at the beginning of the Legislature and not close to the vote. Indeed, it is evident that if the choice of the electoral system takes place at the last moment, the search for an agreement between the political forces will be increasingly conditioned by individual electoral selfishness and not by the search for solutions that put the right of the citizens to vote first. to have a clear and simple system, which allows them to be able to choose their parliamentarians and, consequently, the government majority.
But why didn't electoral reform take place at the beginning of the Legislature? On the one hand, the determination of the centre-right in defending the old system (the Porcellum) weighed heavily in the belief that this would still have favored the PDL-Lega alliance, even in the next elections. On the other, the uncertainties and divisions among the opposition forces which have not been able to press, as they should have, a reluctant majority on this decisive step. Result: the willingness of the centre-right to reform the Porcellum began to manifest itself only after Fini's exit from the PDL, first, and the crisis of the Berlusconi government with the consequent loss of the majority with the League, made so that today going to the vote with the current electoral law has turned into a boomerang for the centre-right.
Despite this fact, and the repeatedly declared willingness of the opposition to change the electoral system, and despite the lengthy negotiations between the parties at a technical level, today a new electoral law is still not in sight, and all this ends up limiting one of the main prerogatives of the head of state: the possibility (in case of need) to dissolve the chambers. At the same time, not knowing which electoral system one will vote with leads to the fact that the alliances and even the parties that will present themselves in the elections are not yet clear.
This applies above all to the centre-right camp, but also to the centre-left camp. We start from here, where things, at least at first glance, seem simpler. We had started from the photo of Vasto: that is to say the hypothesis of an alliance on the left between the Pd, SEL and Idv, which then sought an alliance with the center of Pierferdinando Casini. Then the electoral successes of the so-called grillini, in great fashion in the polls, changed things a bit. And so Di Pietro, also putting the IDV's estate at risk, increasingly distanced himself from Bersani, to seek an understanding with Vedola and Grillo.
Operation failed so far. Result: at the moment the most probable hypothesis is that Bersani, starting from the agreement with Sel, but not with Di Pietro, is trying to close a solid alliance with the center to challenge what remains of the Pdl. But even here we are still on the high seas and all of this conditions and is conditioned by the ongoing negotiations on the electoral law.
Even more confused situation in the center-right where everything is in flux. Berlusconi tries, fielding his candidacy again and sacrificing that of the secretary Alfano, to patch up the pieces of the PDL. With little success so far. He would like to return to the spirit of Forza Italia, perhaps even unpacking the current party, which he however wants to change the name of. But the party apparatus (in particular the former AN) are asking for more democratic internal rules, starting with the primaries. And then there are the possible new formations to deal with. It seems that Montezemolo will not introduce himself in person, but the hypothesis of lists more or less sponsored by Italia-futura is still in the field. There is also talk of a Giannino list of superliberals. What is certain is that many votes are expected in the centre-right: from the Pdl and perhaps also from the League, which has indeed changed its secretary, with Maroni instead of an increasingly worn-out Bossi, but which still appears to be tempted (as demonstrated recent parliamentary episodes) from the old alliance of the previous majority.
As can be seen, the political framework appears increasingly confused and, in some ways, disorganized. Bipolarism is increasingly distant and nuanced. And the risk that the negotiation on electoral reform will fail to go through still appears to be substantial. The return to politics, after the caretaker government, is certainly a duty, but it remains full of unknowns. The hope is that electoral reform (with or without preferences, with or without constituencies) will be done soon. Because everything depends on this step. Starting with the right of citizens to vote, which at the moment they are not yet able to know in order to deliberate. This rule is fundamental for every democracy. Conclusion: the risk is that while the technical government is committed to reducing the spread of our securities on the markets, the parties are unable to reduce the institutional political spread of politics.
