After the massacre in Paris, Poland declared that it deems it impossible to welcome refugees due to the risks involved. Is this the attitude that must prevail in Europe? The first available elements tell us that the terrorists responsible for the attacks come from the suburbs of Paris and Brussels, while the migrants who ask to be welcomed in Europe are fleeing precisely that war that the attackers brought to the center of Paris as they had brought it, on the other hand, those responsible for the Charlie Hebdo massacre.
Combining terrorism and immigration takes us down the wrong path. We are faced with facts and attitudes which, in addition to questioning the essential values of our culture starting from those of freedom to those of acceptance, tend to set in motion tensions and factors of potential disintegration in the EU. The very rigidity of the Maastricht rules is influenced by them with the recognition of reception costs as a reason that justifies their flexibility. The French government has asked that the costs of the war against terrorism not be calculated due to the overrun of the 3% limit of the public deficit.
Migration issues in this context are increasingly a test of our ability to move forward on the path of integration, respecting our values. The basic question is that the "sentiments" against emigration are generally linked to a negative perception of risk factors as well as the feared changes that may occur in the socio-cultural as well as economic context and are almost always disjointed from a concrete analysis of its costs and benefits.
HOW MANY ARE THERE AND WHERE THEY COME FROM
To do this, it should be borne in mind that the share of immigrants in EU countries is still around 12% of the population with peaks of 16% in Sweden and Denmark despite new immigration flows. They reached peaks of 800.000 in the early 90s after the fall of the Berlin Wall and in 2014 as conflicts and wars around Europe intensified. In 2015, a doubling of these values is estimated which, it should be remembered, are modest compared to the population of 500 million European citizens in a decreasing trend, even if settled in a territory with a high population density.
The composition by area of origin, culture and religion is very different. In France immigrants from Maghreb countries are prevalent. In Italy there are more than 1 million Romanians. The largest percentage of Muslims is in France, with 7,5% of the total population. The number of immigrants with acquired citizenship is also very different in the various countries. In addition to refugees and immigration in the strict sense, there is also the so-called circular migration. About 25% of the working-age population of Albania has an experience of circular migration mainly to Greece and Italy, with seasonal jobs.
In this highly differentiated picture of the state of immigration in the EU, today we are led to look at immigration flows as an almost exclusive consequence of the wars that surround us. Instead, we must not ask ourselves whether it is a matter of a wider phenomenon linked to the demographic trends in progress? UN estimates tell us that we must expect migratory flows to continue for a long time with the increase in Africa's population which will continue to show exponential growth. We must then ask ourselves whether it is true that in the future, with the development of the poorest countries, migratory flows will decrease.
POVERTY AND MIGRATION FLOWS
Estimates, albeit within the limits of statistical modeling, say that the countries in the world with a per capita income below 6000 - 8000 dollars (the level, to be clear, of Algeria and Albania), while becoming richer, they will not reduce their contribution to emigration. An immediate implication of this prediction is that the decision taken at the recent meeting in Malta to create a Fund of 1.8 billion in favor of the countries of origin of the migrations, certainly useful as development aid, does not represent an effective tool to curb the emigration.
We must, in fact, be prepared to support a sustained flow of emigration, even if the hoped-for increase in per capita GDP occurs and, together, the reduction of the outbreaks represented by wars. What are the consequences in the short and long term of these trends? The OECD estimates that in the short term, with respect to the reception costs, the integration of immigrants into the labor market will allow for a substantial balance of public finances without significant impacts on wages and employment.
The positive effect of immigration on long-term GDP is, in general, seen within the demographic projections on the fall in fertility and on the aging of the EU population. Increased labor supply and higher productivity of the younger immigrant workforce are the main drivers of potential higher growth. To this must be added that the aging trend of the European population it creates a dilemma which, in time, will have to be answered by accepting immigrants or increasing the retirement age to ensure a job offer adequate to the needs of the economic system and not just for reasons of public finance balance.
A POLITICAL ISSUE
Lastly, it must be said that estimates on the positive effects of immigration generally do not take into account a factor which is essential, social inclusion, with respect to the effects on growth. What consequences would there be for growth if the EU ended up leaning towards the orientation expressed by Cameron, of reserving welfare guarantees only for British citizens? We don't know. Just as we don't know what will be the capacity of the EU to go beyond the policy of immigration quotas. With this we return to the starting point: immigration is a theme that has joints of great complexity in which many of the problems of our times accumulate. The answer must be found at the European level with a political commitment equal to the challenge.
