extract ofarticle taken from the new issue of Limes, "Poland Europe without the Euro", on newsstands, in bookstores and on the iPad.
When comparing the Polish economy to other former socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe, the term "miracle" is often used, by virtue of the level of gross domestic product achieved since 1990.
The miraculous aspect is generally attributed to the ability of the Polish ruling groups to introduce market reforms in a more rapid, determined and efficient way than in the other countries of the area. In making this comparison, however, we often forget that another, negative one must be added to the miracle: the level of unemployment, which was also higher (sometimes by a lot) for the whole period than in other countries. Furthermore, in terms of GDP growth, only the period from 1992-93 to the end of the XNUMXs recorded emerging economy levels, while the performance of the XNUMXs is much less impressive.
Even the latest "miracle", the avoidance of the 2007-9 recession, can be attributed to conditions
internationally favorable. In fact, without detracting from the merits of the Polish leadership, the so-called miracle took advantage of an international attitude which, aiming to make Poland a successful example of the exit from socialism, actually supported its growth in various ways.
The great transformation from a planned economy to a market economy began in Poland as early as 1989, even if the chronicles date it back to 1990. The country had experienced first triple and then double-digit inflation, following the sudden liberalization of prices: agricultural ones in 1989, all the others in
1990. Costs of living only began to fall towards the end of the decade. From 1990 to 1992, the economy went into a sharp recession, much longer and deeper than both Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz and the government's top external adviser Jeffrey Sachs predicted. The fall in GDP over the three-year period was estimated at over 20%. When the unforeseen duration of the recession also began to worry the authorities, the recovery of the world cycle was transmitted to Poland, which grew at a sustained pace starting from 1994: investments began to increase from the mid-1990s and unemployment fell significantly, for to go back up again in the second half of the decade, until it exceeded the levels of the 92-XNUMX recession. […]
As known, since the early XNUMXs there has been a considerable transfer of European funds from countries that had previously enjoyed them (especially Italy, Spain and Greece) to Eastern Europe. These funds have played the role of social safety net in the countryside. It was the joint action of the European shock absorbers and the gradual decline in industrial employment that sanctioned the success of a radical socio-political transformation, much more than the praised determination of Minister Balcerowicz in introducing market reforms.
However, there is a negative side of the Polish economy that needs to be highlighted. The sharp rise in exports that drove growth in the XNUMXs was matched by higher growth in imports, due to the onset of hunger for foreign consumer products and investment activity. The net result was a growing trade deficit. […]
The performance of the Polish economy in the XNUMXs is much less "miraculous" than in the XNUMXs. The growth of income, investments, exports and consumption is overall in the average of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Unemployment instead makes Poland a negative exception. […]
But where the Polish performance seems miraculous at first sight was in the reaction to the global crisis of 2007-9. In 2009, the Polish GDP grew by 1,6%, against falls of 6% for Italy and Germany and catastrophic drops for the other Central-Eastern European countries. In fact, Poland's performance was much better than that of other euro area countries. Here investments, exports, employment and GDP collapsed much more than in Poland. Even unemployment, which returned to growth after 2008, was lower than that of its central-eastern neighbors for the first time since 1989.
Having said that, the miracle must be scaled down. There was a drop in investment and employment and GDP growth went from 6% in 2008 to around 1% in 2009. Therefore, the Polish economy was affected by the crisis to a similar extent to the German one, which lost six points of GDP compared to 2008. [...]
One of the most interesting aspects is the bond developed with the German economy and viewed with fear by some. In this regard, a joke circulates in Poland: «I have two pieces of news to give you: one good, the other bad. The good news is that the Germans are coming. The bad news is that the Germans are coming.'
In fifteen years trade between Poland and the Eurozone has doubled and Polish exports to this area have reached 60% of the total, half of which are directed to Germany. […]
In Poland, the relocation has led to non-negligible direct and indirect effects: in addition to the increase
of employment and the growth of professionalism of the local workforce, we have witnessed the birth of small and medium-sized enterprises around the large German factories, to supply the semi-finished products necessary for automotive production. This dependence on German manufacturing causes the Polish economy to be in sync with Germany's business cycle. […]
The years to come will hardly be very positive for the Polish economy, given that European growth will probably remain anemic and it will be difficult for Poland to compensate for the lack of impetus from abroad with domestic demand and European funds.
[...]
Taken from Limes 1/14 “Poland, Europe without the euro” – http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/preview-di-limes-114-polonia-leuropa-senza-euro/56481
